Determinants of hedge fund activism and shareholder gains by Puustinen, Pekka
HELSINKI SCHOOL OF ECONOMICS (HSE) 
Department of Accounting and Finance





кто Finance Master’s thesis Pekka Puustinen 
Spring 2007
and awardedApproved by the Council of the Department
HELSINKI SCHOOL OF ECONOMICS 





DETERMINANTS OF HEDGE FUND ACTIVISM AND SHAREHOLDER GAINS
Objectives The objective of this thesis is to i) examine the determinants of hedge fund 
activism by comparing firms that were targeted by activist hedge funds to those 
that were not, ii) assess the effects of hedge fund activism on shareholder value, 
and iii) investigate the sources of shareholder gains from hedge fund activism by 
analysing a more comprehensive sample from 2000-2006 than concurrent studies 
by Brav et al. (2006) and Klein and Zur (2006). This thesis extends existing 
literature by examining the effects of undervaluation on targeting likelihood, 
cross-sectional variation in CARs over time, and the relations between CARs 
and target firm characteristics. Overall, this thesis enhances the current 
understanding of the activist hedge funds’ role in the market for corporate 
control.
Data The core data consist of a unique hand-collected set of 470 activist hedge fund-
target firm pairs in 2000-2006 identified using Lexis-Nexis and 13D filings at 
SEC EDGAR Filing System. The control sample consists of 18,696 listed firm- 
years that were not targeted. Accounting and return data are from Thomson 
Worldscope and Thomson Datastream, respectively.
Results Activist hedge funds targets have significantly lower Tobin’s q than their 
industry peers and the likelihood of targeting is significantly higher for such 
firms. Firms from low q industries are also more likely to be targeted. This 
evidence supports the view that activist hedge funds target undervalued firms 
and take actions to enhance firm value. Consistent with the free cash flow 
theory, targets are also characterised as having high free cash flow, low growth 
and low insider ownership and such firms are also more likely to be targeted. 
This evidence supports the view that activist hedge funds can limit agency costs. 
Targets underperform the market and control firms, but targeting likelihood is 
not significantly related to pre-targeting stock price performance, indicating that 
activist hedge funds are not motivated by underperformance per se. In addition, 
high market capitalisation deters activist hedge funds.
Hedge fund activism creates shareholder value; CAR for a 101-day period 
surrounding the 13D filing date is 9.23%. CARs have decreased significantly in 
2000-2006 and investors tracking activist hedge fund purchases have not been 
able to make abnormal gains in 2004-2006. CAR is negatively related to pre­
targeting performance and positively related to free cash flow. This evidence 
supports the view that activist hedge funds can discipline underperforming and 
entrenched managers. CAR is negatively related to Tobin’s q supporting the 
view that markets recognise that activist hedge funds are able to spot 
undervalued firms. CAR is also negatively related to insider ownership 
suggesting that insiders deter changes, as well as manage their firms better. 
Overall, the evidence supports the view that activist hedge funds play an 
important role in the market for corporate control and increase shareholder 
value.
Keywords Corporate governance, market for corporate control, hedge fund activism.
Table of contents
1 INTRODUCTION..............................................................................................................................................1
1.1 Background and motivation.............................................................................................................. 1
1.2 Research problem and objectives..................................................................................................... 3
1.3 Contribution and key results........................................................................................................... 4
1.4 Related research.................................................................................................................................. 8
1.5 Definition of key concepts................................................................................................................10
1.6 Structure of the study...................................................................................................................... 12
2 LITERATURE REVIEW............................................................................................................................... 12
2.1 Hedge funds......................................................................................................................................... 12
2.2 Large shareholders and the market for corporate control................................................. 13
2.2.1 The market for corporate control..................................................................................................... 13
2.2.2 Motivation for shareholder activism................................................................................................. 15
2.2.3 Limits of shareholder activism...........................................................................................................16
2.3 Determinants of hedge fund activism........................................................................................... 18
2.3.1 Undervaluation...............................................................................................................................  19
2.3.2 Pre-targeting performance............................................................................................................... 20




2.4 SHAREHOLDER GAINS FROM HEDGE FUND ACTIVISM............................................................................ 30
2.4.1 Competing views about hedge fund activism.....................................................................................30
2.4.2 Empirical evidence............................................................................................................................32
3 HYPOTHESES................................................................................................................................................ 33
3.1 Determinants of hedge fund activism and sources of shareholder gains........................... 33
3.2 Shareholder wealth effects.......................................................................................................... 39
4 DATA AND METHODOLOGY.....................................................................................................................40
4.1 13D FILINGS............................................................................................................................................ 40
4.2 Sample description.............................................................................................................................41
4.2.1 Sample and descriptive statistics....................................................................................................... 41
4.2.2 Activism types....................................................................................................................................44




4.4.1 Multivariate logit model.....................................................................................................................52
4.4.2 Cumulative abnormal returns.......................................................................................................... 53
4.4.3 OLS regression model.......................................................................................................................54
5 RESULTS AND ANALYSIS..........................................................................................................................56
5.1 Determinants of hedge fund activism...........................................................................................56
5.1.1 Univariate analysis............................................................................................................................ 56
5.1.2 Correlations...................................................................................................................................... 61
5.1.3 Multivariate logit regressions.......................................................................................................... 63
5.1.4 Logit regressions for activism type subsamples...............................................................................69
5.2 Shareholder gains.............................................................................................................................76
5.2.1 Cumulative abnormal returns......................................................................................................... 76
5.2.2 Cumulative abnormal returns by year.............................................................................................. 80
5.2.3 Cumulative abnormal returns by activism type................................................................................84
5.3 Sources of shareholder gains........................................................................................................ 87
6 CONCLUSIONS.............................................................................................................................................. 94
6.1 Discussion of central findings.........................................................................................................95





Table I: Hedge fund activism in 2000-2006............................................................................................................ 43
Table 2: Hedge fund activism by Fama-French 48 industry....................................................................................44
Table 3: Hedge ñmd activism types..........................................................................................................................47
Table 4: Hypotheses, variables, and economic theory.............................................................................................55
Table 5: Descriptive statistics and univariate tests................................................................................................... 57
Table 6: Descriptive statistics for activism type subsamples...................................................................................60
Table 7: Pairwise correlations matrix........................................................................................................................62
Table 8: Logit regressions using S&P500 as performance benchmark................................................................... 64
Table 9: Logit regressions using Fama-French 2x3 portfolios as performance benchmark...................................68
Table 10: Logit regressions for activism type subsamples.......................................................................................71
Table 11 : Abnormal returns around 13D filing date................................................................................................77
Table 12: Cumulative abnormal returns by year...................................................................................................... 81
Table 13: Cumulative abnormal returns by activism type (OLS regressions with suppressed constant)...............85
Table 14: Multivariate OLS regressions of cumulative abnormal returns.............................................................. 88
Table 15: Regression coefficients for year dummies from multivariate OLS regression of CARs........................92
Table 16: Regressions coefficients for activism type dummies from multivariate OLS regression of CARs...... 93
Table 17: Summary of findings on determinants of hedge fund activism and sources of shareholder gains..... 101
List of figures
Figure 1 : Cumulative abnormal returns around 13D filing date..............................................................................80
Figure 2: Cumulative abnormal returns for 101-day period around the 13D filing date by year........................... 83
Figure 3: CAR [.50,50], CAR [-20.20], CAR [.2,2] and 13D filing date returns by year.................................................84
Figure 4: Cumulative abnormal returns by activism type........................................................................................87
1 Introduction
1.1 Background and motivation
In recent years the market for corporate control in the U.S. has experienced a dramatic 
increase in shareholder activism by activist hedge funds and old guard corporate raiders such 
as Carl Icahn and Kirk Kerkorian. In 2006 alone, activist hedge funds targeted 125 U.S. 
companies with a total market capitalisation of almost $200 billion1 pushing for changes in 
corporate policies in an attempt to increase shareholder value. Similar to the hostile raiders of 
the 1980s, activist hedge funds buy large minority stakes in public companies pressuring 
managers to change strategies, pay out excess cash, and divest assets. Sometimes they call for 
the sale of the entire firm, demand leveraged recaps, oppose mergers and acquisitions, and 
demand resignation of underperforming managers. Activist hedge funds accomplish these 
objectives by engaging in dialogue with management. At the extreme end, they initiate 
adverse publicity emphasising weak financial performance and the shortfalls of target firm 
managers, launch proxy fights for board seats, and even threaten to take over firms that they 
perceive as destroying shareholder value.
Hedge fund activism has received a great deal of attention in the financial press. Carl Icahn’s 
campaigns to break-up Time-Warner and demand Kerr-McGee to initiate $4 billion share 
repurchase and asset disposal program, Kirk Kerkorian’s efforts to turn around General 
Motors, and campaigns by lesser-know activist hedge funds including Private Capital 
Management’s push to get Knight-Ridder consider selling itself and SAC Capital Partners’ 
attempt to block the acquisition of Phelps Dodge by Freeport-McRoRan, have all been widely 
publicised as well as criticised in the business media. Whether hedge fund activism creates 
value and what motivates hedge funds to engage in activism has been subject to considerable 
debate. Nevertheless, the market is starting to recognise the increasingly important role hedge 
funds play in the market for corporate control. In response, the Securities and Exchange 
Commission (SEC) is currently considering revisiting rules of shareholder access to proxies in 
alarm that hedge funds might become too powerful. Moreover, activist hedge funds are being
1 Calculation based on NYSE, AMEX, and NASDAQ listed firms that were subject to 13D filings by activist 
hedge funds in 2006 and whose market capitalisation was available in Thomson Worldscope. In reality, the 
number of hedge fund activism events is significantly higher.
2
characterised as the “new barbarians at the gate” by the financial press analogous to the 
private equity groups who transformed corporate America in 1980s.
In theory, the market for corporate control moderates the degree to which managers can 
pursue their own interests at the shareholders’ expense. A commonly suggested mechanism to 
discipline managers who fail to maximise shareholder value is takeovers (Manne 1965, 
Jensen and Ruback 1983). However, large shareholders can also perform this disciplinary 
role. This discipline can take several forms, including taking the firm over or threatening to 
do so, putting it in play, mounting a proxy contest, jawboning, and initiating adverse publicity 
(Shleifer and Vishny 1986, Butz 1994). Such actions may pressure managers to change firm 
policies which should, on average, lead to improvements in firm performance and shareholder 
value.
A great deal of empirical evidence supports the idea that takeovers discipline poorly 
performing and entrenched managers. The most important point is that takeovers typically 
increase the combined value of the target and acquiring firms, indicating that profits are 
expected to increase afterwards (Jensen and Ruback 1983). Takeover targets typically 
experience below average pre-targeting stock price performance (Palepu 1986, More к et al. 
1989) indicating that their managers are not able to maximise shareholder value. In addition, 
LBO targets often have high cash flows and low growth opportunities (Lehn and Poulsen 
1989, Opier and Titman 1993) indicating that they are suffering from agency problems arising 
from free cash flow as described in Jensen (1986). Moreover, takeover targets are commonly 
characterised as having low Tobin’s q values (Palepu 1986, Hasbrouck 1985, Servaes 1991, 
Powell 1997), indicating that they are undervalued. Ang and Chen (2006) further show that 
takeover targets not just have low Tobin’s q but are also undervalued compared to their 
industry peers.
A significant body of empirical research is also dedicated to examining the role of activist 
shareholders in the market for corporate control. Holderness and Sheehan (1985) show that 
block share purchases by corporate raiders in the 1980s were associated with increases in 
shareholder value. Ikenberry and Lakonishok (1993) and Faleye (2004) show that proxy 
fights also generate shareholder wealth. However, the fact that shareholder activism by 
institutional investors such as CalPERS in the 1990s has not improved target firm 
performance, has raised doubts about the efficacy of large shareholders in disciplining 
underperforming managers (see, e.g. Karpoff 1998, Gillan and Starks 1998). A plethora of
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empirical studies focuses on the type of firms that are targeted by dissident shareholders. 
Bethel et al. (1998) show that activist investors in the 1980s targeted excessively diversified 
firms in hope to reap profits by breaking them up. Faleye (2004) shows that proxy contest 
firms hold too much cash, and concludes that proxy fights can thus reduce the agency 
problems related to excess cash flow. Furthermore, the targets of activist pension and mutual 
funds are often poor performers (see, e.g. Smith 1996, Wahal 1996), indicating that active 
shareholders can discipline poorly performing managers.
Even though other mechanisms in the market for corporate control are extensively studied in 
economics literature, empirical research on the role of activist hedge funds in disciplining 
underperforming and entrenched managers is virtually nonexistent. Although today’s hedge 
fund activism bears resemblance to the activity of corporate raiders and private equity groups 
in the 1980s, as well as to shareholder activism by institutional investors in the 1990s, it is 
turning out to be quite different from traditional control mechanisms. This thesis along with 
concurrent work by Brav et al. (2006) and Klein and Zur (2006) are the first attempts to 
examine the role activist hedge funds play in the market for corporate control.
1.2 Research problem and objectives
The objective of this thesis is to empirically examine 470 activist hedge fund-target firm pairs 
between 2000 and 2006 to answer the following questions:
1. What types of firms do activist hedge funds target and what motivates hedge funds to 
engage in activism?;
2. Does hedge fund activism create shareholder value?; and
3. What are the sources of shareholder gains from hedge fund activism?
In an attempt to shed light on the first question, I examine the determinants of hedge fund 
activism by comparing characteristics of the 470 U.S firms that were targeted by activist 
hedge funds to 18,696 control firm-years that were not using univariate tests and multivariate 
logistic regressions. These characteristics are chosen by resorting to underlying theories 
behind other corporate control events such as hostile takeovers, LBOs, and proxy fights. 
Specifically, I examine whether target firms show signs of undervaluation, agency problems, 
and underperformance when compared to control firms and how these affect the likelihood of 
hedge fund activism. Empirical analysis of target firm characteristics helps to explain why 
some firms are targeted by activist hedge fund while others are not. I also document
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significant heterogeneity across activist hedge fund objectives at target firms. Given this 
heterogeneity in agendas, I further investigate the extent to which the determinants of 
activism differ conditioned to type of objectives set forth in the 13D filing.
The second objective is to examine whether hedge fund activism creates shareholder value by 
analysing CARs surrounding the 13D filing date2. If the changes engendered by activist 
hedge funds increase shareholder value, then hedge fund activist should be associated with 
significantly positive CARs. In addition, as the number targets and the number of activist 
hedge funds has increased significantly between 2000 and 2006,1 examine the hypothesis that 
increased competition of fewer attractive targets results to diminishing returns over time. 
Furthermore, I examine the cross-section of CARs between different hedge fund agendas such 
as demanding sale of the target or changes in capital structure.
The third objective is to examine the relations between CARs and firm characteristics using 
multivariate OLS regression analysis. In addition to explaining variation in the likelihood of 
targeting, firm characteristics should explain the cross-sectional variation in shareholder gains 
from hedge fund activism. If an important source of shareholder gains from hedge fund 
activism is the mitigation of agency problems or disciplining underperforming managers, 
CARs associated with hedge fund activism should be directly related to the severity of agency 
problems or the magnitude of underperformance. I also examine the effects of targeting year 
and activism type on CARs in a multivariate setting.
1.3 Contribution and key results
Due to the nascent nature of hedge fund activism, the literature examining this phenomenon is 
virtually nonexistent. Along with this thesis, concurrent work by Brav et al. (2006) and Klein 
and Zur (2006) are the first attempts to examine the differences between activist hedge fund 
targets and nontargets and the shareholder wealth effects associated with hedge fund activism. 
Brav et al. (2006) compare 374 targets in 2004-2005 to size and market/book matched control 
firms and find that targets have lower Tobin’s q values, have higher cash flows, spend less on 
R&D, and tend to be smaller than comparable firms. Brav et al. (2006) also show that targets
2 The 13D filing date is the first time the markets become aware of the activist hedge funds’ efforts. In fact, 
activist hedge have strong incentives not to announce their agendas before they are required to file the 
Schedule 13D because that would only exacerbate the free-rider problem of Grossmann and Hart (1980). 
Therefore, it is plausible to assume that the 13D filing date is indeed the first time the investing public learns 
about hedge fund activism.
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earn a mean CAR of 6.8% during a 41-day period around the 13D filing date. Klein and Zur 
(2006) add to the literature by examining the determinants of 140 hedge fund activism events 
in 2003-2005. Using a size and market/book matched control sample, they find that 
likelihood of hedge fund activism increases with return on assets and cash holdings and 
decreases with Altman’s Z-score. They also show that hedge fund activism is associated with 
10.3% geometrically compounded size-adjusted returns during a 61-day period around the 
13D filing date3.
This thesis contributes to existing research in numerous ways. First, it provides a more 
comprehensive picture on the type of firms that are targeted by activist hedge funds. Most 
importantly, this thesis extends the work of Brav et al. (2006) and Klein and Zur (2006) by 
examining the hypothesis that hedge funds target undervalued firms using a novel method 
introduced in Ang and Chen (2006) who empirically test the stock market driven acquisitions 
theory of Shleifer and Vishny (2003). Second, this thesis also adds to the understanding of 
motives behind hedge fund activism as it is the first paper to investigate the effects of 
undervaluation on targeting likelihood. In addition, this thesis examines the previously 
unexplored relation between targeting likelihood and variables such as sales growth, market 
capitalisation, insider and institutional ownership. Third, this is the first paper to examine the 
cross-sectional variation in returns from hedge fund activism over time covering a period 
from 2000 to 2006. Fourth, this thesis is the first attempt to examine the relations between 
CARs and target firm characteristics while controlling for cross-sectional variation in returns 
over time and between activism types. This analysis sheds additional light on hedge funds 
motives to engage in activism as well as on the type of firms that are most likely to benefit 
from hedge fund activism. Finally, compared to concurrent studies, the data used in this thesis 
cover a longer period of time from 2000 to 2006 and contain about four times as many hedge 
fund activism events4. The remainder of this section discusses these contributions more 
directly.
3 According to Klein and Zur (2006), geometrically compounded size-adjusted return is “the size-adjusted 
return that an investor would earn by buying and holding the stocks over the holding period". They provide no 
further elaboration on how these returns are calculated.
4 The data used in this thesis consist of 470 hedge fund activism events. By comparison, Brav et al. (2006) 
contain 374 events, but they have all variables available for less than a quarter of target firms. Brav et al. 
(2006) do not report this number. Klein and Zur (2006)’s sample contains 140 events. Brav et al. (2006) and 
Klein and Zur’s (2006) data include firms that are listed not only on NYSE, NASDAQ and AMEX, but also
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The first area of contribution is related to target firm characteristics and how they affect the 
likelihood of hedge fund activism. Following Ang and Chen (2006) I decompose Tobin’s q 
into firm-specific and industry-specific components. The firm-specific component (denoted 
abnormal q in this thesis) is the percentage difference between the firm’s Tobin’s q and the 
median of its industry peers. Ang and Chen (2006) argue that this is a good measure of 
misvaluation as it avoids over/undervaluation that affect whole industries and because it has 
been widely used to proxy market anomalies (see, e.g. Ikenberry et al. 1995, Rau and 
Vermaelen 1998, and Chen and Jindra 2001). The industry-specific component is simply the 
median Tobin’s q of all firms in the target firm’s Fama-French 48 industry.
Using the methodology adapted from Ang and Chen (2006), I find that activist hedge fund 
targets have significantly lower Tobin’s q values compared to their industry peers (that is, 
they have lower abnormal q) and the likelihood of targeting is significantly higher for such 
firms. Firms from low q industries are also more likely to be targeted. This evidence supports 
the view that activist hedge funds target undervalued firms and take actions to reverse the 
undervaluation. This finding contributes to existing research as it shows that undervaluation, 
as measured by abnormal q, is a key determinant of hedge fund activism. Klein and Zur 
(2006) do not examine the effects of Tobin’s q on targeting probability because their control 
group consists of size and market/book matched firms. Moreover, although Brav et al. (2006) 
find that targets have lower Tobin’s q, they only perform univariate analysis and are thus not 
able to draw conclusions about the effects of Tobin’s q on targeting probability. This evidence 
is in line with Ang and Chen (2006) and Rhodes-Kropf et al. (2005) who find that firms with 
low q values compared to industry peers are more likely to be subject to cash tender offers.
Consistent with Jensen’s (1986) free cash flow theory, targets are also characterised as 
having high free cash flow, low growth and low insider ownership and such firms are also 
more likely to be targeted. This evidence supports the view that activist hedge funds are 
motivated by the potential of limiting agency problems in U.S corporations. This is consistent 
with Klein and Zur (2006), with the exception that they use return on assets that does not 
account for the managerial discretion in distributing excess cash to shareholders and do not 
include proxies for growth opportunities nor insider ownership in their logistic model. This
on OTC bulletin boards and pink sheets. This thesis only includes target firms listed in major exchanges to 
avoid the problem that results could be driven by small firms in minor exchanges.
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evidence is also consistent with evidence from LBOs (see, e.g. Lehn and Poulsen 1989, Opier 
and Titman 1993), suggesting that the driving forces behind hedge fund activism and LBOs 
are, at least to some extent, similar. A major difference, however, is that high insider 
ownership deters activism, which is consistent with insider ownership deterring changes in 
corporate control as well as with insiders completing such changes. These results regarding 
insider ownership are in line with empirical evidence from hostile takeovers (McConnel and 
Servaes 1991), proxy fights (Faleye 2004) and block share purchases (Bethel et al. 1998).
In contrast to concurrent papers, I show that targets underperform the market and control 
firms prior to targeting5, but targeting likelihood is not significantly related to pre-targeting 
performance indicating that activist hedge funds are not motivated by underperformance per 
se. This suggests that pre-targeting performance is correlated with undervaluation or agency 
problems, which appear to play a more important role in target selection. This result is in line 
with Karpoff et al. (1996) who show that even though firms receiving shareholder proposals 
underperform the market, pre-targeting performance does not affect targeting likelihood after 
controlling for other variables. Faleye (2004) examines the determinants of proxy fights in 
1988-2000 and reports similar results.
Finally, in line with Brav et al. (2006), I show that activist hedge fund targets are smaller 
firms compared to control firms when measured with market capitalisation supporting the 
view that hedge funds are wealth constrained and that 5% stakes in larger targets introduce 
too much idiosyncratic risk on their portfolios. This thesis contributes to existing literature by 
showing that high market capitalisation decreases the likelihood of targeting as well. This 
result is consistent with the evidence that size deters takeovers (Palepu 1986, Ambrose and 
Megginson 1992).
The second area of contribution relates to shareholder gains from hedge fund activism. In line 
with concurrent papers, I find that hedge fund activism creates shareholder value; CAR for a 
101-day period surrounding the 13D filing date is 9.23%. However, mean CAR is somewhat 
higher than the 6.8% documented by Brav et al. (2006)6. This is because the CARs have 
decreased significantly between 2000 and 2006. The cumulative abnormal returns over the
5 Control sample consists of all NYSE, NASDAQ, and AMEX firms. Both the S&P500 and returns on Fama 
French 2*3 size and market/book portfolios are used as performance benchmarks. The latter benchmark 
controls for market/book effects.
6 When I calculate returns over a 41-day period, CARs of 8.1% is still higher than in Brav et al. (2006).
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101-day event window are statistically significantly higher in 2000 (19.27%), 2001 (24.25%), 
and 2003 (22.83%) than in 2002 (5.80%), 2004 (4.33%), 2005 (7.84%), and 2006 (2.59%). 
The result is in line with the hypothesis that increased competition of fewer attractive targets 
and the fact that markets increasingly anticipate hedge fund activism will result in declining 
returns over time. This is also consistent with the finding of Bradley et al. (2006) that closed- 
end fund discount shrinks in anticipation of the open-ending attempts from hedge funds. As 
returns have declined, investors tracking activist hedge fund purchases (that is, buying shares 
in target companies after the 13D filing date and holding the shares for 50 days) have not 
been able to make abnormal gains in 2004-2006. In contrast, this strategy has yielded 
significant abnormal gains in 2000, 2001, and 2003.
The analysis of relations between CARs and firm characteristics is the third area in which this 
thesis contributes to existing literature. After controlling for cross-sectional variation in 
returns over time and between activism types7, I find that CAR is negatively related to pre­
targeting performance and positively related to free cash flow. This evidence supports the 
view that activist hedge funds can discipline underperforming and entrenched managers. The 
evidence is also in line with Lehn and Poulsen (1989) who find that LBO premium is 
positively related to free cash flow and Faleye (2004) who shows that CARs associated with 
proxy fights are positively related to excess cash. CAR is negatively related to Tobin’s q 
supporting the view that markets recognise that activist hedge funds are able to spot 
undervalued firms. This result is consistent with Lang et al. (1989) and Servaes (1991) who 
document a negative relation between Tobin’s q and gains from takeovers. CAR is also 
negatively related to insider ownership suggesting that insiders deter changes, as well as 
manage their firms better as suggested by Dann and DeAngelo (1988), Stulz (1988), and 
Denis (1990).
1.4 Related research
As mentioned in the previous section, there are two concurrent working papers by Brav et al. 
(2006) and Klein and Zur (2006) that share similarities with this thesis, but also differ from it 
in several important areas other than sample size and period covered . The most important 
difference between this thesis and Brav et al. (2006) is that while the latter paper examines the
7 I find significant differences in returns between activism types. See section 5.2.1 for details.
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differences between activist hedge fund targets and nontargets using univariate tests only, this 
thesis uses both univariate tests and multivariate logit analysis. As a result, this thesis 
provides new evidence not only on the type of firms targeted by activist hedge funds but also 
on the factors that affect targeting likelihood. In other words, this paper examines which 
factors are the most important ones in target selection and is therefore able to draw 
conclusions with regard to the motives of hedge funds to engage in activism. This thesis also 
adds to the work of Brav et al. (2006) by using a decomposition of Tobin’s q into firm and 
industry specific components. Brav et al. (2006) draw strong conclusions about target 
“undervaluation” based on the finding that targets have low Tobin’s q when compared 
matched controls although this result may have various alternative interpretations. Targets 
may just have low growth opportunities or they may come from low q industries, to name a 
few. Using the firm-specific component, I show that targets have low q values compared to 
industry peers.
Klein and Zur’s (2006) working paper is more similar to this study than Brav et al. (2006) as 
is it the first attempt to examine the determinants of hedge fund activism using logistic 
regressions. Compared to this thesis, however, their methodological approach and choice of 
variables are quite different. Most importantly, their control group consists of an equal 
number of industry, size, and market/book matched firms, which has several important 
implications regarding statistical analyses. First, hedge fund activism events are heavily 
overrepresented in their sample as compared to their true population proportion. If this not 
specifically accounted for in parameter estimation, the resulting estimates are, according to 
Palepu (1986), inconsistent and asymptotically biased. 1 account for this issue by using a 
control group that consists of all NYSE, NASDAQ, and AMEX listed firms, which makes the 
proportion of hedge fund activism events extremely close to true population proportion8.
Second, as Klein and Zur (2006) use size and market/book matched control firms, they are not 
able to assess the importance of these variables in target selection whereas this thesis is. In 
fact, as I show, both Tobin’s q and size are extremely important determinants of hedge fund 
activism. I also add several important variables to my logit specification that are not used in 
Klein and Zur (2006). Using free cash flow as defined in Jansen and Kleimeier (2003) instead
8 Discrepancies may arise if the proportion of firms that do not have available data between the hedge fund 
activism sample and control sample are different.
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of return on assets controls for the managerial discretion in distributing cash to shareholders. I 
also include sales growth as a proxy for growth opportunities. Even though Klein and Zur’s 
(2006) market/book matched control sample partly accounts for the differences in growth 
opportunities, I show that sales growth enters the logit model with significance even after the 
inclusion of Tobin’s q. Moreover, Klein and Zur’s (2006) specification does not include 
ownership structure variables, which are not only on theoretical grounds but also from an 
empirical standpoint crucial to understanding the role of activist hedge funds in the market for 
corporate control. Consequently, I include insider ownership, which proxies for severity of 
agency problems, and institutional ownership, which proxies for the presence of large 
shareholders and their role in mitigating the free-rider problem of Grossman and Hart (1980). 
Both variables appear to be significant in predicting hedge fund activism.
Another important difference between Brav et al. (2006) and Klein and Zur’s (2006) papers 
and the current study relates to the cross-sectional differences in abnormal returns from hedge 
fund activism. Perhaps due to their short sample periods and smaller samples, neither Brav et 
al. nor Klein and Zur (2006) examine how CARs from hedge fund activism vary over time. 
As discussed in the previous section, the returns have decreased significantly over time. Brav 
et al. (2006) as well as this thesis also analyse the cross-section of returns according to the 
type of activism and find significant variation in returns. However, unlike concurrent papers, 
this thesis examines the relations between shareholder gains and firm characteristic while 
controlling for cross-sectional differences in returns over time and between activism types and 
finds that firm characteristics have more statistical power in explaining the variation in 
returns. This suggests that the variation in market reaction to announcement of different types 
of activism is arises due to the differences in firms attracting different types of proposals.
1.5 Definition of key concepts
This section defines the main terms and concepts used in this thesis. Although hedge fund 
activism has received a great deal of attention in the financial press, existing academic 
literature does not provide a clear definition of activist hedge funds or hedge fund activism. 
This is not surprising given that there is no generally agreed-upon definition of hedge funds 
themselves. In this thesis, activist hedge funds are hedge funds who announce their intention 
of influencing firm policies or who are known for activist policies in the past. This group also 
includes a number of well-known “raiders” such as Carl Icahn and Kirk Kerkorian but does 
not include pension or mutual funds, such as CalPERS, that are also known for activist
policies. Mutual and pension funds are excluded because their organisational structure, 
motives, and incentives to engage in activism differ markedly from those of hedge funds.
1 define hedge fund activism as an event where an activist hedge fund acquires at least 5% of a 
firm’s outstanding equity with the intention of influencing firm policies. More specifically, 
Section 13D of the Exchange Act of 1934, passed by U.S. Congress to regulate the method 
and timing of tender offers, requires anyone who acquires more than 5% of a public 
company’s outstanding shares with the intention of influencing firm policies9 to file a 
Schedule 13D, a disclosure document, with the SEC within ten days of surpassing the 5% 
ownership threshold. Among other items, this filing includes the name and background of 
each acquiring individual or of any individuals who control the acquiring corporations. 
Therefore, hedge fund activism is when an activist hedge fund acquires at least 5% of a firm’s 
outstanding equity and subsequently files a Schedule 13D with the SEC. Activist hedge fund 
targets are naturally the firms that are subject to the 13D filings. The term activist hedge fund- 
target firm pair refers to a specific activist hedge fund that is matched to a target firm based 
on the 13D filing by that fund. However, a severe drawback of this definition is that it 
precludes cases where the activist hedge fund stake remains below the 5% threshold. For 
example, Pershing Square Capital Management’s efforts to force McDonald's Corporation to 
restructure its business and sell 65% of its restaurants in 2005 would have been excluded from 
the sample as Pershing’s stake remained below the 5% threshold at 4.5%.
One of the key hypotheses examined in this thesis is the undervaluation hypothesis. This 
thesis defines undervaluation as relative undervaluation and measures it by comparing 
Tobin’s q values of target firms to the median Tobin’s q of their Fama-French 48 industry 
peers. This method uses the product of the individual firm’s book value and its industry 
median market/book value as the measure of the firm’s fair value. Consequently, firms with 
lower Tobin’s q than their industry peers are considered as being undervalued and can be 
considered as “cheap buys”. The relative undervaluation comparison removes the effects that
9 in particular, these include events that would result in: a) the acquisition of additional securities or disposal of 
securities of the issuer; b) a merger, reorganization, liquidation involving the issuer or any of its subsidiaries; 
c) material disposals of issuer’s assets; d) change in present board of directors or management; e) change in 
capitalisation or dividend policy; f) any other material change in the issuer’s business or corporate structure; g) 
changes in the firm’s charter or bylaws; h) delisting of issuer’s shares; i) any class of equity security eligible 
for termination of registration; or j) any action similar to any of those enumerated above.
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are time period or industry specific, and thus helps to put the magnitude of undervaluation in 
perspective.
1.6 Structure of the study
The remainder of this thesis is organised as follows. Section 2 provides a review of the most 
relevant theoretical and empirical research on the topic. Section 3 presents the hypotheses and 
Section 4 discusses the data. Section 5 presents the empirical results. Finally, Section 6 
reviews central findings and concludes.
2 Literature review
This section reviews the most relevant theoretical and empirical research in the area of hedge 
fund activism. Section 2.1 briefly describes the unique characteristics of hedge funds. Section
2.2 reviews the theoretical literature on large shareholders’ role in the market for corporate 
control. Section 2.3 discusses various theories that can be used to explain motives behind 
hedge fund activism and corresponding empirical evidence. Finally, Section 2.4 presents 
competing views about the effects of hedge fund activism on shareholder value and discusses 
related empirical findings.
2.1 Hedge funds
Hedge funds have been in existence for over 50 years. However, their recent growth has 
increased their prominence in all corners of capital markets and in the financial press. Since 
the beginning of 1990s, the number of hedge funds has risen by 20 percent per year. The rate 
of growth has been even more dramatic in assets under hedge funds’ management. In 1990 
slightly more than 500 hedge funds managed less than $40 billion in assets. In the end of 
2004, there were more than 5000 hedge funds managing a total of nearly $900 billion10 
implying and average size of $160 million. Though the number and size of hedge funds are 
small relative to mutual funds, their growth reflects their increasing power in the capital 
markets. The increased competition between hedge funds has driven down returns on 
traditional hedge fund strategies such as convertible arbitrage and some hedge funds are 
looking to shareholder activism as an additional strategy.
10 Statistics on hedge fund growth appear in the HFR Industry Report - Year End 2004, produced by Hedge 
Fund Research, Inc.
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Ackermann et al. (1999) outline five features that generally characterise hedge funds. These 
features include i) a largely unregulated organisation structure, ii) flexible investment 
strategies, iii) relatively sophisticated investors, iv) substantial managerial investment, and v) 
strong managerial incentives, and are briefly described in the following two paragraphs.
According to Ackermann et al. (1999), U.S. hedge funds are largely unregulated because they 
are typically limited partnerships with fewer than 100 investors who are institutions or very 
high net worth individuals, which exempt them from the Investment Company Act of 1940. 
The limited regulations that can be applied to hedge funds allow them to be extremely flexible 
in their investment strategies. Hedge funds can use short selling, high leverage, derivatives, 
and highly concentrated investment positions to enhance returns and reduce systematic risk. 
Ackermann et al. (1999) note that hedge funds attract mainly institutional investors and 
wealthy individuals, with minimum investments typically ranging from $250,000 to $1 
million. Additionally, hedge funds often limit an investors’ liquidity with lock-up periods of 
one to three years. This allows hedge funds to tap more illiquid market than traditional mutual 
funds.
Hedge funds are also characterised by strong performance related incentives. Ackermann et 
al. (1999) show that, on average, hedge fund manager receives a one percent annual 
management fee and 14 percent of the annual profits. Although incentive fees could lead to 
excessive risk taking under some conditions, the fact that hedge fund managers often invest a 
substantial amount of their own money in the fund mitigates these problems. Furthermore, 
Ackermann et al. (1999) note that managers of U.S. hedge funds are general partners, so they 
may incur substantial legal liability if the fund goes bankrupt. As pointed out by Ackermann 
et al. (1999), the structure and characteristics of hedge funds closely resembles that of venture 
capital and private equity funds that tend to be limited partnerships with strong incentive fees. 
In this sense, it is not surprising to observe that activist hedge funds are increasingly behaving 
like private equity firms, but in the public markets.
2.2 Large shareholders and the market for corporate control
2.2.1 The market for corporate control
The separation of ownership and control documented by Berle and Means (1932) creates 
substantial conflicts of interests, or agency problems, between managers and shareholders. 
Agency theory, analysis of such conflicts, is now a major part of the economics literature.
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Economists have identified numerous ways in which managers may engage in non-value 
maximising behaviour. For example, it can include insufficient effort (Jensen and Meckling 
1976), sheer incompetence (Jensen 1988), excessive growth or diversification (Jensen 1986), 
entrenching investments (Shleifer and Vishny 1989), consumption of excessive perks (Jensen 
and Meckling 1976), or outright illegal activities such as thievery (Shleifer and Vishny 1997). 
There is a considerable amount of theoretical and empirical evidence of agency costs and the 
prevalence of non-value maximising or even value destructive managerial behaviour that does 
not serve the interests of shareholders (see, e.g. Shleifer and Vishny 1997).
The range of non-value maximising behaviour on the part of managers is wide and can be 
very expensive to shareholders. It ensues that reducing the possibility of managers to engage 
in such behaviour can have substantial positive effects on firm value. Economists have 
identified various mechanisms that alleviate insider moral hazard and help align managers’ 
interests with those of shareholders. These can be divided into internal and external control 
mechanisms. Internal mechanisms include managerial incentives (Jensen and Murphy 1990), 
bonding activities (Jensen and Meckling 1976), monitoring by the board of directors (Fama 
and Jensen, 1983), and product-market competition (Hart 1983).
However, these internal mechanisms often fail, or they are too slow, costly and clumsy to 
bring about the required changes. To begin with, Jensen and Murphy (1990) show there is an 
insufficient link between executive pay and performance. In addition, Jensen (1993) shows 
that management is often reluctant to assume debt so as to bond their promise to pay out free 
cash flow. Moreover, Morck et al. (1989) show that the board is only partly effective in 
disciplining poorly performing managers. Furthermore, Shleifer and Vishny (1997) argue that 
the effects of product-market competition on management behaviour materialise painfully 
slow as illustrated by the crisis of the U.S. automobile manufacturing industry. Finally, Jensen 
(1986) argues product-market competition is markedly weaker in new activities which 
generate substantial free cash flow. In such instances where the internal controls fail, 
investors rely on external control mechanisms - that is, the market for corporate control - to 
redirect management toward value maximising behaviour or otherwise replace the incumbent 
management team.
The market for corporate control moderates the degree to which managers can pursue their 
own interests at the shareholders’ expense. A commonly suggested mechanism to discipline 
managers who fail to maximise shareholder value is takeovers (Manne 1965, Jensen and
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Ruback 1983). However, Shleifer and Vishny (1986) argue that large shareholders can also 
perform this disciplinary role. Next section will discuss large shareholder’s disciplinary role 
more thoroughly by reviewing the most important theoretical work related to the topic.
2.2.2 Motivation for shareholder activism
Before analysing the incentives of large shareholder to monitor managers and engage in 
activism, it is useful to distinguish between three choices they face when they are not satisfied 
with managerial performance. First, they can “vote with their feet’’ and follow the so called 
“Wall Street Walk” and sell their shares. Second, they can hold on to their shares and do 
nothing. Third, they can hold their shares and voice their dissatisfaction, that is, engage in 
shareholder activism. The generic distinction between these alternatives: exit, loyalty, and 
voice, was first introduces by Hirschman (1970). However, Tiróle (2006) point out that there 
is also a fourth alternative: entry, which may be desirable because the incumbent shareholder 
may be ineffective or in the case where the entrant has obtained favourable information that 
the target company is, for example, undervalued. Not surprisingly, rational shareholders will 
become “active” (voice or entry) if the expected benefits exceed the expected costs of 
activism.
Economists widely agree that the involvement of large shareholders in monitoring and 
shareholder activism has the potential to limit nonvalue maximising behaviour on the part of 
managers and create shareholder value. However, shareholder activism is costly, undermining 
large shareholders’ incentives engage in such activity. Shleifer and Vishny (1986) is the first 
paper to formally address large shareholders’ role in disciplining managers through takeovers, 
proxy fights and informal negotiations with managers (“jawboning”). They argue due to the 
free-rider problem described in Grossman and Hart (1980) there will be too little monitoring 
and that potential monitors with small initial holdings never find it profitable to intervene with 
management. Furthermore, they argue that these impediments make a large shareholder a 
necessary condition for value-increasing takeovers to occur at all as they make takeovers less 
costly and more likely to be successful. As subsequent theoretical research shows, these 
arguments do not always hold. Butz (1994) shows that merely threatening to take over or 
initiating adverse publicity, large shareholder can pressure managers to adopt value increasing 
policies. In order to keep their positions, managers have an incentive to adopt a fraction of the 
improvements that pre-empts the takeover.
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Furthermore, in contrast to Shleifer and Vishny (1986), Admati et al. (1994) show that even 
investors with zero initial holdings have an incentive to increase their stake and engage in 
monitoring activities. Admati et al. (1994) also point out that large shareholders can obtain 
private information as a by-product of monitoring and realise trading gains that partially 
offset the costs associated with the free-rider problem. Similarly, Kyle and Vila (1991) show 
that corporate raiders lacking any initial stake find it profitable to take over in spite of the 
free-rider problem and the lack of presence of large shareholder due to “noise trading”. Maug 
(1998) also analyses the effect of liquidity on large shareholder incentives to intervene and 
posits that higher liquidity mitigates the free-rider problem since large shareholders can 
accumulate larger stakes without a significant price impact. In addition, he shows that the 
more liquid market, the more effective methods such as restructurings are used to correct 
managerial failure. However, Kahn and Winton (1998) point out that market liquidity can also 
undermine large shareholders’ incentives to monitor by giving them incentives to trade on 
private information rather than intervene. Finally, Noe (1997) shows that there is not 
monotonie relationship between the size of the shareholder and incentives to monitor. In fact, 
Noe (1997) suggests that among those investors who choose activism those with the smallest 
holding are the most aggressive.
Not all economists consider activism by large shareholders as purely beneficial. One example 
is Bukart et al. (1997) arguing that constraints on managers through monitoring may also be 
costly precisely because managerial discretion comes with many benefits. Specifically, even 
if managerial discretion is ex post detrimental to shareholders, it can be beneficial ex ante as it 
favours noncontractible investments, like searching for new investment projects. Bukart et al. 
(1997) posit that managers are less inclined to show such initiative when shareholders are 
likely to intervene. Hence, to the extent that managerial initiative contributes to firm value, 
there is a trade-off between the gains from monitoring and those from managerial initiative.
2.2.3 Limits of shareholder activism
For all its benefits, shareholder activism encounters a number of limitations that make 
monitoring less effective or undermine the large shareholder’s incentives to engage in 
activism. Tiróle (2006) provides an excellent review of the literature that relates to these 
limitations and groups them into four categories that are outline below. However, the unique 
organisational structure of hedge funds at least partly mitigates these issues.
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Agency problems
First, activist investors face substantial agency problems themselves. As pointed out by Tiróle 
(2006), institutional investors such as pension and mutual funds have a dispersed ownership 
structure with no large shareholders wielding control over management. The negative effects 
are augmented by the fact that there are very few mechanisms that mitigate agency problems 
within the funds themselves (Coffee 1991). Indeed, the Investment Company Act of 1940 
imposed restrictions on mutual fund fees that resulted in a compensation structure where fees 
are based on assets under management rather than investment performance decreasing fund 
manager’s incentives to act in the best interest of their shareholders or beneficiaries. Coffee 
(1991) also notes that most U.S. money managers have no debt and face no threat of hostile 
takeovers or proxy fights and therefore face less pressure to comply with shareholder value 
maximising policies.
As pointed out in Section 2.1., the organisational structure of hedge funds is markedly 
different from that of traditional institutional investors. For example, hedge funds are not only 
exempt from the restrictions of the Investment Company Act of 1940, but also have 
compensation structures that are more sensitive to actual performance. Hedge fund managers’ 
incentives are further strengthened by the fact that they typically retain large stake in the 
funds they manage. This greatly reduces the potential for agency problems within hedge 
funds.
Undermonitoring, collusion and private bene fits of control
Tiróle (2006) suggests that because active investors do not internalise the welfare of other 
investors, their incentives to monitor managers may be distinctly weaker. This obviously 
results in less than the first-best level of monitoring. Tiróle (2006) also suggests that it may 
give rise to collusion with management. For example, mutual fund managers have an 
incentive to support management as they might seek to manage their pensions. Additionally, 
Tiróle (2006) points out that large shareholders may extract private benefits of control 
through affiliated transactions such as selling assets to companies they own at below market 
prices.
Cost of providing incentives
According to Tiróle (2006), the third set of limitations relate to the costs of providing proper 
incentives to monitor managers. Coffee (1991) and Bhide (1993) argue that only '‘long-term
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players” are good monitors. The basic idea in these studies is that investors have little 
incentive to engage in activism if they can easily sell their shares at a fair price. This cut-and- 
run behaviour has been labelled by economists and finance practitioners as the “Wall Street 
Walk”. These authors further argue that illiquidity in the form of privately held equity, capital 
gains tax, and letter stocks would enhance the quality of monitoring, but consider it as 
extremely costly from the perspective of mutual funds that face continuous redemptions. 
Because hedge funds often limit an investors’ liquidity with lock-up periods of one to three 
years they obviously have greater incentives to monitor firm performance.
Regulatory obstacles
Fourth, would-be activist investors face substantial legal and regulatory obstacles that 
discourage them from activism. Roe (1991), Coffee (1991), and Bhide (1993) offer various 
examples of legal, fiscal, and regulatory impediments to investors that discourage efficient 
governance in the form of shareholder activism. For example, large investors who are deemed 
to be in “control” face severe trading restrictions; Section 16(b) of the Securities Exchange 
Act of 1934 stipulates that any gain that an officer, director, or 10% holder of a security 
receives on purchases or sales of the security within six months or an earlier purchase or sale 
must be paid back to the company. Tiróle (2006) argues that these restrictions create 
illiquidity and are especially costly for mutual funds that face redemptions on a continuous 
basis and must therefore be able to sell easily. Another potential source of discouragement 
presented in Tiróle (2006) is the diversification rule. In order to receive favourable tax 
treatment as a diversified fund, pension or mutual fund cannot hold more than 10% of any 
firm’s equity nor can 5% of the fund’s assets be invested in any one security. Again, hedge 
funds are largely exempt from these regulations. They face no diversification rules and can 
therefore hold large positions in any firms without considerable tax consequences.
2.3 Determinants of hedge fund activism
As discussed in Section 2.2, rational shareholder will become active is the expected benefits 
exceed the expected costs of activism. This section describes most prominent theories that 
explain why activist hedge funds are more likely to target some firms and not others and why 
such events are likely to create shareholder value. A bulk of these theories comes from the 
takeover literature but they can also be used to develop hypotheses about which firms are 
more likely to be targeted by activist hedge funds.
19
2.3.1 Undervaluation
Activist hedge funds commonly cite that target undervaluation is a key motive driving their 
investment decisions. This explanation of hedge fund activism also appears frequently in the 
financial press. However, theoretical foundations for the undervaluation hypothesis are not as 
strong as it is empirically difficult to tell apart between undervaluation and other motives for 
taking over companies such as underperformance. However, economists frequently argue that 
undervaluation is an important motive for taking over companies (see, e.g. Palepu 1986, 
Holderness and Sheehan 1985, Powell 1997).
The superior security analysis hypothesis presented by Holderness and Sheehan (1985) 
suggests that corporate raiders in the 1980s were systematically able to purchase undervalued 
stock. Holderness and Sheehan argue that these stock purchases can be based on either non­
public information about target firms possessed by the raiders or on superior analysis skills 
that raiders have in interpreting publicly available information about target firms. This 
hypothesis is consistent with the theoretical analysis of Admati et al. (1994) who suggest that 
large shareholder who closely monitor firm performance are able to obtain private 
information as a by-product of monitoring and make trading gains on such information. If the 
markets are aware that some type of investors can exploit private information, then this 
hypothesis should also explain why the market prices increase upon announcement of block 
purchases.
Empirical research into the link between undervaluation and the likelihood of corporate 
control events suffers greatly from alternative interpretations of variables that have been used 
to measure undervaluation. For example, Palepu (1986), Hasbrouck (1985), and Powell 
(1997) use Tobin’s q as a measure of undervaluation. On the other hand, Opier and Titman 
(1993) and others use Tobin’s q as a measure of growth opportunities. Third, Lang and Stulz, 
(1994) and Servaes (1991) use Tobin’s q as a proxy for managerial performance. All of the 
above mentioned studies find a negative relation between takeover probability and Tobin’s q, 
but differ greatly in their conclusions.
A partial solution to his problem can be found in Ang and Chen (2006) who decompose 
Tobin’s q into firm-specific and industry-specific components. The purpose of Ang and 
Chen’s (2006) paper is to empirically test the stock market driven acquisitions theory of 
Shleifer and Vishny (2003) according to which managers are able to spot valuation errors in 
their company’s as well as potential target’s share price and exploit this information by
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undertaking acquisitions of relatively (absolutely) undervalued firms using stock (cash). 
Using the firm-specific component, Ang and Chen (2006) can make interpretations about 
target undervaluation that are not so easily mixed with alternative explanations and mitigate 
the “high water raises all boats” phenomenon because the firm-specific component is clean 
from industry-wide valuation errors. Using this methodology, Ang and Chen (2006) find that 
acquisition targets are significantly undervalued compared to their industry peers when cash is 
used as a method of payments. Rhodes-Kropf et al. (2005) perform similar analysis and find 
comparable results.
With regard to hedge fund activism, Brav et al. (2006) find that target firms have lower 
Tobin’s q values than industry and size matched controls. They do not examine whether 
Tobin’s q affects targeting likelihood but suggest that this indicates that activist hedge funds 
seek undervalued targets. Klein and Zur (2006) do not test differences in Tobin’s q as their 
control group consists of market/book matched firms.
2.3.2 Pre-targeting performance
A substantial amount of academic literature in the area of market for corporate control notes 
the importance of target share price performance in predicting corporate control contests, such 
as takeovers, proxy fights, and shareholder activism. Theoretical foundations for this 
inefficient management hypothesis are laid out in Manne (1965). A wide body of empirical 
research supports the premise that poor stock price performance increases the likelihood of 
corporate control contests and replacement of inefficient managers.
The initial theoretical work that recognised the role of takeovers and proxy fights in 
disciplining poorly performing managers is Manne (1965). He argues that the market for 
corporate control mitigates problems arising from the separation of ownership and control 
documented by Berle and Means (1932). A fundamental premise behind Manne’s (1965) 
argument is the existence of a high positive correlation between managerial efficiency and the 
share price performance of that firm. Therefore, if a firm is suffering from severe agency 
problems or is just poorly managed, then the market price of the firm’s shares will decline 
relative to other companies in the same industry or relative to the market as a whole. 
According to Manne (1965), this phenomenon has a dual importance for the market for 
corporate control. In the first place, low share price facilitates competition of managerial 
positions. More importantly, low share price does not just measure managerial efficiency, but 
also potential gains that could be realised under efficient management. Thus, Manne (1965)
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concludes that the lower the share price, relative to what it could be under more efficient 
management, the more attractive takeover becomes to those who believe that they can manage 
the firm more efficiently.
Palepu (1986) is on of the first papers that documents an inverse relation between takeover 
probability and share price performance. Palepu (1986) measures performance using both 
excess returns and return on equity averaged over a period of four years prior to the takeover 
bid. He further notes that excess returns is probably a better proxy for performance as it 
measures both current and expected performance. Morck et al. (1989) confirm Palepu’s 
(1986) results and find that the likelihood of hostile takeovers decreases with share price 
performance. Furthermore, they identify separate firm-specific and industry-specific effects 
indicating that while board of directors is effective is disciplining managers of firms that 
clearly underperform their industry, only hostile takeovers do the job when the firm, and its 
industry, are suffering from underperformance. In addition, Martin and McConnel (1991) 
show that firms experiencing post-acquisition top management changes experience 
significantly lower pre-acquisition returns than firms where no management changes took 
place. These findings indicate that the takeover market plays an important role in controlling 
nonvalue maximising behaviour on the part of managers.
While economists examining proxy fight targets widely agree on the fact that target firms 
experience below average accounting performance prior to targeting (see, e.g. DeAngelo 
1988, Ikenberry and Lakonishok 1993, Faleye 2004), the evidence on prior share price 
performance is somewhat mixed. DeAngelo (1988) finds no link between stock price 
performance and the occurrence of proxy fights, which they attribute to the fact that dissident 
shareholder typically cite poor earnings rather than poor share price performance as 
necessitating the proposed hostile management change. However, a later study by Ikenberry 
and Lakonishok (1993) contradicts DeAngelo’s results (1988) and finds that proxy fight 
targets significantly underperform the market prior to proxy contest. However, Faleye (2004) 
finds that even though proxy contest firms underperform the market prior to targeting, the 
effects of share price performance on targeting probability do not endure in a multivariate 
setting.
A substantial body of empirical literature examines firm characteristics associated with 
shareholder activism by institutional investors. Opier and Sokobin (1997), Strickland et al. 
(1996), and Wahal (1996) show that negative returns prior to targeting increase the
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probability of institutional investor activism. On the contrary, Bizjak and Marquette (1998), 
Carleton et al (1998), and Smith (1996) find that prior stock price performance in not 
significantly related to targeting. Furthermore, Karpoff et al. (1996) show that the effects of 
prior returns on targeting probability become insignificant after controlling for other firm 
characteristics. Empirical evidence on accounting measures of performance is more 
conclusive. Opier and Sokobin (1997), Wahal (1996), and Karpoff et al. (1996) all find that 
low return on assets is associated with increased targeting probability.
In addition to this thesis, two concurrent working papers by Brav et al. (2006) and Klein and 
Zur (2006) analyse the characteristics of firms that are targeted by activist hedge funds. Brav 
et al. (2006), analysing a sample of 374 13D filings by activist hedge funds in 2004-2005, 
find that there are no differences between prior share price performance of activist hedge fund 
targets and size and market/book matched control firms. They do not examine determinants of 
hedge fund activism in a multivariate setting as they have data only for one third of their 
sample. Similarly, examining 140 13D filings in 2003-2005, Klein and Zur (2006) find no 
differences in prior performance between activist hedge fund targets and size and 
market/book matched control firms. However, they do find that activist hedge fund targets 
perform significantly better than other firms that were subject to 13D filings. In conclusion, 
the empirical evidence on share price performance and occurrence of hedge fund activism is 
somewhat mixed and suffers from the fact that earlier studies use small samples from short 
periods of time accompanied by different control samples and methodologies in performance 
measurement. However, existing empirical evidence suggests that activist hedge fund targets 
do not experience underperformance prior to targeting.
2.3.3 Free cash flow
Jensen’s (1986) free cash flow theory is one of the most prominent theories that explain why 
firms with substantial cash flow are likely to destroy shareholder and how takeovers can 
mitigate these agency problems. Empirical evidence from takeovers, LBOs, and proxy fights 
has found compelling evidence in support the free cash flow hypothesis of takeovers.
Jensen (1986) lays out the agency issues raised by free cash flow and excess liquidity. As 
argued by Jensen, payout of free cash flow creates major conflicts between managers and 
shareholders and defines free cash flow as cash flow in excess of what is needed to finance all 
positive net present value projects. By definition, such cash should be paid out to the firm’s 
shareholders since the corporation cannot invest it profitably on its behalf. However, payouts
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to shareholders reduce the resources under managers’ control, restricts their ability to pursue 
growth, and increases monitoring from capital markets. Additionally, managers have 
incentives to grow their firms beyond the size that maximises shareholder value because 
growth increases managers’ power and compensation. Moreover, the tendency of firms to 
reward middle managers through promotion rather than year-to-year bonuses also creates an 
organisational bias toward growth to supply the new positions that such promotion-based 
reward systems require. Jensen’s (1986) free cash flow theory explains why managers may 
engage in pet projects, build empires, make dubious acquisitions, and diversify their firms 
excessively when the investment opportunities in their traditional business are low to the 
detriment of shareholders. According to Jensen (1986), agency problems associated with free 
cash flow are especially severe in firms with substantial free cash flow and low growth 
prospects since such firms may suffer from a shortage on positive NPV projects.
Jensen and Meckling (1976) suggest that management can engage in bonding activities that 
eliminate or reduce the potential for agency problems. In the context of excess free cash flow, 
debt creation without the retention of proceeds enables managers to effectively bond their 
promise to payout future cash flows. Such activities include substituting debt and other fixed 
claims for common equity (Masulis 1980, Copeland and Lee 1991), increasing payout to 
shareholder through a stock repurchase or special dividends (Vermaelen 1981, Nohel and 
Tarhan 1998), or taking the firm private in a leveraged buyout (Lehn and Puolsen 1989, Opier 
and Titman 1993). The abnormal returns accompanying these transactions suggest that 
investors recognise the potential for agency problems in the utilisation of cash and reward 
firms whose managers take suitable actions to minimise such problems. Yet, Jensen (1993) 
shows that management is often reluctant to make appropriate changes and do not opt for a 
value maximising leverage level.
Jensen (1986) argues that the free cash flow theory predicts value increasing takeovers occur 
in response to breakdowns of internal control processes in firms with substantial free cash 
flow. Several empirical studies provide support for Jensen’s (1986) theory. Lehn and Poulsen 
(1989) show that LBO probability and associated premiums increase with free cash flow. 
Palepu (1986) finds that takeover probability increases with the combination of low growth, 
high cash holdings, and low leverage. Opier and Titman (1993) support Palepu’s (1986) 
findings by showing that firms with high free cash flow and low Tobin’s q are more likely to 
go private in an LBO. However, some contradicting evidence can be found from research on 
hostile takeovers. For example, Pinkowitz (2002) finds that takeover likelihood decreases
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with cash holdings. Specifically, Pinkowitz (2002) finds that firms that were not targeted hold 
40% more cash than those that were, and the likelihood of receiving hostile bids decreases 
significantly with cash holding. In an earlier paper, Harford (1999) documents a similar 
relation between cash holdings and hostile bids. Both Pinkowitz (2002) and Harford (1999) 
also find that hostile takeover likelihood is decreasing in leverage.
Faleye (2004) analyses the free cash flow hypothesis in the context of proxy fights and 
outlines several reasons why takeovers might fail to discipline firms with excess cash. 
Substantial cash holdings provide firms with many anti-takeover defences. They can make 
share repurchases, which can concentrate voting power in the hands of insiders (Harris and 
Ravis 1988, Stulz 1988) and may increase the costs of a takeover (Bagwell 1991). Cash rich 
firms can also defend themselves by acquiring a competitor of the bidder or by making a 
counter bid for the unwanted bidder (Dann and DeAngelo 1988). Furthermore, Faleye (2004) 
suggests the proxy contest as an effective alternative to takeovers for addressing the agency 
costs arising from free cash flow. He argues that the extra defences a cash rich firm may use 
against a hostile bidder are largely ineffective against dissident shareholders. For example, it 
is obvious that share repurchases cannot discourage a plain proxy fight intended to force 
managers to disgorge excess cash. In the empirical part of his paper, Faleye (2004) finds 
support for this theory by showing that proxy fight targets hold significantly more cash even 
after controlling for growth opportunities, riskiness of cash flow, and other determinants of 
corporate cash holdings. Faleye (2004) also shows that probability of proxy contests is 
significantly increasing in cash holdings.
Existing empirical research into characteristics of firms that attract shareholder proposals 
from active institutional investors provides generally no support for Jensen’s free cash flow 
theory. Opier and Sokobin (1997), Wahal (1996), and Karpoff et al. (1996) all find that low 
return on assets is associated with increased targeting probability. However, Strickland et al. 
(1996) report that return on assets has no effect on targeting probability, but this result can 
probably be attributed to the fact that they study United Shareholder Association’s targets 
only. However, Karpoff et al. (1996), Johnson and Shackell (1997), and Bizjak and 
Marquette (1998), all find that growth in sales is negatively related to shareholder activism, 
suggesting that shareholder activism targets are more susceptible to agency problems even 
though they do not appear to generate substantial free cash flow.
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Examining the characteristics of activist hedge fund targets, Brav et al. (2006) find that they 
have significantly higher cash flows than size and market/book matched control firms. 
However, target firms do not appear to possess lower growth prospects as there are no 
differences in sales growth between them and control firms. This may simply be a 
market/book effect as their choice of control group implicitly controls for cross-sectional 
variation in market/book. Brav et al. (2006) find that target firms hold significantly less cash 
and significantly more debt than control firms. In another paper, Klein and Zur (2006) find no 
differences in profitability between targets and size and market/book matched control firms. 
However, in their multivariate analysis, Klein and Zur find that firms with high return on 
assets are more likely to be targeted by activist hedge funds. They also find that cash holdings 
are positively related to targeting probability. Overall, these results lead the authors to assert 
that rather than targeting poor performers, activist hedge funds target firms with ample cash 
flows and high potential for agency problems
2.3.4 Diversification
One specific cause of poor performance, especially in the 1980s, appears to have been 
excessive diversification. Theoretical work by Jensen (1986) and Shleifer and Vishny (1989) 
present arguments that managers have incentives to excessively diversify their firms to the 
detriment of shareholders. Several pieces of empirical literature show that diversification does 
destroy shareholder value. One implication of diversification discount hypothesis is that 
bidders in takeovers and dissident shareholders have an opportunity to improve performance 
and create shareholder value by increasing focus.
Shleifer and Vishny (1989) argue that substantial agency costs arise from the fact that 
managers can expropriate shareholders by entrenching themselves and staying on the job even 
if they are no longer competent or qualified to run the firm. One specific way managers can 
reduce the probability of replacement is through diversifying acquisitions. Moreover, they 
may overpay for their targets because they can extract more private benefits including salary 
and perquisites through increased entrenchment. This result is especially true for poorly 
performing managers who are most threatened by replacement. One of the most important 
predictions of Shleifer and Vishny (1989) theory is that bust-up takeovers should be 
associated with increased shareholder value.
Jensen’s (1986) free cash flow theory also explains why managers may seek to diversify their 
firms excessively. As explained earlier, firms facing limited growth opportunities and
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substantial free cash flow are more likely to engage in diversifying acquisitions as growth 
prospects in their traditional business are low. Even though these investments are not value 
decreasing per se, they would be more valuable under different management.
The value destruction associated with diversification generates large profit opportunities for 
outsiders who are able to increase corporate focus. For example, potential acquirers have an 
incentive to take over excessively diversified companies and break them up. Additionally, 
dissident shareholder can pressure managers to do the breaking-up themselves. Consistent 
with diversification discount hypothesis of takeovers, Berger and Ofek (1996) find that 
greater value losses from diversification are associated with increased takeover probability, 
even after controlling for other determinants of takeovers. Furthermore, they find that when 
the acquirer is an LBO association, the value losses are significantly greater. Berger and Ofek 
(1996) also show that the greater the value loss associated with diversification, the greater the 
probability of a subsequent break-up. Overall, their results are consistent with the market for 
corporate control targeting and breaking-up firms that would be more valuable on a stand­
alone basis.
Consistent with the hypothesis that dissident shareholder can also mitigate problems arising 
from excessive diversification, Bethel et al. (1998) find that activist investors in the 1980s 
were significantly more likely to purchase blocks of shares in highly diversified firms with 
poor profitability. These block purchases were followed by increases in assets divestitures and 
abnormal share price appreciation. Their evidence supports the view that in addition to 
takeovers, activist shareholders can alleviate problems associated with agency problems and 
excessive diversification.
With regard to hedge fund activism, Brav et al. (2006) find evidence that target firms are 
excessively diversified. Specifically, they compute the Herfindahl-Hirschman index of sales 
in different business segments and find that target firms are more diversified than size and 
market/book matched control firms. However, as they do not perform logistic analysis, Brav 
et al. (2006) do not draw conclusions about the importance of diversification in the target 
selection process.
2.3.5 Ownership structure
Ownership structure has been shown to affect the probability of takeovers, proxy fights, and 
shareholder activism. There are various theories that explain why the likelihood of corporate
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control contests should decrease with insider ownership (Jensen and Meckling 1976, Stulz 
1988). On the other hand, the presence of large outside block holders can increase this 
probability (Shleifer and Vishny 1986).
Insider ownership
Jensen and Meckling (1976) formally model the relation between insider ownership and firm 
value. They divide shareholder into two groups - insiders who manage the firm and have 
exclusive voting rights and outsiders who do not. Both insiders and outsiders have equal right 
to dividends per shares held. However, the insider can obtain private benefits by consuming 
excessive perks, such as corporate jets, and engage in other nonvalue maximising strategies 
that benefit him but reduce cash flows to outside shareholder. Thus, the value of firm depends 
on the fraction of share held by insiders and the greater such fraction, the greater the value of 
the firm. McConnel and Servaes (1990) confirm this by documenting a curvilinear relation 
between Tobin’s q and insider ownership. Their empirical analysis shows that the curve 
slopes upward until insider ownership reaches 40-50% and then sloes slightly downwards.
Stulz (1988) focuses on the importance of the market for corporate control for disciplining 
corporate managers. In his theoretical model, the premium that a hostile bidder must pay to 
gain control of the target firm increases with the fraction of shares held by management, but 
the probability of success of the takeover decreases. At low levels of insider ownership, 
increased equity holdings better align the interests with outside shareholders, enhancing firm 
value. At higher levels of insider ownership, managerial entrenchment blocks takeovers and 
makes them more costly. As a result, Stulz (1988) predicts that takeover probability decreases 
with insider ownership, which is likely to decrease the value of the firm. For example, at 50% 
insider ownership, the probability of hostile takeovers decreases to zero because the 
incumbents can block the takeover by just voting no. Stulz’s (1988) analysis also applies in 
the context of hedge fund activism. To get their proposals implemented dissident shareholders 
must pressure managers or launch a proxy fight in order to get firms to adopt proposed 
changes. Indeed, if managers control over 50% of the voting power, dissidents are almost 
guaranteed to fail and no proxy fights would occur.
Empirical evidence on takeovers, proxy fights and shareholder activism suggests that insider 
ownership does deter corporate control contests. For example, McConnel and Servaes (1990), 
Song and Walkling (1993), and Shivdasani (1993) all find that managerial ownership is 
negatively related to takeover attempts. However, in a paper examining the determinants of
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LBOs, Weir et al. (2005) find that the relation between LBO probability and insider 
ownership is positive, which is probably due to the fact that incumbent managers play a key 
role in the LBO process.
The deterrence effect of insider ownership has also been documented in the proxy fight 
literature. Faleye (2004) finds that firms with high insider ownership are significantly less 
likely to become targets in proxy contests. Similarly, Bethel et al. (1998) examine activist 
block purchases in the 1980s and find an inverse relation between probability of activist block 
purchases and a dummy variable that equals one if managers own more than 5% of equity. 
Additionally, empirical studies on shareholder activism by institutional investors show that 
target firms have lower insider ownership (see, e.g. Smith 1996, Karpoff et al. 1996, 
Strickland et al. 1996). Interestingly, Smith (1996) and Karpoff et al. (1996) fail to find 
significance for the relation between insider ownership and the likelihood of targeting in 
logistic regression indicating that it does not affect targeting probability. However, Strickland 
et al. (1996) show that insider ownership significantly decreases targeting probability, but this 
finding can probably be attributed to the fact that they study targets of United Shareholders 
Association only. There is no existing evidence with respect to hedge fund activism and 
insider ownership.
Institutional ownership
In contrast to the deterrence effect of insider ownership, the presence of a large outside 
shareholder can increase the likelihood that a firm is targeted. Shleifer and Vishny (1986) 
formulate a model in which the presence of a large minority shareholder who does not take 
part in the management of the firm provides a partial solution to the free-rider problem of 
Grossman and Hart (1980). They show that the probability of takeovers, proxy fights, and 
jawboning increases with the proportion of shares held by non-affiliated blockholders. This is 
because takeovers and proxy fights become not only cheaper but also more likely to succeed 
with increasing outside ownership. As argued by Shleifer and Vishny (1986), contests for 
corporate control become cheaper because high insider ownership mitigates the free-rider 
problem since large shareholder can share the costs with an outsider who is considering a 
takeover or a proxy fight. Not surprisingly, high outside ownership makes such control 
contests more successful as outsiders’ voting power increases.
A plethora of empirical evidence support Shleifer and Vishny’s (1986) theory. Shivdasani 
(1993) finds a positive (negative) relation between ownership of unaffiliated (affiliated)
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blockholders and the likelihood of a hostile takeover attempt. Furthermore, there is a wide 
agreement among researchers examining institutional investor activism that institutional 
ownership increases targeting probability (see, e.g. Del Quercio and Hawkins 1999, Carleton 
et al. 1998, Smith 1996, Karpoff et al. 1996). With regard to hedge funds activism, Brav et al. 
(2006) finds that targets have higher institutional ownership, but they do not perform logistic 
analysis and are therefore unable to confirm whether the level of institutional ownership is 
important in activist hedge funds’ targeting decisions.
2.3.6 Size
Economists widely agree that firm size affects the probability of takeover attempts. The idea 
is that it is more difficult to gain control in larger firms as any given fraction of ownership is 
more valuable. The theoretical foundations for this wealth constraint hypothesis are laid out in 
Demsetz and Lehn (1985).
Demsetz and Lehn (1985) analyse the determinants of the structure of corporate ownership. 
They posit that the fact that the market value of a given fraction of ownership in a firm 
increases with its market capitalisation results in a negative relation between ownership 
concentration and market capitalisation. Therefore, one should observe larger shareholdings 
in small companies and smaller stakes in large companies. This is of importance for would-be 
acquirers and dissident shareholders waging proxy contests and other activism. As size 
increases, it will become harder for them to gain control with any given amount of assets, 
resulting in an inverse relation between size and the probability of corporate control contests.
When considering activist hedge funds, it is not just the wealth constraint hypothesis of 
Demsetz and Lehn (1985) described above, but also the idiosyncratic risk that is likely to 
affect the size of their targets. As noted in Section 2.1, the average size of hedge funds in 
2004 was only $160 million. Acquiring a 5% stake in a large company might introduce too 
much idiosyncratic risk on their portfolios making them opt for smaller targets.
The fact that takeover probability decreases with firm size has probably received most 
consistent empirical support in takeover literature (see, e.g. Palepu 1986, Ambrose and 
Megginson 1992, Powell 1997). In contrast, shareholder activism literature widely agrees on 
the fact that the probability of receiving shareholder proposals from activist institutional 
investors increases with size (see, e.g. Bizjak and Marquette 1998, Carleton et al. 1998, Opier 
and Sokobin 1997, Johnson and Shackell 1997, Karpoff et al. 1996, Smith 1996, Wahal
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1996). However, this is consistent Smith (1996) who argues that as larger firms generally 
comprise a larger percentage of an institution’s investment portfolio (perhaps due to indexing 
strategies) the expected benefits may be larger from targeting such firms.
Empirical evidence on hedge fund activism also suggests that hedge funds are wealth 
constrained and target smaller firms. For example, Brav et al. (2006) find that targets are 
significantly smaller than market/book matched control firms when measured with market 
capitalisation. Klein and Zur (2006) do not examine the size hypothesis because their control 
group consists of firms that are matched based on size. Furthermore, their sampling 
methodology does not allow them to asses whether size increases or decreases targeting 
probability.
2.4 Shareholder gains from hedge fund activism
This section first presents competing views about the efficacy of hedge fund activism in 
improving target firm performance and creating shareholder value. Second, a brief review of 
recent empirical evidence that examines the shareholder wealth effects associated with hedge 
fund activism is presented.
2.4.1 Competing views about hedge fund activism
Performance improvement hypothesis
Several theories suggest that the intervention by large shareholder in general and activist 
hedge funds in particular should be associated with increases in shareholder value. Activist 
hedge funds can remove poorly performing managers through takeovers, jawboning, and 
proxy fights (Shleifer and Vishny 1986) or initiating adverse publicity (Butz 1994). They can 
alleviate problems arising from free cash flow by pressuring managers to engage in bonding 
activities and disgorge excess cash and assume more debt (Jensen and Meckling 1976). They 
can also reverse excessive diversification by pressuring managers to divest businesses that 
could be more valuable under alternative management teams (Bethel et al. 1998). Finally, as 
modelled by Shleifer and Vishny (1986), the presence of a large shareholder may increase 
firm value because it increases the probability of subsequent control contests by reducing the 
free-rider problem suggested by Grossman and Hart (1980).
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Undervaluation hypothesis
Another view is that activist hedge funds consistently target undervalued companies rather 
than improve their performance. This view parallels the hypothesis presented in Holderness 
and Sheehan (1985) that corporate raiders can spot undervalued firms. Activist hedge funds 
may have superior analysis skills in interpreting publicly available information that enable 
them to ascertain whether target firm is undervalued. They can also obtain private information 
as a by-product of monitoring enabling them to ascertain that the target is undervalued 
(Admati et al. 1994). Another form of the undervaluation hypothesis presented by Kraakman 
(1988) is that the firm’s stock price is permanently underpriced for some unknown reason. 
This hypothesis presumes that the discount pricing can only be corrected by transactions that 
redeem shares for asset values such as takeover or liquidation. Accordingly, the presence of a 
large shareholder can facilitate such a takeover, as suggested by Shleifer and Vishny (1986).
If markets are aware that hedge funds are able to pick undervalued shares, then the 
announcement of a block purchase by an activist hedge fund should result in an increase in 
share price. This is consistent with the arguments of Chidambaram and John (1998) that large 
sophisticated investors can credibly convey information to the markets. However, the fact that 
activist hedge funds try to change firm policies is more consistent with the performance 
improvement hypothesis presented earlier. It should be noted, however, that such activities 
are not inconsistent with the undervaluation hypothesis either. Indeed, it is possible that both 
of these hypotheses may simultaneously explain share price reactions associated with 
targeting.
Increased demand hypothesis
Alternative explanation for positive abnormal returns around the event date could be an 
increase in demand for the shares of the target firm. Activist hedge funds need to accumulate 
at least 5% stake in target firms, which should increase demand of target’s shares. If the 
excess supply curve of the target’s shares is upward sloping, new demand could only be met 
at higher prices (see, e.g. Scholes 1972, Mikkelson and Parcth 1985).
Disturbance hypothesis
A competing view offered primarily by law scholars holds that shareholder activism in 
general tends to impair firm management, degrade performance, and decrease firm value. For 
example, Wohlstetter (1993) claims that most activist shareholders and pension fund
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managers have neither the skills nor the experience to improve managers’ decisions. 
Therefore, dissident shareholders’ attempts to influence corporate policies tend to disrupt the 
firm’s operations. Lipton and Rosenblum (1991) argue that even well-intended initiatives can 
distract managers and harm their ability to manage their firms effectively. In a more recent 
paper, Bainbridge (2005) claims that activist investors often pursue agendas that are in 
conflict with those of other shareholders as well as undermine the role of board of directors 
making corporate governance less effective. Kahan and Rock (2006) also argue that hedge 
funds may be too focused on short-term gains to care much about their long-term impact on 
firms.
2.4.2 Empirical evidence
Most studies that investigate whether various corporate control events create or destroy value 
examine the abnormal returns to target shareholders around the announcement of such 
activity. To the extent that the capital market efficiently incorporates new information into 
market prices, the short-term adjustment in prices should accurately reflect the expected 
wealth effects. This section provides an overview of the empirical findings on shareholder 
returns associated with hedge fund activism and other related corporate control events.
With regard to hedge fund activism, there are two working papers that examine the 
cumulative abnormal returns to target firm shareholders around the initial 13D filing date, 
namely Brav et al. (2006) and Klein and Zur (2006). Brav et al. (2006) calculate cumulative 
abnormal returns from 20 days before through 20 days after the initial 13D filing by activist 
hedge funds for 374 target firms in 2004-2005 and document mean and median returns of 
6.8% and 4.7%, respectively, both significant at 1% level. They observe a run-up of about 
1.8% before the 13D filing date, and a 2.2% jump in the two following days. Similarly, 
analysing 136 13D filings in 2003-2005, Klein and Zur (2006) document mean and median 
size-adjusted returns of 10.3% and 8.9% over a 61-day event window, respectively, both 
significant at 1% level. Klein and Zur also document a run-up in returns starting at about day - 
15 and a slight post announcement drift. The minor differences in their results arise from 
different sample period and the fact that Klein and Zur (2006) report only raw returns.
Brav et al. (2006) also examine the cross-section of cumulative returns and find that there are 
significant differences in returns between various characteristics of the events. Most 
prominently, they find that returns vary significantly with the stated goals of activist hedge 
funds. They find that activism that aims to provide finance, or the sale of the target, generates
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the highest abnormal return, with mean abnormal return of 16.8% and 10.4%, respectively. 
Business strategy related activism also generates a significant abnormal return of 5.9%. 
Activism where the hedge fund does not state any specific agenda yields an abnormal return 
of 5.5%, on average. Surprisingly, they find that activism targeting at capital structure issues 
and governance issue exhibits near zero abnormal return. Neither Brav et al. (2006) nor Klein 
and Zur (2006) examine how returns from hedge fund activism differ from year to year. 
Additionally, neither of these papers analyse how target firm characteristics affect returns 
from hedge fund activism.
The results obtained by Brav et al. (2006) and Klein and Zur (2006) with regard to cumulative 
abnormal returns are rather similar to other corporate control events. Most interestingly, 
hedge fund activism seems to yield significantly higher returns than traditional institutional 
investor activism, which is generally associated with insignificant returns (Karpoff 1998). 
Compared to abnormal returns associated with proxy fights (Ikenberry and Lakonishok 1993: 
4.27% over a one month period), hedge fund activism appears to generate slightly higher 
returns. The returns associated with block purchases by corporate raiders in the 1980s are also 
of similar magnitude, as shown by Bethel et al. (1998) and Holderness and Sheehan (1985) 
who document mean returns of 14.2% and 6.73% over similar event windows, respectively. 
In comparison to takeovers, 13D filings by activist hedge funds appear to generate somewhat 
lower returns, as indicated by the 15.9% abnormal return over a one month period around 
takeover announcements (Jensen and Ruback 1983).
3 Hypotheses
This section presents the hypotheses that will be tested in this study. The hypotheses are 
mainly based on literature reviewed in Section 2.2, but I also draw motivation from other 
sources. Section 3.1 formulates hypotheses relating various firm characteristics to the 
probability of targeting and to the sources of shareholder gains. Section 3.2 presents 
hypotheses about the shareholder wealth effects of hedge fund activism.
3.1 Determinants of hedge fund activism and sources of shareholder gains
This section presents hypotheses regarding firm characteristics that increase or decrease the 
likelihood of being targeted by activist hedge funds. In addition to explaining targeting 
likelihood they should explain cross-sectional variation in cumulative abnormal returns 
around the 13D filing date. I therefore present hypotheses about the relations between firm
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characteristics and shareholder gains from hedge fund activism in this section as well. The 
first set of hypotheses relate to the targeting probability and are marked with “a” and the 
second set of hypotheses relate to sources of shareholder gains and are marked with “6”.
Economists widely agree that managers may not always act in the best interest of shareholders 
or do so inefficiently. Manne (1965) argues that there exists a high and positive correlation 
between managerial efficiency and the share price of that firm. Therefore, low share price will 
not only be indicative of lacklustre managerial performance, but also the potential gains that 
can be realised by replacing the incumbent managers with more efficient ones. Specifically, 
managers who fail to maximise shareholder value may be disciplined by large shareholders. 
This discipline can take several forms, including taking the firm over or threatening to do so, 
putting it in play, mounting a proxy contest, jawboning, and initiating adverse publicity 
(Manne 1965, Shleifer and Vishny 1986, Butz 1994). Such actions may pressure managers to 
change firm policies and, on average, lead to improvements in firm performance and 
shareholder value. Thus, I expect that poorly performing firms are more likely to become 
targets of activist hedge funds, and that such firms would have strong incentives to deter 
activist hedge fund intervention by changing firm policies so as to improve performance and 
increase shareholder value.
HI a. Poorly performing firms are more likely to be targeted by activist hedge funds.
Hlb. Shareholder gains from hedge fund activism will be negatively related to pre-targeting 
performance.
Jensen’s (1986) free cash flow theory explains why firms with substantial cash flow are likely 
to destroy shareholder value. Specifically, managers of firms with substantial free cash flow 
may engage in pet projects, build empires, make dubious acquisitions, and diversify their 
firms excessively when the investment opportunities in their traditional business are low, all 
to the detriment of shareholders. Jensen (1986) argues that mitigation of agency costs of free 
cash flow is the main source of value creation in takeovers. Lehn and Poulsen (1989) confirm 
this view by documenting a positive relation between LBO premium and free cash flow. As 
noted several times earlier in this thesis, large shareholder can also mitigate agency problems 
arising from free cash flow. Therefore, I expect that:
H2a. Firms with substantial free cash flow are more likely to be targeted by activist hedge 
funds.
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H2b. Shareholder gains from hedge fund activism will be positively related to the level of 
free cash flow.
The agency problems associated with free cash flow are especially severe when the firm faces 
limited growth opportunities since they may suffer from a shortage of positive NPV projects 
(Jensen 1986). If managers are specialised in the firm’s current lines of business, then 
diversifying investments might be unprofitable as well. Thus, in addition to high level of free 
cash flow, activist hedge fund targets are likely to have fewer profitable investment 
opportunities. Based on the discussion, I posit that:
H3a. Firms with low growth opportunities are more likely to be targeted by activist hedge 
funds.
H3b Shareholder gains from hedge fund activism will be negatively related to growth 
opportunities.
A commonly suggested mechanism for containing the agency problems of excess liquidity is 
the takeover market (Jensen 1986). Similarly, Pinkowitz (2002) suggests that takeovers 
should discipline cash-rich firms. However, Harford (1999) and Pinkowitz (2002) both find 
that the likelihood of becoming a takeover target is significantly negatively related to the 
holding of excess cash suggesting that cash serves as a deterrent to would-be bidders. Excess 
cash enhances the ability of a target to defend itself by such means as share repurchases, 
acquiring a competitor of the bidders and filing antitrust litigation, or acquiring the bidder 
itself (Bagwell 1991, Stulz 1988, Dann and DeAngelo 1988). However, Faleye (2004) 
suggests that proxy fights are an effective mechanism for addressing the agency problems of 
excess liquidity since the defences a cash-rich firm may employ against a hostile bidder are 
largely ineffective against dissident shareholders waging a proxy fight. Similarly, I expect that 
hedge funds not deterred by excess cash. Thus, I have the following hypotheses.
H4a. Firms with substantial cash holdings are more likely to be targeted by activist hedge 
funds.
H4b. Shareholder gains from hedge fund activism are positively related to cash holdings.
Jensen and Meckling (1976) show that management can engage in bonding activities to 
eliminate or reduce the potential for agency problems. In the context of excess free cash flow,
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debt creation without the retention of proceeds enables managers to effectively bond their 
promise to payout future cash flows. Low leverage indicates absence of bonding activities and 
thus higher potential for agency problems. High leverage also deters takeovers. First, for any 
given fraction of shares held by management, an increase in leverage will result in a larger 
fraction of voting rights controlled by the management (Harris and Raviv 1988). Second, the 
covenants attached to debt can substantially strengthen management’s bargaining position and 
make hostile takeovers less likely (Stulz 1988), especially in the case where the suitor is 
seeking restructuring of the firm. Thus, lower leverage suggests that there is a higher potential 
for reducing agency problems and that interventions are more likely to succeed. Therefore I 
expect that:
H5a Firms with low leverage are more likely to be targeted by activist hedge funds.
H5b Shareholder gains from hedge fund activism are negatively related to leverage.
One specific cause of poor firm performance, especially in the 1980s, appears to have been 
excessive diversification. Jensen (1986) and Shleifer and Vishny (1989) argue that managers 
have an incentive to excessively diversify their firms at the expense of shareholders. Indeed, 
empirical evidence from the 1980s support the hypothesis that diversification decreases 
shareholder value. Comment and Jarre1 (1995) show that higher focus is associated with 
higher firm values. Berger and Ofek (1995) show that diversified companies trade at a 
substantial discount when compared to their more focused counterparts. However, the value 
destruction associated with diversification generates large profit opportunities for outsiders 
who are able to increase corporate focus. Activist hedge funds can mitigate these problems by 
bringing pressuring manager to undertake divestitures and other value increasing changes.
H6a. Highly diversified firms are more likely to be targeted by activism hedge funds
H6b. Shareholder gains from hedge fund activism are positively related to the degree of 
diversification.
Undervaluation is a commonly suggested motivation for hedge funds to engage in activism by 
the financial press. Similarly, a plethora of economists argue that undervaluation is a key 
motive for takeovers (Palepu 1986) and LBOs (Opier and Titman 1993). The argument is that 
firms with low Tobin’s q values are “cheap buys”. Shleifer and Vishny (2003) model this 
formally and posit that undervalued firms make more attractive takeover targets. In addition,
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Holderness and Sheehan (1985) hypothesised that corporate raiders in the 1980s were able to 
spot undervalued firm. In line with this, it is fair to assume that sophisticated hedge fund 
managers have superior analysis skills in interpreting publicly available information or can 
obtain private information as a by-product of monitoring (Admati et al. 1994) that enable 
them to ascertain whether target firm is undervalued. Another form of the undervaluation 
hypothesis presented by Kraakman (1988) is that the firm’s stock price is permanently 
underpriced for some unknown reason. This hypothesis presumes that the discount pricing 
can only be corrected by transactions that redeem shares for asset values such as takeover or 
liquidation. Accordingly, the presence of a large shareholder can facilitate such a takeover, as 
suggested by Shleifer and Vishny (1986). Therefore I expect that:
H7a. Undervalued firms are more likely to be targeted by activist hedge funds
H7b. Shareholder gains from hedge fund activism will be negatively related to the degree of 
undervaluation
Insider ownership may reduce the likelihood that a firm is targeted by an activist hedge fund. 
First, high insider ownership mitigates agency problems because it aligns the interests of 
managers and shareholders (Jensen and Meckling 1976). In this case, there should be little 
opportunity for outside investors to improve performance. High insider ownership also makes 
it harder to take over the firm or replace management (Stulz 1988). Therefore, we have the 
following hypotheses:
H8a. Firms with high insider ownership are less likely to be targeted by activist hedge 
funds.
H8b. Shareholder gains from hedge fund activism are negatively related to insider 
ownership.
Shleifer and Vishny (1986) predict that the presence of large outside blockholder increases 
the likelihood of being targeted by takeovers, proxy fights, and jawboning. Theoretically, 
large shareholders can mitigate Grossman and Hart’s (1980) free-rider problem by sharing 
some of the costs a possible suitor faces in accumulating a stake in the firm. In addition, large 
institutional investors are easier to coordinate with and are considered more likely to support 
proposals by other activist investors (Del Quercio and Hawkins 1999). Therefore, I expect 
that firms with high institutional ownership are more likely to be targeted by activist hedge
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funds. In such cases, activist hedge funds are also more likely to get their improvements 
implemented, which should result in higher returns.
H9a. Firms with high institutional ownership are more likely to be targeted by activist 
hedge funds.
H9b. Shareholder gains from hedge fund activism are positively related to institutional 
ownership.
Firm size may affect the likelihood of being targeted by activist hedge funds. Remember that 
to be included in the sample, activist hedge funds need to file a schedule 13D with the SEC, 
which requires at least 5% ownership. Demsetz and Lehn (1985) posit the market value of a 
given fraction of ownership in a firm increases with its market capitalisation, which should in 
turn result in a negative relation between ownership concentration and market capitalisation. 
The wealth constraints hypothesis is likely to play an especially important role in the case of 
activist hedge funds since hedge funds do not have substantial amounts of assets under 
management (on average, hedge funds have $160 million of assets under management). What 
is more, larger investments in target companies could increase the systematic risks of their 
portfolios too much. Smaller firms are also more susceptible of information asymmetry, 
which makes them vulnerable to undervaluation (Myers and Maljuf 1984). Moeller et al. 
(2004) show that target gains from takeovers are negatively correlated with size. In line with 
this, I expect that shareholder gains from hedge fund activism will be lower in larger firms.
HlOa. Larger firms are less likely to be targeted by activist hedge funds.
HI Ob. Shareholder gains from hedge fund activism are negatively related to size.
Kahn and Winton (1998) conjecture that large shareholder intervention should be most likely 
in situations that are relatively accessible to outsider investors: mature or low-technology 
industries and situations where management is clearly sub par. In contrast, they argue that it is 
harder for outsiders to know what to do in firms that specialise in new technologies and have 
high R&D focus. Therefore, I expect activist hedge funds to avoid R&D intensive firms. 
Kahn and Winton (1998) also suggest that implementing improvements in high R&D firms is 
difficult and likely to involve delays. Therefore, I expect that shareholder gains from hedge 
fund activism are lower in such firms.
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Hila. R&D intensive firms are less likely to be targeted by activism hedge funds.
HI lb. Shareholder gains from hedge funds activism will be lower in R&D intensive firms.
Liquidity of a firm’s stock may also affect the likelihood of being targeted by an activist 
hedge fund. As discussed in Section 2.2 Grossman and Hart’s (1980) free-rider problem is 
likely to deter potential buyers of large blocks of shares as they have to pay for the 
improvements they intend to carry out. High liquidity mitigates this problem as it is easier to 
accumulate large blocks without a significant price impact (Maug 1998). Thus I expect that:
HI2a. Firms whose share is more liquid are more likely to be targeted by activist hedge 
funds.
HI2b. Shareholder gains from hedge fund activism will be positively related to the liquidity 
of a firm 's shares.
3.2 Shareholder wealth effects
Economists widely agree that large shareholders can mitigate agency problems by wielding 
control over management through takeovers or takeover threats, proxy fights and jawboning 
(Manne 1965, Shleifer and Vishny 1986, Butz 1994). Activist investors can also have superior 
analysis skills (Holderness and Sheehan 1985) or they can obtain private information as a by­
product of monitoring (Admati et al. 1994) enabling them to ascertain if firms are 
undervalued and consistently target such firms. If markets are aware that hedge funds are able 
to pick undervalued shares, then 13D filings by activist hedge funds should result in increases 
in share prices. Alternative explanation for positive abnormal returns around the event date 
could be an increase in demand for the shares of the target firm. If the excess supply curve of 
the target’s shares is upward sloping, new demand could only be met at higher prices (see, 
e.g. Scholes 1972, Mikkelsen and Parcth 1985). Therefore, 1 hypothesise that:
H13. Hedge fund activism creates shareholder value and is therefore associated with 
increases in target firm share prices around the 13D filing date.
The number of firms targeted by activist hedge funds as well the number of hedge funds 
pursuing activist strategies have increased substantially over 2000-2006 (see Section 4.2). 
Bradley et al. (1988) present a hypothesis regarding the relation between diminishing returns 
and competition between bidding firms in the acquisitions market. They argue that the best 
opportunities in the acquisition market are taken first meaning that the value derived from
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takeovers is likely to decline over time. They also argue that competition between bidding 
firms is likely to decrease returns to acquirers. Thus, I hypothesise that:
H14. Cumulative abnormal returns from hedge fund activism will decline over time as the 
number of firms targeted and the number of hedge funds pursuing activist strategy 
increase.
4 Data and methodology
The first subsection describes the institutional background to Schedule 13D filings. The 
second part of this section provides a description of the data used in this thesis. The third part 
defines the variables that are examined. Finally, the fourth part introduces the methodological 
approaches applied in this thesis.
4.1 13D filings
There is no central database that records hedge fund activism events. However, such events 
can be identified using 13D filings by hedge funds that can be considered as pursuing activist 
strategies. Section 13D of the Exchange Act of 1934, passed by U.S. Congress to regulate the 
method and timing of tender offers, requires anyone who acquires more than 5% of a public 
corporation’s outstanding shares with the intention of influencing firm policies to file a 
Schedule 13D, a disclosure document, with the SEC within ten days of surpassing the 5% 
ownership threshold.
In particular, according to the Section 13D, these include events that would result in: a) the 
acquisition of additional securities or disposal of securities of the issuer; b) a merger, 
reorganisation, liquidation involving the issuer or any of its subsidiaries; c) material disposals 
of issuer’s assets; d) change in present board of directors or management; e) change in 
capitalisation or dividend policy; 0 any other material change in the issuer’s business or 
corporate structure; g) changes in the firm’s charter or bylaws; h) delisting of issuer’s shares; 
i) any class of equity security eligible for termination of registration; or j) any action similar 
to any of those enumerated above.
Among other items, this filing includes the name and background of each acquiring individual 
or of any individuals who control the acquiring corporations. In addition, Item 4 of Schedule 
13D requires the filer to declare the reasons for acquiring the shares, particularly if the 
intention is to engage in merger and acquisition activity, seek a sale of the firm or its assets, 
change capitalisation or dividend policy, or demand other types of policy changes. Schedule
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13D filings are publicly available through the SEC EDGAR filing system". Hence, 13D 
filings can be used to identify events where an activist hedge fund is seeking to influence firm 
policies.
In contrast, passive institutional investors that acquire more than 5% of the company’s stock 
and do not intend to seek control at the target firm are required to file a Schedule 13G within 
45 days of crossing this ownership threshold. Typically, the filing of a Schedule 13G does not 
indicate an activist event. However, if an institutional investor did change its initial passive 
purpose and decide to become active, they would need to file a Schedule 13D to announce 
this change in the purpose of investment.
4.2 Sample description
4.2.1 Sample and descriptive statistics
The core data used in this study consist of a unique hand-collected set of 470 activist hedge 
fund-target pairs between 1/1/2000 and 31/12/2006. The core data was obtained using a two- 
step procedure similar to that applied by Brav et al. (2006) and Klein and Zur (2006). First, a 
comprehensive list of 194 activist hedge funds was compiled by performing extensive news 
searches in Lexis-Nexis database and other news sources for stories mentioning terms such as 
“hedge fund”, “activism”, and “activist” in various combinations. The news search yielded in 
total 194 hedge funds (including few individual investors such as Carl Icahn) that were 
considered as pursuing an activist strategy. Second, a list of activist hedge fund-target firm 
pairs was compiled by searching 13D filings by the names of the 194 activist funds from the 
SEC EDGAR filing system between 2000 and 2006. The SEC EDGAR search for 13D filings 
by activist hedge funds and individuals yields a total of 911 activist hedge fund-target pairs. 
To be included in the final sample, hedge fund-target firm pairs must satisfy following 
criteria:
1. The Schedule 13D is filed between 1/1/2000 and 31/12/2006 by an activist hedge 
fund;
11 EDGAR, the Electronic Data Gathering, Analysis, and Retrieval system, performs automated collection, 
validation, indexing, acceptance, and forwarding of submissions by companies and others who are required by 
law to file forms with the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC). These filings are available at 
http://www.sec.gov/edgar.shtml.
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2. The target firm is listed in New York Stock Exchange (NYSE), NASDAQ National 
Market (NASDAQ), or American Stock Exchange (AMEX);
3. The target firm is not a financial firm (SIC codes 60 to 67);
4. If a firm is targeted more than once in a single year, the firm is included in the sample 
only by the first 13D filing.
The final core sample includes 470 hedge fund-target pairs, 414 unique target firms, and 94 
activist hedge funds that have data on all key variables described in Section 4.2.2. Table 1 
stratifies the sample by the year of targeting. A major limitation of this study, however, is the 
exclusion of hedge fund activism events in which the ownership of the fund remains below 
the 5% threshold. Furthermore, the sample may not be exhaustive of all hedge fund activism 
events in 2000-2006 because the screening process for activist hedge funds may have missed 
some funds altogether. However, I believe that the sample includes all important hedge fund 
activism events because the ones that have been left out have not received a sufficient amount 
of media attention or are carried out by lesser-known hedge funds.
To address the question why some firms are targeted by activist hedge funds and others 
are not, I construct a control group that consists of firms that were not subject to 13D filings 
by activist hedge funds during 2000-2006. For this purpose, I first obtain NYSE, NASDAQ, 
and AMEX constituent lists from Thomson Financial for 2000-2006. Second, I remove 
financial firms with SIC codes ranging from 60 to 67.1 also remove firms that were subject to 
13D filings by activist hedge funds because they are already included in the target sample. 
Finally, I gather the same data (described in Section 4.2.2) for control firms as I did for 
activist hedge fund targets and remove firms that do not have key data available on Thomson 
Worldscope. The final control sample includes 18,696 firm-years that were not targeted by 
activist hedge funds and that have data available for all key variables.
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Table 1 : Hedge fund activism in 2000-2006
The table reports the number of NYSE, NASDAQ, and AMEX listed firms that were subject to 13D filings by activist hedge funds in 2000- 
2006, the number of activist hedge funds that submitted 13D filings at the respective firms, and mean market capitalisation of target firms at 
year end before the 13D filing year. Year is the calendar year in which the Schedule 13D was filed. Number of targets refers to the number of 
filed Schedule 13Ds during a particular year, which equals the number of targeted firms. Number of activist hedge fund refers to how many 
different activist hedge funds filed Schedule 13Ds during a particular year. Mean market capitalisation is the mean year end market value of 












2000 22 2 605 0.8% 15 346.4
2001 26 2 402 1.1% 14 357.3
2002 33 2 622 1.2% 22 467.1
2003 68 2 724 2.4% 28 383.4
2004 88 2 704 3.2% 36 632.1
2005 108 2 808 3.7% 49 1465.8
2006 125 2 831 4.2% 45 1570.6
'Fötal 470 18 696 2.5% 94 997.1
Table 1 describes the frequency of hedge fund activism by year. In all, 470 13D filings by 
94 activist hedge funds took place in 2000-2006, representing on average 2.5% of the entire 
population of NYSE, NASDAQ, and AMEX listed firms that meet my selection criteria. The 
most prominent feature of Table 1 is the dramatic increase in the number of firms targeted by 
activist hedge funds from 22 in 2000 to 125 in 2006. The proportion of firms experiencing 
hedge fund activism has also increased from 0.8% in 2000 to 4.2% in 2006. Moreover, the 
number of activist hedge fund pursuing activist strategy has increased three-fold, reflecting 
the increase in the number hedge funds and amount of funds under management. For 
example, according to Hedge Fund Research Inc, a research firm, the number of hedge funds 
has increased from 39 in 1990 to 890 in 2005, with assets estimated to reach one trillion in 
2006. With assets under management, the size of targets has also increased from $346 million 
in 2000 to $1.57 billion in 2006 measured by mean market capitalisation. Indeed, huge 
companies such as Time-Warner, General Motors, and Kerr-McGee have been first-hand 
witnesses to the increasing clout of activist hedge funds.
Table 3 shows the distribution of target and control firms by industry. The industries with 
the highest frequency of hedge fund activism include business services and retailers. The high 
number of targets in the business services sector probably reflects the trend that activist hedge 
funds are increasingly trying to apply private equity model in public companies to increase 
value. Indeed, many funds explicitly state that they want to replicate the private equity model 
in the public markets. Business services sector is ripe for private equity as the level cash flow 
is high and volatility low. The high number of retail firms in the sample may arise from the 
fact that many of these firms own significant amounts of real estate, which could be sold at a
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profit. Activist hedge funds argue that the recent surge in real estate values in not fully 
reflected in the retailers’ market prices making the companies undervalued. Overall, there is 
no other industry clustering in the sample
Table 2: Hedge fund activism by Fama-French 48 industry
This table reports, by industry, the number and fraction of activist hedge fund targets and control firm-years in the same industry Targets are 
NYSE NASDAQ and AMEX listed firms that were subject to 13D filings by activist hedge funds while control firm-years were not. Industry 
data is organised by Fama-French 48 industry classification.
Industry Code
Control1 sample Target sample
Industry Code
Control1 sample TarKct sample
N % N % N % N %
Agriculture 1 77 0.4% 1 0.2% Automobiles and trucks 24 269 1.4% 5 i.i%
Food products 2 334 1.8% 10 2.1% Aircraft 25 114 0.6% 1 0.2%
Candy and soda 3 56 0.3% 0 0.0% Shipbuilding, railroad equipment 26 59 0.3% 1 0.2%
Alcoholic beverages 4 98 0.5% 1 0.2% Defense 27 42 0.2% 5 1.1%
Tobacco products 5 30 0.2% 0 0.0% Precious metals 28 26 0.1% 0 0.0%
Recreational products 6 214 1.1% 4 0.9% Nonmetallic mining 29 53 0.3% 2 0.4%
Entertainment 7 270 1.4% 14 3.0% Coal 30 31 0.2% 2 0.4%
Printing and publishing 8 155 0.8% 8 1.7% Petroleum and natural gas 31 867 4.6% 11 2.3%
Consumer goods 9 279 1.5% 12 2.6% Utilities 32 757 4.0% 13 2.8%
Apparel 10 343 1.8% 7 1.5% Telecommunications 33 650 3.5% 21 4.5%
I lealthcare 11 386 2.1% 7 1.5% Personal services 34 241 1.3% 14 3.0%
Medical equipment 12 772 4.1% 18 3.8% Business services 35 2645 14.1% 100 21.3%
Pharmaceutical products 13 1300 7.0% 18 3.8% Computers 36 860 4.6% 15 3.2%
Chemicals 14 399 2.1% 7 1.5% Electronic equipment 37 1308 7.0% 23 4.9%
Rubber and plastic products 15 130 0.7% 8 1.7% Measuring and control equipment 38 591 3.2% 8 1.7%
Textiles 16 6i 0.3% 0 0.0% Business supplies 39 235 1.3% 11 2.3%
Construction materials 17 346 1.9% 11 2.3% Shipping containers 40 59 0.3% 1 0.2%
Construction 18 279 1.5% 3 0.6% Transportation 41 535 2.9% 14 3.0%
Steel works, etc. 19 260 1.4% 7 1.5% Wholesale 42 784 4.2% 21 4.5%
Fabricated products 20 64 0.3% 0 0.0% Retail 43 1154 6.2% 28 6.0%
Machinery 21 711 3.8% 16 3.4% Restaurants, hotels, and motels 44 355 1.9% 10 2.1%
Electrical equipment 22 337 1.8% 8 1.7% Other 48 160 0.9% 4 0.9%
4.2.2 Activism types
Analysis of Item 4s in the 13D filings reveals significant heterogeneity in activist hedge fund 
demands at target companies. I divide different types of demands into seven categories, which 
are not mutually exclusive. Together, I refer to the seven categories as “activism type”.
General category includes all events where the hedge funds do not specify any demands; 
rather they state a general demand to increase shareholder value through discussions with 
management. For example, Wilshire Enterprises Inc was subject to a Schedule 13D filed by 
Bulldog Investors on 17 August 2006 that stated:
"The filing persons have acquired the shares of WOC [Wilshire Enterprises] for investment 
purposes. The reporting persons may communicate with management to discuss ways to 
enhance shareholder value ”.
Corporate governance category includes all events related to firing CEOs, changing board 
composition, or rescinding takeover defences. As an example, Third Point's Daniel Loeb
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wrote a letter to Star Gas Partners’ CEO Irik P. Sevin, which was attached to a Schedule 13D 
filed on 14 February 2005, that stated:
"Sadly, your ineptitude is not limited to your failure to communicate with bond and unit 
holders. A review of your record reveals years of value destruction and strategic blunders 
which have led us to dub you one of the most dangerous and incompetent executives in 
America. (I was amused to learn, in the course of our investigation that at Cornell University 
there is an "Irik Sevin Scholarship. " One can only pity the poor student who suffers the 
indignity of attaching your name to his academic record.) I have known you personally for 
many years and thus what I am about to say may seem harsh, but is said with some authority. 
It is time for you to step down from your role as CEO and director so that you can do what 
you do best: retreat to your waterfront mansion in the Hamptons where you can play tennis 
and hobnob with your fellow socialites. The matter of repairing the mess you have created 
should be left to professional management and those that have an economic stake in the 
outcome. ”
Demand sale category includes events where the hedge funds demand a sale of the target 
company, or some of its assets to a third party (in most cases) or to themselves. As an 
example, Sl Corp was subject to a Schedule 13D filed by Ramius Capital on 29 March 2006 
that stated:
“The Reporting Persons purchased the Shares based on the belief that the Shares were 
undervalued and represented an attractive investment opportunity. The Reporting Persons 
are concerned about the competitive position of the Issuer, especially in light of the fact that 
the Issuer has lost more than 75% of its market value since January 2002. The Reporting 
Persons believe that the Issuer has valuable core assets but the current business strategy 
employed by management has and continues to result in a deterioration of stockholder value. 
The Reporting Persons have serious concerns about the ability of the current Board of 
Directors to maximize stockholder value. On March 29, 2006, Ramius Capital delivered a 
letter to the Chairman and Chief Executive Officer of the Issuer expressing its belief that the 
Issuer's assets are undervalued and that the best way to unlock shareholder value is through 
the sale of the Issuer.
Capital structure category relates to demands with respect to disgorging excess cash through 
dividends, share repurchases, or leveraged recapitalisations. For example, Massey Energy 
Company was subject to a Schedule 13D filed by Jana Partners on 16 September 2005 that 
stated:
“The Reporting Person believes that the Shares at current market prices are undervalued and 
represent an attractive investment opportunity ...On September 14, 2005, the Reporting 
Person discussed with representatives of the Issuer, including Donald Blankenship, the 
Chairman, President and CEO of the Issuer, the Reporting Person's belief that the Issuer 
could unlock significant value for shareholders through a prompt repurchase of its common 
stock. Such representatives of the Company stated that they would consider taking such 
action. Therefore, following this discussion, the Reporting Person sent a letter to Mr. 
Blankenship outlining the benefits of a prompt share repurchase and stating its belief that the 
Issuer should undertake such action. ”
i
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Strategy category includes events where the hedge fund’s aim is to change the target firm’s 
operating strategy. For example, H.J. Heinz Company was subject to a Schedule 13D filed by 
Trian Fund Management on 24 April 2006 that stated:
“The Filing Persons acquired the Shares for investment purposes because they believe that 
the Shares were undervalued. The Filing Persons believe that the Issuer has a valuable group 
of core brands but that the business strategy employed by management for the better part of a 
decade has not resulted in a significant increase in shareholder value... The Filing Persons 
see opportunities to create value at the Issuer through sharper strategic focus, better 
operational execution and more efficient uses of capital...and expect to publicly release a 
report prepared by them that examines the Issuer's performance, proposes various strategies 
for the enhancement of shareholder value, and analyzes the potential financial impact of such 
strategies.
Oppose M&A category includes all events where the hedge fund is opposing a pending M&A 
deal; either demanding a higher price for their shares or discouraging the target firm to go 
ahead with a planned acquisition. For example, Mylan Laboratories was subject to a Schedule 
13D filed by Icahn Associates on 7 September 2004 that stated:
“The Registrants acquired the Shares because they believe the Shares to be undervalued in 
the market place... The Registrants' present intention is to oppose and solicit proxies against 
the Issuer's proposed merger with King Pharmaceuticals, Inc. The Registrants have made 
plans to meet with Robert J. Coury, the Issuer's CEO, this week. ”
Financing category takes all events where a hedge fund is willing to extend financing to the 
target firm to implement growth strategies, or help it in financial distress. This category 
includes only two observations, so I decide not to give an example for the sake of space.
Table 2 on the following page presents the target sample divided into subsamples by activism 
types described on previous page. The number of observation does not match the sample size 
as the seven categories are not mutually exclusive. The table shows that general category 
represents 65% of activism events in the sample. However, this may arise from the fact that 
some hedge funds just state the intention to increase shareholder value, but later demand other 
policy changes using other means. Corporate governance related proposals take 22% of the 
sample followed by demand to put the company for sale or divest assets with 15%. Capital 
structure proposals we almost as frequent as sale and divestiture proposals with 12% of total. 
Activist hedge funds demanded strategic changes and opposed M&A deals less frequently, as 
suggested by their 7% and 5% proportions in the sample, respectively. Finally, financing 
category includes only two cases.
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Table 3: Hedge fund activism types
The table presents the 470 hedge fund activism events in 2000-2006 divided into categories according to activism type, i.e. the type of 












N 305 103 72 58 31 24 2 470
% of total 64.9% 21.9% 15.3% 12.3% 6.6% 5.1% 0.4%
4.3 Variables applied in the study
This section describes the variables that are applied in this paper. The first subsection 
elaborates on the dependent variables for logit and OLS regressions. The second subsection 
defines the independent variables that are used in the regressions and explains the rationale 
behind their use.
4.3.1 Dependent variables
Activism dummy: is a dummy variable that equals one if the firm was subject to a 13D filing 
by an activist hedge fund during my sample period of 2000-2006 and zero otherwise. In other 
words, activism dummy equals one for activist hedge fund targets and zero for the control 
firms. This variable is used as a dependent variable in the logit regressions. Further 
elaboration can be found in Section 4.4.1.
CAR ,]\ is the cumulative abnormal return measured over various event windows where day 
0 is the 13D filing date and -t and t are the start and end dates of the event window, 
respectively. The purpose of this variable is to proxy for the target firm shareholder wealth 
effects associated with hedge fund activism. Cumulative abnormal returns are widely used by 
economists to examine the wealth effects of various corporate events (see, e.g. Weston et al. 
2004). The abnormal return is calculated based on market model parameters estimated from 
days -300 to -51. The returns of the S&P 500, over the corresponding time period, are used as 
a proxy for the market’s return. The event windows used in this study are [-50, 50], [-20, 20], 
[-2, 2], and [0, 0]. Brav et al. (2006) and Klein and Zur (2006) study returns to hedge fund 
activism using [-20, 20] and [-30, 30] event windows, respectively. Stock price data for 
calculation of CARs is obtained from Datastream. The methodology of calculating CARs is 
described in detail in Section 4.4.2. This variable is used as the dependent variable in OLS 
regressions to analyse the sources of shareholder gains.
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4.3.2 Independent variables
This subsection defines the independent variables used in logit and OLS models. The 
expected signs for the variables are in brackets after the variable names. The first and second 
brackets give the expected signs for the logit regression and OLS regression, respectively. 
Accounting data is from Thomson Worldscope and the stock return data is from Thomson 
Datastream. All variables are calculated as of the year end before the 13D filing.
Net-of-market return [-], [-]: is the abnormal holding period return prior to the 13D filing 
year. The net-of-market return is calculated as follows:
Net-of-market return = ^ (/?, , - Rm l ) ( 1 )
l=a
where R¡,, is the return of firm i for month t, and a and b define the interval over which the 
return is calculated. Rm,, refers to the return on the benchmark portfolio over the same period. 
The returns on the S&P500 index and Fama-French 2x3 market/book and size matched 
portfolios12 are used as proxies for the market return. The returns are then calculated for 12 
and 24 month periods using both benchmark indices. This variable has been applied in 
numerous shareholder activism related studies as a proxy for managerial performance (see, 
e.g. Brav et al. 2006, Smith 1996, Wahal 1996). The expectation is that poorly performing 
firms are more likely to be targeted, hence the negative expected sign. Moreover, the potential 
for improvement is bigger in such firm, resulting in a negative expected relation between this 
variable and CARs.
Free cash flow [+], [+]: is the undistributed free cash flow divided by total assets, and 
proxies for Jensen’s (1986) free cash flow. Undistributed cash flow equals earnings before 
depreciation and amortisation less tax, interest, dividends and share repurchases following 
Jansen and Kleimeier (2003). Total assets equal the book value of assets. This variable is a 
better proxy for agency problems than return on assets used, for example, in Brav et al. (2006)
12 The portfolios, which are constructed at the end of each June, are the intersections of 2 portfolios formed on 
size (market equity, ME) and 3 portfolios formed on the ratio of book equity to market equity (BE/ME). The 
size breakpoint for year t is the median NYSE market equity at the end of June of year t. BE/ME for June of 
year t is the book equity for the last fiscal year end in t-1 divided by ME for December of t-1. The BE/ME 
breakpoints are the 30th and 70th NYSE percentiles. The portfolios for July of year t to June of t+1 include all 
NYSE, AMEX, and NASDAQ stocks for which we have market equity data for December of t-1 and June of t, 
and (positive) book equity data for t-1. Fama and French calculate returns on these portfolios, which are
available at: http://mba.tuck.dartmouth.edu/pages/faculty/ken.french/data_library.html.
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and Klein and Zur (2006) because it accounts for the management discretion in the 
distribution of cash flow to shareholders. The expectation is that firms with high free cash 
flow are more likely to invest in negative NPV projects, and are therefore more likely to be 
targeted. Furthermore, the level of free cash flow is expected to be positively related to 
cumulative abnormal returns as the potential for improvements is bigger.
Cash ratio [+], [+]: is the cash and marketable securities divided by total assets at year-end 
prior to the 13D filing year. Cash ratio has been applied as a proxy for agency problems, for 
example, in Faleye (2004)’s study on the determinants of proxy fights and in Klein and Zur’s 
(2006) working paper on hedge fund activism. From an agency perspective, firms that have a 
high endowment of liquid assets may be more prone to engage in nonvalue maximising 
behaviour, so I expect a positive relation between this variable and the likelihood of being 
targeted. Similarly, I expect a positive relation between this variable and CAR.
Debt ratio [-], [-]: is the total debt divided by total assets one at year-end prior to the 13D 
filing year. In examining the determinants of proxy fights, Faleye (2004) uses debt ratio as a 
proxy for agency problems; low debt ratio indicates lack of bonding activities on the part of 
managers to reduce these problems. High leverage also acts as a takeover deterrent (Stulz, 
1988). Therefore I expect debt ratio to have a negative relation with targeting probability. 
Moreover, as higher debt ratio indicates that managers have engaged in bonding activities, 
there should be a negative relation between this variable and CARs.
Sales growth [-], [-]: is the average geometric growth rate in firm’s sales for a period of two 
years prior to the 13D filing year. The variable has been widely used by economists as a 
proxy for growth opportunities, including Lehn and Poulsen (1989) in predicting LBOs and 
Powell (1997) and Palepu (1986) in predicting takeovers. Firms facing low growth 
opportunities in their own businesses are more likely to spend free cash flow in negative NPV 
projects or diversify excessively to the detriment of shareholders (Jensen 1986). Thus, the 
likelihood of targeting is expected to decrease with sales growth. Similarly, as low growth 
firms are more prone to suffer from agency problems, intervention by activist hedge funds 
should decrease the costs arising from agency problems relatively more. This results in a 
negative expected relation between sales growth and CARs.
Diversification [+], [+]: is the number of business segments for which a firm reports a four­
digit SIC code. There are numerous interpretations for this variable. It may proxy 
overinvestment of free cash flow (Jensen 1986), managerial entrenchment (Shleifer and
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Vishny 1986), or undervaluation (Berger and Ofek 1995). Brav et al. (2006) and Bethel et al. 
(1998) use diversification as a measure of poor performance arising from agency problems 
and potential undervaluation. Whether diversification results in poor performance or 
undervaluation, it is expected to be positively related to the targeting probability and 
cumulative abnormal returns.
Tobin’s q [-], [-]: is the sum of market value of equity and book value of debt divided by the 
book value of assets. Existing literature offers various interpretations for Tobin’s q, including 
managerial performance (Servaes 1991), growth opportunities (Opier and Titman 1993), and 
undervaluation (Hasbrouck 1985). All explanations should, however, result in a negative 
expected sing in both logit and OLS models. However, to tell apart between these different 
hypotheses, I decompose Tobin’s q into two separate variables: industry q and abnormal q, 
which proxy for industry-wide undervaluation and firm-specific undervaluation compared to 
industry peers, respectively.
Industry q [-], [-]: is the median Tobin’s q of firms in the same Fama-French 48 industry13. 
The purpose of this variable is to proxy industry wide undervaluation. Empirical precedent for 
this type of interpretation can be found in Ang and Chen (2006) and Rhodes-Kropf et al. 
(2006). Industry q can alternatively be interpreted as growth opportunities within a given 
industry as explained in previous paragraph. In either case, I expect it to receive a negative 
sign in both logit and OLS models.
Abnormal q [-], [-]\ is the difference between a particular firm’s Tobin’s q and respective 
industry q measured in percents. This variable measures firm-specific undervaluation and is 
free from alternative interpretations of the simple Tobin’s q. This method uses the product of 
the individual firm’s book value and its industry median market/book value as the measure of 
the firm’s fair value. For example, if a firm’s abnormal q is -0.20, it can be said that the firm 
is “undervalued” by 20% compared to its Fama-French 48 industry peers. Furthermore, using 
abnormal q alleviates problems arising from “high water raises all boats” phenomenon, as it 
implicitly controls for industry-wide and time-specific valuation errors. This type of variable 
has been used by Ang and Chen (2006) and Rhodes-Kropf et al. (2006) to test the market 
driven acquisitions theory by Shleifer and Vishny (2003). The expectation is that undervalued
13 Industry classifications and corresponding four-digit SIC codes are available at
http://mba.tuck.dartmouth.edu/pages/faculty/ken.french/Data_Library/changes_ind.html.
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firms are more likely to be targeted, hence the negative expected sign. With regard to CARs, 
the expected sign is also negative.
Insider ownership [-], [-]: is the percentage of closely held shares as reported by Thomson 
Worldscope at year end prior to the 13D filing. It includes shares held i) by officers, directors 
(and families) ii) in trust iii) by other corporations iii) by pension/benefit plans iii) by 
individuals who hold more than 5% of outstanding shares. McConnel and Servaes (1990) and 
Bethel et al. (1998) use closely held shares as a proxy of insider ownership and hence as a 
proxy of severity of agency problems. Firms with low insider ownership are expected to be 
more likely among activist hedge fund targets. As high insider ownership makes it more 
difficult to gain control and successfully implement improvements, the expected sign with 
regard to CARs is also negative.
Institutional ownership [+], [+]: is the percentage of shares held by institutional investors, 
such as pension funds and mutual funds. Smith (1996) uses institutional ownership variable in 
his logistic regressions predicting CalPERS activism. As hypothesised in Section 3.1, firms 
with high institutional ownership are more likely to be targeted by activist hedge funds 
because institutional owners may mitigate the free-rider problem, hence the positive expected 
sign. As the probability of success is higher in such cases, the expected relation between 
institutional ownership and CARs is also positive.
Ln (Market capitalisation) [-], [-]: is the natural logarithm of year end market capitalisation. I 
take the natural logarithm to alleviate problems arising from skewed data. 1 expect ln(market 
capitalisation) to enter the logit models with negative coefficient due to wealth constraints 
faced by activist hedge funds. Also, I expect it to enter OLS models with a negative 
coefficient, following the finding of Moeller et al. (2004) that the relation between target size 
and CAR is negative in acquisitions.
R&D dummy [-], [-]: is a dummy variable that equals one if the firm reported R&D 
expenditures in Worldscope, and zero otherwise. Brav et al. (2006) use R&D expense in their 
univariate tests. As suggested by Kahn and Winton (1998) it is more difficult to improve 
performance in R&D intensive firms as they are harder to understand. Therefore, I expect that 
this variable enter the logit models with a negative sign.
Liquidity [+], [+]: is the mean yearly share turnover of a firm’s stock for the year prior to the 
13D filing. Liquidity mitigates the free-rider problem (Maug 1997) and is therefore expected 
to have a positive effect on the targeting probability and cumulative abnormal returns. Healy
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et al. (1999) are among researchers that have used share turnover as a measure of liquidity. 
Brav et al. (2006), on the other hand, use Amihud liquidity measure in their univariate tests.
Activism type dummies: are dummy variables that represent the 7 different categories of 
demands set out by activist hedge funds in the Item 4: Purpose of Transaction section of the 
Schedule 13D. These categories include: general, corporate governance, demand sale, capital 
structure, strategy, oppose merger, and financing. The categories are not mutually exclusive. 
For example, when Jana Partners on March 3 2005 demanded Kerr-McGee Corp to sell its 
chemicals business, distribute returns to shareholders as well as proposed to nominate 
directors, dummy variables demand sale, capital structure, and corporate governance receive 
values of one and others would equal zero. The purpose of the inclusion of these variables in 
the OLS models is to control for the cross-sectional variation in returns between the types of 
activism.
SIC dummies: are dummy variables that represent the ten one-digit SIC codes (0-9). For 
example, a manufacturing firm with a two-digit SIC code of 31 would have a dummy variable 
equal to one for a one-digit code of three and zero otherwise. This inclusion in the regression 
models will control for possible industry effects that may be occurring in the data.
Year dummies: are dummy variables that represent the individual years in the study. For 
example, the Schedule 13D filed at Cutter and Buck Inc on July 21 2004 by Pirate Capital 
LLC is assigned a dummy equal to one for the year 2004 and zero for all other years. The 
purpose for the inclusion of these variables is to control for possible time effects. In OLS 
regressions, these variables control for the cross-sectional variation in returns over time.
4.4 Methodology
This section describes the methodologies applied in this study. Fist subsection elaborates on 
the logistic model that is used to examine the determinants of hedge fund activism. Second 
subsection presents the event study methodology. Finally, the third subsection describes the 
OLS regression model used to analyse the sources of shareholder gains.
4.4.1 Multivariate logit model
In an attempt the examine the determinants of hedge fund activism I compare characteristics 
of firms that were targeted by activist hedge fund with those of firms that were not targeted. 
In particular, I do this by estimating a multivariate logit probability model to specify the 
functional relationship between a firm’s characteristics and its likelihood of being targeted by
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an activist hedge fund. Similar models have been used to evaluate factors that affect the 
likelihood of takeovers (Palepu 1986, Lehn and Poulsen 1989), shareholder activism (Smith 
1996, Wahal 1996), and block share purchases by active individual investors (Bethel et al. 
1998).
The multivariate logit model specifies the probability, Py, that firm i will belong to event j 
(e.g., be a target of activist hedge fund if j = 1, or a non-target if y = 0) as a function of a 
vector, Z„ of measured characteristics, X¡, of the firm i. As described in Dougherty (2002), the 
probability of the occurrence of the event is determined by the function:
(2)
where
(3)Z, = ßjXi = ß0 + ßxX\ +... + ßnXl
whereßl is a vector and/?0,Д are the individual parameters (corresponding to firm
characteristics Xt ) to be estimated. The parameters of the model are estimated by maximum 
likelihood estimation. The maximum likelihood estimation will yield consistent estimators 
which are asymptotically efficient, that is, efficient in large samples.
There is no measure of goodness of fit equivalent to R2 in maximum likelihood estimation to 
measure the model’s explanatory power. In default, numerous measures have been proposed 
for comparing alternative model specifications. However, Ameniya (1981) recommends 
considering more than one measure, including the pseudo- R~ and chi-squared, and comparing 
the results. Nevertheless, the standard significance tests are similar to those for the standard 
regression model. The significance of an individual parameter/coefficient can be evaluated via 
its t statistic.
4.4.2 Cumulative abnormal returns
To evaluate the shareholder wealth effects of hedge fund activism I examine abnormal returns 
to target firm shareholders around the 13D filing date by activist hedge funds. This study uses 
standard market model based event study methodology presented by Brown and Warner 
(1985) and reviewed by Weston et al. (2004) to determine the cumulative abnormal returns to 
shareholders around the targeting date.
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The market returns (Rml) are based on the logarithmic daily returns for the S&P 500 index. 
The returns for a particular hedge fund activism target firm shareholders (/?„) are regressed on 
the market returns for the clean estimation period of-300 to -51 days before the 13D filing 
date (t=0) to get the market model parameter «, and Д estimates for the respective firm using 
the market model:
R„ =a,-ßiRml+e„, (4)
where Rm, is the return on the market index for day /, Д measures the sensitivity of returns of 
firm i to the market return, a, measures the mean return not captured by the market return 
and Д, and where the disturbance term, sit, has mean zero and is independent of Rm, . The 
abnormal return to firm i shareholders on day / (AR„) is then calculated using the market 
model parameters obtained from equation (1) in the following formula:
AR„ =Rll-ä,-ß,Rml. (5)
Once abnormal returns for the respective firm and the time period are determined, cumulative 
abnormal return for firm i for the duration of the event window around 13D filing date (t=0) is 
calculated by summing together the daily abnormal returns (AR„):
CAR,.M = f,AR„- <6>
l=p\
where p\ and p2 are the starting and ending days of the event window, respectively. 
Cumulative abnormal returns are calculated for the entire sample of activist hedge fund 
targets, as well as their subsamples.
4.4.3 OLS regression model
In addition to explaining the likelihood of being targeted by an activist hedge fund, firm 
characteristics should explain cross-sectional variation in cumulative abnormal returns around 
the 13D filing dare. Hence, I estimate the cumulative abnormal returns as a function of firm 
characteristics and control for targeting year and activism type. For this purpose, I perform 
ordinary least squares regressions of CARs around the initial 13D filing on various 
independent variables described in Section 4.3.2.
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The OLS model, as laid out by Dougherty (2002), assumes that variable Y (the cumulative 
abnormal return around the event date) depends on k-1 explanatory variables X2,..., Xk 
according to a true, unknown relationship
Y,=ß+ß2X2l+... + ßkXkl+u,. (7)
Given a set on n observations on Y, X2,..., Xk, least squares regression in used to fit the 
equation
Y¡ =bx +b2X2i + ... + bkXki. (8)
This is done by minimising the sum of the squares of the residuals, which are given
bye, = Yi-Yl, by choosing bk so as to minimise . The regression coefficient of
/=1
each X variable provides an estimate of its influence on Y, controlling for the effects of all 
other X,. To evaluate the joint explanatory power of the variables included in the regression 
model, 1 use the F test of goodness of fit, the null hypothesis being Ho: ßk = 0 . The t tests test
the significance of the coefficient of each variable individually.
Table 4 summarises the hypotheses that will be tested in this thesis and the corresponding 
variables. Table 4 also shows the expected signs of variables in both multivariate logistic and 
OLS regressions. Not surprisingly, the expected signs in logit and OLS regressions are same 
without exception as activist hedge funds are ultimately motivated by profits.
Table 4: Hypotheses, variables, and economic theory
The table summarises the hypotheses formulated in Sections 3.1, gives the variable names (and theories they are proxying for) that are used 
to test the hypotheses. The table also presents the expected sign of each variable’s coefficient in both logistic and ordinary least squares 
regressions.
Hypothesis Variable Proxying for Expected sign
Targeting probability Shareholder gains
HI Net-of-market return Managerial performance Negative Negative
H2 Free cash flow Agency problems Positive Positive
H3 Sales growth Growth opportunities Negative Negative
H4 Cash ratio Agency problems, takeover deterrence Positive Positive
H5 Debt ratio Agency problems, takeover deterrence Negative Negative
H6 Diversification Agency problems, undervaluation Positive Positive
H7 Tobin's q, Industry q, Abnormal q
Undervaluation, perfomance, growth opportunities Negative Negative
H8 Insider ownership Agency problems, takeover deterrence Negative Negative
H9 Institutional ownership Mitigation of the free rider problem Positive Positive
1111 Ln (market capitalisation) Size (wealth constraints) Negative Negative
H12 R&D dummy Difficulty of improvement implementation Negative Negative
H13 1 liquidity Mitigation of the free rider problem Positive Positive
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5 Results and analysis
This section presents and analyses the empirical results of this thesis. Section 5.1 compares 
target firms to nontargets, examines the correlations between variables and, most importantly, 
presents the multivariate logistic regression estimates about the relations of targeting 
likelihood and firm characteristics. Section 5.2 examines the CARs associated with hedge 
fund activism. Section 5.3 investigates the relations between CARs and firm characteristics.
5.1 Determinants of hedge fund activism
5.1.1 Univariate analysis
Table 5 on the next page presents descriptive statistics for the entire sample of 470 hedge fund 
activism targets and 18,696 nontarget control firms-years. Table 5 also reports the t-statistics 
for differences in means and Wilcoxon test statistics for differences in medians for each 
variable between targets and control firms. For some variables the number of observations is 
smaller due to missing data and omission of outliers14.
14 The problem of missing data is especially severe in case of net-of-market returns as some firms do not have 
enough price history. Second, data on institutional ownership are gathered from SEC database, which does not 
have data on all firms in the sample. Cash ratio and sales growth are affected by the exclusion of outliers at 1% 
level.
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Table 5: Descriptive statistics and univariate tests
The table shows mean and median values of variables for target and control samples, and the corresponding twO tailed t-statistics for equality 
of means and Wilcoxon test statistics for equality of medians. The target sample consists of 470 NYSE, NASDAQ, and AMEX listed firms 
that were subject to a 13D filing by an activist hedge fund in 2000-2006 and the control sample consists of 18,696 firm-years that were not. 
Nel-of-market return (S&P 500) is the one year unadjusted return prior to the 13D filing year less same penod return on S&P 500 index; Net- 
of-market return (Fama-French 2x3) is the one year unadjusted return prior to the 13D filing year less same period return on respective 
Fama-French 2x3 market/book and size portfolio; Free cash flow is earnings before depreciation and amortisation less tax, interest, dividends 
and share repurchases divided by total assets; Cash ratio is the cash and marketable securities divided by total assets; Debt ratio is the total 
debt divided by total assets; Sales growth is the average geometric growth rate in firm’s sales for a two year period before the 13D filing 
year; Diversification is the number of business segments for which a firm reports four-digit SIC code; Tobin ’s q is the sum of market value 
of equity and book value of debt divided by the book value of assets; Industry q is the median Tobin’s q of firms in the same Fama-French 48 
industry; Abnormal q is the percentage difference between Tobin’s q and industry q\ Insider ownership is the percentage of closely held 
shares as reported by Thomson Financial; Institutional ownership is the percentage of shares held by institutional investors as reported by 
Thomson Financial; Market capitalisation is the year end market value of firm’s common stock; R&D dummy is a dummy variable that 
equals one if the firm reported R&D expenditures, and zero otherwise; Liquidity is the mean yearly share turnover of a firm’s stock. For 
each variable, ***, **, and * indicate that the value for target firms is significantly different from the value for control firms at the 1%, 5%, 
and 10% levels, respectively.
Control sample______ ______ Target sample______ Difference test
Variable Mean Median n Mean Median n Means (t) Medians (z)
Net-of-market return (S&P 500) 0.03 0.05 17 659 -0.04 -0.03 451 -2.69 “ -3.21 “
Net-of-market return (Fama-French Z\3) 0.15 0.06 17 734 0.00 -0.04 451 -4.98 ™ -4.31 ”
Free cash flow 0.01 0.06 18 696 0.03 0.05 470 2.50 0.70
Cash ratio 0.19 0.09 18 490 0.18 0.11 467 -1.16 0.70
Debt ratio 0.20 0.17 18 696 0.20 0.18 470 0.00 0.70
Sales growth 0.23 0.10 18 124 0.11 0.06 466 -7.04 ■” -5.92 -
Diversification 2.37 2.00 18 696 2.51 2.00 470 1.48' 1.60
Tobin's q 2.14 1.55 18 477 1.60 1.32 470 -11.58 •” -7.10™
Industry q 1.71 1.53 18 696 1.68 1.56 470 -1.68'• 1.58
Abnormal q 0.27 0.00 18 477 -0.04 -0.15 470 -12.66-• -8.86 ™
Insider ownership 0.28 0.24 18 692 0.25 0.22 450 -2.96 -1.15
Institutional ownership 0.59 0.66 16 416 0.66 0.73 329 4.31 - 3.76 •"
Market capitalisation 3629.88 340.97 18 696 997.13 260.87 470 -15.03™ -2.71 ™
R&D dummy 0.49 0.00 18 696 0.44 0.00 470 -1.79" -1.78 '
Liquidity 2.33 1.13 18 696 1.73 1.22 464 1.57’ 1.07
Activist hedge fund targets differ from control firms with regard to several characteristics. 
The most prominent result of Table 5 is the difference in valuation variables Tobin’s q, 
industry q, and abnormal q. For target firms, mean and median Tobin’s q are significantly 
lower compared to control firms at 1% level, suggesting either that targets are undervalued or 
have limited growth prospects. The results are comparable to Brav et al. (2006) who report 
significantly lower Tobin’s q for activist hedge fund targets. The split of Tobin’s q into 
industry q and abnormal q provides more interesting results. For targets, industry q is 
significantly lower only in the mean at 5% level, suggesting that target firms face somewhat 
lower growth opportunities than nontargets or come from undervalued industries. The most 
profound result relates to abnormal q. Mean and median abnormal q for targets are -3.89% 
and -15.00%, respectively, suggesting that they are substantially undervalued compared to
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their Fama-French 48 industry peers. The differences in abnormal q are significant at 1% 
level.
Table 5 also shows target firms have significantly underperformed the S&P 500 index while 
control firms appear to have slightly overperformed the S&P 500 when the returns are 
calculated for a period of one year ending before the 13D filing year. Similarly, when the net- 
of-market returns are calculated based on six Fama-French 2*3 size and market/book 
portfolios, targets fare significantly worse than control firms. When the net-of-market returns 
are calculated over a 2 year period prior to targeting (not reported), the differences are similar, 
although not significant when the benchmark index is the S&P 500. These results support the 
hypothesis that target firms should experience poor performance prior to targeting. In 
contrast, existing research on hedge fund activism indicates either that hedge fund targets’ 
performance is at par with control firms (Brav et al. 2006) or that target firms overperform 
control firms (Klein and Zur 2006). The differences may be attributed to the fact that they use 
size and market/book matched control groups. Klein and Zur (2006) also compare activist 
hedge fund targets to firms that were subject to 13D filings by nonhedge fund activists and 
find similar results. The fact that their samples are smaller and from shorter periods of time 
may also affect the results.
Table 5 also reports free cash flow for the entire sample. Mean and median free cash flow for 
targets are 2.79% and 5.00%, respectively, compared to 0.79% and 6.00% for control firms. 
The difference is only significant in the mean at 1% level. Similar results are obtained for 
return on assets (not shown). These results suggest that target firms enjoy, on average, 
somewhat higher cash flows that nontargets, but the differences arise because some target 
firms appear to have extremely high free cash flow, while majority of them enjoy merely 
average cash flows when compared to control firms. These results are somewhat different to 
those obtained by Brav et al (2006) who report significantly higher cash flows for target 
firms. Targets also experience lower sales growth compared to nontargets. The significantly 
lower sales growth for target firms implies that although free cash flow does not differ 
significantly among targets and nontargets, targets retain too much cash given their lower 
growth opportunities. The combination of slightly above average cash flows and significantly 
lower growth opportunities indicates that target firms are susceptible to agency problems. It 
should be noted that Brav et al. (2006) do not report lower sales growth for targets. Again, 
this discrepancy probably arises from their choice of size and market/book matched control
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group. Using market/book as matching criteria implicitly controls for growth opportunities so 
it is not surprising that they do not find differences in sales growth.
An interesting aspect regarding the results of Table 5 is that there are no significant 
differences in cash ratio or debt ratio between targets and nontargets. On closer inspection of 
the data, it appears that among the control group there are many firms with extremely high 
cash ratio. Even after excluding outliers at 1% level from the top, highest cash ratios remain 
well above 90%. This has substantial effects on univariate results. However, this skewness is 
less likely to cause bias in multivariate logit regressions because maximum likelihood 
estimation is used. Brav et al. (2006) find that target have significantly lower cash holdings 
and higher leverage. Klein and Zur’s (2006) findings in terms of cash ratio and debt ratio are 
similar to this thesis. However, when compared to nonhedge fund activist targets, Klein and 
Zur (2006) report significantly higher cash holdings for activist hedge fund targets.
When considering other target characteristics, there are several important differences between 
hedge fund targets and control firms. Targets appear to be slightly more diversified than 
control firms, a finding that is in line with Brav et al. (2006). However, the difference is only 
significant in the mean at 10% level. Higher diversification may indicate information 
asymmetries and, hence, undervaluation. The prospect of breaking up a highly diversified 
firm may also attract activist hedge fund interest. Although the result regarding diversification 
is similar to Bethel et al. (1998) who examine activist investors in the 1980s, it should be 
noted that their results are more robust, indicating that targeting excessively diversified firms 
may have been peculiar to the 1980s. This view is consistent with the increase in corporate 
focus towards 1990s documented by Comment and Jarrell (1995). Table 5 also shows that 
insider ownership is lower for target firms, although the difference is only significant in the 
mean at 1% level. This result is consistent with agency theory as higher managerial ownership 
helps to align interests between managers and shareholder (Jensen and Meckling 1976). High 
insider ownership may also deter activist hedge funds because it is harder win control in firms 
with high insider ownership (Stulz 1988). Brav et al. (2006) nor Klein and Zur (2006) do not 
include insider ownership in their choice of variables, so no comparison to previous activist 
hedge fund research can be made. However, this result is in line with previous literature that 
examines the characteristics of firms involved in takeovers (McConnell and Servaes 1991), 
proxy fights (Faleye 2004), and shareholder activism (Smith 1996).
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Moreover, target firms appear to be smaller than control firms when measured with market 
capitalisation. The mean and median market capitalisation for targets are $997 million and 
$261 million, respectively. Corresponding figures for the control group are $3.63 billion and 
$340 million, which are both significantly larger than those of targets at 1% level. The results 
regarding target size are comparable to those of Brav et al (2006) and Klein and Zur (2006).
Table 5 also shows that target firms come from less R&D intensive industries, have higher 
institutional ownership, and lower liquidity. Mean R&D dummy value for target firms is 0.44, 
compared to 0.49 for nontargets, indicating that targets are less R&D intensive firms. This 
result is in line with the analysis of Kahn and Winton (1998) who argue that improvements 
are harder to implement in R&D intensive firms. Higher institutional ownership can be 
explained by the fact that institutional investors can mitigate the free-rider problem (Shleifer 
and Vishny 1986).
Table 6: Descriptive statistics for activism type subsamples
The table shows mean values of variables for activism type subsamples and control sample and the test statistics of an F-test for differences 
in means between subsamples for each variable. The target sample consists of 470 NYSE, NASDAQ, and AMEX listed firms that were 
subject to a 13D filing by an activist hedge fund in 2000-2006 and the control sample consists of 18,696 firm-years that were not. Net-of- 
market return (S&P 500) is the one year unadjusted return prior to the 13D filing year less same period return on S&P 500 index; Net-of- 
market return (Fama-French 2x3) is the one year unadjusted return prior to the 13D filing year less same period return on respective Fama- 
French 2x3 market/book and size portfolio; Free cash flow is earnings before depreciation and amortisation less tax, interest, dividends and 
share repurchases divided by total assets; Cash ratio is the cash and marketable securities divided by total assets; Debt ratio is the total debt 
divided by total assets; Sales growth is the average geometric growth rate in firm’s sales for a two year period before the 13D filing year; 
Diversification is the number of business segments for which a firm reports four-digit SIC code; Tobin 's q is the sum of market value of 
equity and book value of debt divided by the book value of assets; Industry q is the median Tobin’s q of firms in the same Fama-French 48 
industry; Abnormal q is the percentage difference between Tobin’s q and industry q, Insider ownership is the percentage of closely held 
shares as reported by Thomson Financial; Institutional ownership is the percentage of shares held by institutional investors as reported by 
Thomson Financial; Market capitalisation is the year end market value of firm’s common stock; R&D dummy is a dummy variable that 
equals one if the firm reported R&D expenditures, and zero otherwise; Liquidity is the mean yearly share turnover of a firm’s stock. For 














F-stat Prob > F
Net-of-market return (S&P 500) 0.03 -0.02 -0.09 -0.11 0.05 -0.25 0.08 1.61 0.14
Net-of-market return (Fama-French) 0.15 0.01 -0.04 -0.04 0.11 -0.23 0.12 1.61 0.14
Free cash flow 0.01 0.04 -0.01 0.05 0.02 0.04 0.04 3.17" 0.00
Cash ratio 0.19 0.17 0.20 0.18 0.17 0.21 0.22 1.1 0.36
Debt ratio 0.20 0.20 0.22 0.20 0.22 0.22 0.25 0.84 0.54
Sales growth 0.23 0.12 0.02 0.08 0.14 0.04 0.04 4.44“ 0.00
Diversification 2.37 2.51 2.38 2.50 2.52 2.35 2.25 0.4 0.88
Tobin's q 2.14 1.65 1.50 1.41 1.44 1.41 1.52 1.46 0.19
Industry q 1.71 1.68 1.68 1.60 1.68 1.61 1.70 0.78 0.59
Abnormal q 0.27 -0.01 -0.13 -0.10 -0.12 -0.12 -0.11 1.36 0.23
Insider ownership 0.28 0.26 0.27 0.23 0.27 0.24 0.23 0.87 0.52
Institutional ownership 0.59 0.66 0.62 0.67 0.64 0.68 0.62 0.59 0.74
Market capitalisation 3629.88 986.32 636.57 1061.08 927.99 988.42 1538.74 0.48 0.83
R&D dummy 0.49 0.46 0.42 0.40 0.38 0.35 0.50 0.55 0.77
Liquidity 2.33 1.66 1.38 1.81 1.57 1.92 2.44 2.65" 0.02
Number of observations 18 969 305 103 72 58 31 24
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Table 6 presents mean values of variables for the control sample and for each activism type 
subsample. In general, target firm characteristics do not differ significantly among 
subsamples, but there are significant differences with regard to three variables. First, targets 
attracting capital structure and oppose M&A type of activism overperform the market during 
the year prior to targeting while other targets appear to suffer from underperformance. 
Second, it appears that targets of corporate governance related proposals fare significantly 
worse than other targets when measured with free cash flow. Finally, there are significant 
differences in sales growth between targets in different categories. Targets in general and 
capital structure categories appear to experience higher than average sales growth in two years 
prior to targeting when compared to other targets. On the other hand, targets of corporate 
governance, strategy, and oppose M&A related proposals seem to experience significantly 
lower sales growth than targets in general.
5.1.2 Correlations
Table 7 presents a matrix of the pairwise correlations between the explanatory variables as 
well as theirs correlations with an activist dummy variable which identifies firms that are 
targeted by activist hedge funds. This analysis will accomplish to equally important goals. 
First, it will provide preliminary insights into the relation between the occurrence of hedge 
fund activism and firm characteristics. Second, it helps to detect multicollinearity between the 
explanatory variables. A high level of correlation between explanatory variables may induce 
statistical instability in the regressions, suggesting that such variables should not be used 
simultaneously in regression models.
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Table 7: Pairwise correlations matrix
The table shows pairwise correlation coefficients between variables used in this study. The sample covers 2000-2006 and consists of 470 
NYSE, NASDAQ, and AMEX listed firms that were subject to 13D filings by activist hedge funds and 18,696 firm-years that were not. 
Activism dummy is a dummy variable that equals one for firms that were subject to 13D filings by activist hedge funds and zero otherwise; 
Net-of-market return (S&P 500) is the one year unadjusted return prior to the 13D filing year less same period return on S&P 500 index; Net- 
of-market return (Fama-French 2x3) is the one year unadjusted return prior to the 13D filing year less same period return on respective 
Fama-French 2x3 market/book and size portfolio; Free cash flow is earnings before depreciation and amortisation less tax, interest, dividends 
and share repurchases divided by total assets; Cash ratio is the cash and marketable securities divided by total assets; Debt ratio is the total 
debt divided by total assets; Sales growth is the average geometric growth rate in firm’s sales for a two year period before the 13D filing 
year; Diversification is the number of business segments for which a firm reports four-digit SIC code; Tobin's q is the sum of market value 
of equity and book value of debt divided by the book value of assets; Industry q is the median Tobin’s q of firms in the same Fama-French 48 
industry; Abnormal q is the percentage difference between Tobin’s q and industry q\ Insider ownership is the percentage of closely held 
shares as reported by Thomson Financial; Institutional ownership is the percentage of shares held by institutional investors as reported by 
Thomson Financial; In (mar ket capitalisationjis the natural logarithm of year end market capitalisation; R&D dummy is a dummy variable 
that equals one if the firm reported R&D expenditures, and zero otherwise; Liquidity is the mean yearly share turnover of a firm’s stock. For 
each pair of variables, ***, **, and * indicate that the correlation coefficient is different from zero at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, 
respectively.
Variable (i) (2) (3) (4) (5) («) P) (8) P) (1°) (U) (12) (13) (14) (13) (16)
(1) Activism dummy 1.00
(2) Net-of-market return (S&P500) -0.02 " 1.00
(3) Net-of-market return (Fama-French) -0.01 * 0.45“ 1.00
(4) Free cash flow 0.01 0.10“' 0.01 1.00
(5) Cash rano -0.01 -0.04 " 0.03“ -0.38 “ 1.00
(6) Debt ratio 0.00 -0.01 -0.02 " 0.07“ -0.47™ 1.00
(7) Sales growth -0.03 “ -0.06 “ 0.01 -0.03 “ 0.16™' -0.06 ™ 1.00
(8) Diversification 0.01 " 0.01 ’ -0.03 “ 0.08 -0.24 ™ 0.19 -0.07 " 1.00
(9) Tobin's q -0.05 “ 0.25“ 0.11 “ -0.18“ 0.40™' -0.28 ™' 0.16“ -0.13 “ 1.00
(10) Industry q -0.01 0.05" 0.04“ -0.14 “ 0.41 ™' -0.24 " 0.11 -0.14“ 0.39 1.00
(11) Abnormal q -0.05 - 0.24 ™ 0.10 -0.05 0.25™ -0.21 0.13 " -0.08 “ 0.87 -0.02 1.00
(12) Insider ownership -0.02 “ -0.02 “ 0.00 -0.01 0.00 0.00 0.04“ -0.16™ -0.06 -0.04 -0.04 1.00
(13) Institutional ownership 0.03“ 0.07" -0.01 0.15“ -0.09 “ 0.10 ' 0.00 0.16™ 0.03 -0.10 0.07 -0.32 “ 1.00
(14) In (market capitalisation) -0.02 “ 0.13™' 0.00 0.14“ -0.07 ™' 0.09™’ 0.03“ 0.30™ 0.22 ' -0.01 0.26™ -0.35 0.60 ~ 1.00
(15) R&D dummy -0.01 * -0.04 “■ 0.01 * -0.09 ™ 0.37™ -0.28 0.06 -0.02 ~ 0.22 0.33 0.10 -0.10 -0.03 0.01 1.00
(16) Liquidity 0.00 0.02™' 0.02 ~ 0.00 0.01 " -0.01 " 0.02™ 0.00 0.02™ 0.02 0.03™ -0.01 ' 0.01 0.01 0.01 1.00
Table 7 shows that there is a significant negative relation between the activism dummy and 
net-of-market return variables. The correlation coefficient for net-of-market return is higher 
and significant at 1% level when the S&P 500 is used as a benchmark index, compared to 
lower correlation coefficient and only 10% significance between activist dummy and Fama- 
French adjusted returns. The valuation variables Tobin’s q and abnormal q are also 
significantly negatively related to the occurrence of hedge fund activism. The correlation with 
sales growth and activism dummy is also negative and significant at 1% level. Furthermore, 
the correlation between activism dummy and free cash flow is positive but insignificant, a 
result that is in line with the univariate tests. Similarly, cash ratio and debt ratio have small 
correlations with activism dummy and are not significantly different from zero. In addition, 
there is a positive and significant relation between the activism dummy variable and 
diversification. Table 7 also shows that there is a negative and significant relation between the 
activism dummy and natural logarithm of market capitalisation, insider ownership, and the 
R&D dummy. The relation between the occurrence of activism and institutional ownership is 
significantly positive.
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Table 7 also shows some interesting results with respect to the relations between the 
explanatory variables. First noteworthy aspect of Table 7 is the high negative correlation 
between cash ratio and free cash flow. This can be explained by cross-sectional differences in 
investment opportunities and operating needs. Indeed, Opier et al. (1999) model cash as a 
function of growth opportunities, volatility of cash flow, access to capital markets, and the 
cost of raising funds through assets sales and dividend cuts. Therefore, for example, firms 
with high and less volatile cash flows should hold less cash. Their model also explains the 
high and significantly negative correlation between cash and diversification. In addition, low 
Tobin’s q firms require less cash as they face fewer investment opportunities, which is 
evident from the negative correlation coefficient between Tobin’s q and cash ratio.
The second notable aspect is the correlations between valuation variables: Tobin’s q, industry 
q, and abnormal q. While there is a very high and significant correlation of 0.89 between 
Tobin’s q and abnormal q, the correlation coefficient between industry q and abnormal q is 
quite small. This indicates that one should not use Tobin’s q and abnormal q simultaneously 
in logistics regression. Using industry q instead of Tobin’s q alleviates problems arising from 
multicollinearity.
5.1.3 Multivariate logit regressions
This section provides answers to the main question of this thesis: why are some firms targeted 
by activist hedge funds while others are not? 1 begin the analysis by estimating logistic 
regressions with various specifications for the full target sample relating the probability of 
hedge fund activism to various explanatory variables described in Section 4.3.2. I then 
estimate logistic regressions for each subsample based on activism type. In each regression, 
the dependent variable is a binary variable that equals one for targets and zero for nontargets. 
The target sample consists of 470 activist hedge fund targets in 2000-2006. The nontarget 
control group consists of 18,696 NYSE, NASDAQ, and AMEX listed firm-years that were 
not subject to 13D filings by activist hedge funds in 2000-2006.
Table 8 reports the coefficients from six multivariate logit regressions for the full hedge fund 
activism sample and control firms. Table 8 uses S&P 500 index as a benchmark for net-of- 
market return while Table 9 uses Fama-French adjusted returns. Model I in both tables does 
not include variables derived from Tobin’s q. Tobin’s q is added to Model II. In Model III, 
Tobin’s q is decomposed into industry q and abnormal q, which allows the assessment of 
firm-specific undervaluation. Debt ratio is dropped from Model IV due to the fairly high
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correlation between cash and debt ratios. In Model V, cash is dropped and debt is 
reintroduced to the model. Finally, institutional ownership variable is included in Model IV 
(It was excluded from Models I-V due to low number of observations).
Table 8: Logit regressions using S&P500 as performance benchmark
The table reports the maximum likelihood regression coefficients and corresponding t-statistics (in parentheses under each coefficient) along 
with x2, corresponding p-value, and pseudo R2 for six logit regression models on the sample covering 2000-2006 and consisting of 470 
NYSE, NASDAQ, and AMEX listed firms that were subject to 13D filings by activist hedge funds and 18,696 firm-years that were not. In 
each regression, the dependent variable is a dummy variable that equals one for firms that were subject to 13D filings by activist hedge funds 
and zero otherwise. Independent variable Net-of-market return is the one year unadjusted return prior to the 13D filing year less same period 
return on S&P 500 index; Free cash flow is earnings before depreciation and amortisation less tax, interest, dividends and share repurchases 
divided by total assets; Cash ratio is the cash and marketable securities divided by total assets; Debt ratio is the total debt divided by total 
assets; Sales growth is the average geometric growth rate in firm’s sales for a two year period before the 13D filing year; Diversification is 
the number of business segments for which a firm reports four-digit SIC code; Tobin s q is the sum of market value of equity and book value 
of debt divided by the book value of assets; Industry q is the median Tobin’s q of firms in the same Fama-French 48 industry; Abnormal q is 
the percentage difference between Tobin’s q and industry q, Insider ownership is the percentage of closely held shares as reported by 
Thomson Financial; Institutional ownership is the percentage of shares held by institutional investors as reported by Thomson Financial; 
Infmarket capitalisation)^ the natural logarithm of year end market capitalisation; R&D dummy is a dummy variable that equals one if the 
firm reported R&D expenditures, and zero otherwise; Liquidity is the mean yearly share turnover of a firm’s stock; SIC dummies are dummy 
variables that represent the ten one-digit SIC codes; Year dummies are dummy variables that represent the individual years. All variables are 
calculated as of the year end before the I3D filing. For each coefficient, ***, *♦, and * indicate that the coefficient is different from zero at 
the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.
Dependent variable: 1 f target, 0 otherwise
Independent variables I II III IV V VI
Net-of-market return -0.2474 *" -0.0633 -0.0505 -0.0526 -0.0474 0.0081
(-2.55) (-0.61) (-0.49) (-0.51) (-0.46) (0.06)
Free cash flow + 1.1185 ■" 1.0439 *** 1.0660’" 1.1010’" 0.9648 "* 0.2908
(2.97) (2.41) (2-44) (2.53) (2.34) (0.59)
Cash ratio + -0.2064 0.2935 0.3243 0.4066 * 0.1036
(-0.67) (0.94) (1.02) (1.36) (0.27)
Debt ratio . 0.0351 -0.2280 -0.2483 -0.3600 -0.6490 "
(0.11) (-0.7) (-0.76) (-1.17) (-1.67)
Sales growth -0.8233 "* -0.5930 "■ -0.5799 -0.5858 "* -0.5680 "■ -0.5490 "’
(-4.02) (-3.04) (-2.98) (-3.01) (-2.95) (-2.32)
Diversification + 0.0713 “ 0.0417 0.0399 0.0389 0.0346 0.0772 "
(2.09) (1.20) (1.15) (1.12) (1.01) (1.92)
Tobin's q - -0.4281 ***
(-5.85)
Industry q - -0.4446 -0.4383 "* -0.4235 "* -0.3611 ”’
(-3.02) (-2.98) (-2.98) (-2.04)
Abnormal q . -0.8012*" -0.7923 "■ -0.7709 *“ -0.9022 "*
(-6.02) (-5.98) (-5 94) (-5.37)
Insider ownership - -0.0086 **' -0.0082 -0.0083 "* -0.0083 '" -0.0083 "■ -0.0044 "
(-3.32) (-3.19) (-322) (-3.25) (-3.24) (-1.36)
Institutional ownership + 0.0157 ""
(5.73)
In (market capitalisation) - -0.1403 -0.0799 "* -0.0736 "* -0.0763 *" -0.0747 "" -0.1930 ***
(-4.96) (-2.65) (-2.42) (-2.53) (-2.46) (-4.08)
R&D dummy -0.1719 ' -0.0779 -0.0611 0.0001 -0.0251 -0.0684
(-1.33) (-0.59) (-0.46) (0.03) (-0.19) (-043)
Liquidity + -0.0048 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 -0.0023
(-0.23) (0.00) (0.04) (0.03) (0.05) (-0.08)
Intercept -3.5543 "" -1.5012 " -3.0356 *“ -3.0988 "" -3.0014 "* -3.8726 *"
(-9.96) (-2.21) (-6.80) (-7.06) (-6.75) (-7.63)
SIC dummies yes yes yes yes yes yes
Year dummies yes yes yes yes yes yes
Number of observations 17 535 17 408 17 408 17 408 17 554 15 360
thereof targets 430 430 430 430 432 307
thereof non targets 17 105 16 978 16 978 16 978 17 122 15 0532
X 228.78 270.86 276.91 276.32 278.62 256.25
(p-value) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Pseudo R2 0.0567 0.0672 0.0687 0.0685 0.0687 0.0851
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Overall, after controlling for size, industry, and years, the results indicate that undervalued 
firms suffering from agency problems are significantly more likely to be targeted by activist 
hedge funds. As shown in Table 8, the likelihood of targeting significantly negatively related 
to abnormal q and industry q in all model specifications, suggesting that activist hedge funds 
look for undervalued firms in low q industries. As the effects of abnormal q are robust across 
different specifications, the results strongly support the undervaluation hypothesis.
The significantly positive coefficients across Table 8 for free cash flow are in line with 
Jensen’s (1986) free cash flow theory. The likelihood of targeting increases in free cash flow 
in all models except in Model VI that includes the institutional ownership variable. 
Corroborating evidence in support of the free cash flow hypothesis is found from the fact the 
likelihood of targeting significantly decreases in sales growth in all models. Regression 
results also show that the likelihood of targeting is positively related to diversification, an 
indication agency problems as well as bust-up potential, but not in a robust manner given the 
insignificant coefficients in Models II to V. Moreover, although the coefficients on net-of- 
market return are negative as expected, they do not appear to have any significant impact on 
the targeting probability, except in Model I, where Tobin’s q is not included. This is 
surprising given the highly significant differences in net-of-market return between target and 
control firms in the univariate tests. The findings are inconsistent with the empirical evidence 
on institutional investor activism, where poor stock price performance increases targeting 
probability (see, e.g. Karpoff 1998, Gillan and Starks 1998).
Also, the coefficients for cash ratio are generally positive but insignificant, Model IV being 
the exception with a significant coefficient for cash ratio at 10% level. Similar results are 
obtained for debt ratio: the coefficients are generally negative but fail to gain any significance, 
except when the institutional ownership variable is introduced in Model VI. Even though the 
coefficients for cash ratio and debt ratio are generally insignificant, an important conclusion 
can be drawn from the evidence: activist hedge funds do not appear to be deterred by cash or 
leverage. This is not always the case for corporate acquirers who are sometimes deterred by 
high leverage and high cash holdings (Pinkowitz 2002, Harford 1999).
As shown in Table 8, ownership structure variables also take expected signs. Firms with high 
insider ownership are significantly less likely to become targets of activist hedge funds. 
However, the significance of the coefficient of the insider ownership variable decreases from 
1% to 10% level when institutional ownership is introduced to the equation in Model VI. This
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may be explained by the significantly negative correlation of -0.32 between the two variables. 
Nevertheless, the effects of insider ownership are robust and in line with agency theory. As 
can be observed from Model IV, the probability of targeting is significantly positively related 
to institutional ownership, suggesting that activist hedge funds look for companies where 
incumbent institutional investors help to alleviate the free-rider problem, or alternatively 
failed their monitoring duty or that they more likely to support the hedge fund’s agendas.
Furthermore, the coefficient for ln(market capitalisation) is significantly negative across all 
specifications, indicating that hedge funds are wealth constrained as they avoid larger firms. 
Also, smaller firms may be susceptible to informational asymmetries and undervaluation 
(Myers and Maljuf 1984). When considering other control variables, the coefficients of the 
R&D dummy are negative as expected but insignificant in all models. Liquidity, too, fails to 
obtain any significance. As a whole, the models are all significant at 1% level as shown by the 
high chi-squared values but have quite low explanatory power. However, this is in line with 
previous literature that uses logistic models in similar context (see, e.g. Palepu 1986, Opier et 
al. 1998).
As there is some variation in the patterns of coefficients and significance between different 
specifications in Table 8, closer examination of Models I-VI is warranted. The most notable 
difference is the fact the net-of-market return variable obtains 1% significance in Model I, but 
the effect fails to persist in Models II-VI. Model I does not include variables derived from 
Tobin’s q, which naturally leads to the conclusion that the significant coefficient for net-of- 
market return in the model is simply a market/book effect. However, the significance persists 
in Table 9 where size and market/book adjusted returns are used, but this may arise from that 
fact that I only divide firms into three groups based on book/market, which may not be 
sufficient to capture all its effects.
Additionally, the coefficient for and significance of cash ratio varies somewhat from model to 
model. The negative, although insignificant, coefficient for cash in Model I can be explained 
with the market/book effect since low Tobin’s q firms hold less cash, as indicated by the 
positive and significant correlation coefficient of 0.40. Indeed, after controlling for Tobin’s q, 
the sign of the coefficient turns positive, as expected. Moreover, the coefficient for cash ratio 
becomes significant at 10% level in Model IV, where debt ratio is not included due to the high 
correlation between these variables. The coefficients for debt ratio behave similarly to those 
of the cash ratio, which means that the above analysis also applies in the case of debt ratio.
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The coefficients for diversification also show variation across different specifications. In 
Models I and VI, the probability of hedge fund activism increases significantly in 
diversification at 5% level, but the coefficients loose significance in Models II-V, although t- 
statistics are still reasonably high. Interestingly, in Model VI, the coefficient for 
diversification is significantly positive even though the model controls for market/book effect 
by using abnormal q and industry q. Moreover, free cash flow looses its significance and debt 
ratio becomes significant at 5% level in Model VI. The discrepancies between Models I-V 
and Model VI may be due to selection bias as data on institutional ownership are only 
available for some firms. On closer inspection, it appears that firms for which Thomson 
provides institutional ownership data are significantly larger when measured by market 
capitalisation.
Robustness checks
As a robustness check, I estimate the same logistic regressions as show in Table 8 using 
Fama-French adjusted returns, which control for size and book/market effects, in calculating 
net-of-market return variable. The results of these regressions are shown in Table 9. In 
general, the pattern of coefficients and significance are very similar to those obtained from 
Table 9, which leads me to conclude that the results are robust to the choice of benchmark in 
calculating net-of-market returns. It should be noted, however, that the t-statistics for the 
coefficients of net-of-market return increase slightly in all models except in Model I, 
suggesting that activist hedge funds put more emphasis on prior returns when compared to a 
more relevant benchmark. This result is somewhat similar to the findings in Morck et al. 
(1989) showing that tendency of the board to replace CEOs decreases with industry adjusted 
rather than the market adjusted performance.
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Table 9: Logit regressions using Fama-French 2x3 portfolios as performance benchmark
The table reports the maximum likelihood regression coefficients and corresponding t-statistics (in parentheses under each coefficient) along 
with x2, corresponding p-value, and pseudo R2 for six logit regression models on the sample covering 2000-2006 and consisting of 470 
NYSE, NASDAQ, and AMEX listed firms that were subject to 13D filings by activist hedge funds and 18,696 firm-years that were not. In 
each regression, the dependent variable is a dummy variable that equals one for firms that were subject to 13D filings by activist hedge funds 
and zero otherwise. Independent variable Net-of-market return is the one year unadjusted return prior to the 13D filing year less same period 
return on respective Fama-French 2x3 market/book and size portfolio; Free cash flow is earnings before depreciation and amortisation less 
tax, interest, dividends and share repurchases divided by total assets; Cash ratio is the cash and marketable securities divided by total assets; 
Debt ratio is the total debt divided by total assets; Sales growth is the average geometric growth rate in firm’s sales for a two year period 
before the 13D filing year; Diversification is the number of business segments for which a firm reports four-digit SIC code; Tobin 's q is the 
sum of market value of equity and book value of debt divided by the book value of assets; Industry q is the median Tobin’s q of firms in the 
same Fama-French 48 industry; Abnormal q is the percentage difference between Tobin’s q and industry q, Insider ownership is the 
percentage of closely held shares as reported by Thomson Financial; Institutional ownership is the percentage of shares held by institutional 
investors as reported by Thomson Financial; Infmarket capitalisation7is the natural logarithm of year end market capitalisation; R&D dummy 
is a dummy variable that equals one if the firm reported R&D expenditures, and zero otherwise; Liquidity is the mean yearly share turnover 
of a firm’s stock; SIC dummies are dummy variables that represent the ten one-digit SIC codes; Year dummies are dummy variables that 
represent the individual years. All variables are calculated as of the year end before the 13D filing. For each coefficient, ***, **, and * 




Dependent variable: 1 if target, 0 otherwise
I II III IV V VI
Net-of-market return -0.2276 -0.0876 -0.0777 -0.0792 -0.0736 -0.0139
(-2.70) (-1.00) (-0.88) (-0.90) (-0.85) (-0.14)
Free cash flow + 1.0621 *" 1.0396'" 1.0672 1.1023 0.9661 0.3078
(2.85) (2.44) (2-48) (2.57) (2.39) (0.63)
Cash ratio + -0.1947 0.2952 0.3243 0.4081 ' 0.1006
(-0.64) (0.94) (1.02) (1.37) (0.26)
Debt ratio 0.0315 -0.2319 -0.2519 -0.3638 -0.6545 "
(0.10) (-0.72) (-0.78) (-119) (-1.68)
Sales growth -0.8176 -0.5941 ™ -0.5817 - -0.5875 -0.5699 *“ -0.5534 “'
(-4.00) (-3.04) (-2.99) (-3.02) (-2.97) (-2.34)
Diversification + 0.0704 “ 0.0410 0.0393 0.0382 0.0340 0.0771 ”
(2.07) (1.19) (1.14) (ui) (0.99) (1.92)
Tobin's q - -0.4245 “
(-5.83)
Industry q - -0.4397 "* -0.4333 -0.4188 “* -0.3578 '"
(-2-99) (-2.95) (-294) (-203)
Abnormal q - -0.7945 "* -0.7856 -0.7646 *” -0.8976 ***
(-6.01) (-5.97) (-5.93) (-5.75)
Insider ownership . -0.0085 -0.0081 -0.0082 ’** -0.0083 -0.0082 “* -0.0043 '
(-3.31) (-3.17) (-3.20) (-3.23) (-3.22) (-1.35)
Institutional ownership + 0.0157
(5-75)
In (market capitalisation) - -0.1416 *" -0.0793 -0.0730 ■'* -0.0757 ™ -0.0740 -0.1925 "*
(-5.03) (-2.64) (-2.40) (-2.51) (-2-44) (-4.07)
R&D dummy -0.1589 -0.0751 -0.0591 -0.0487 -0.0231 -0.0688
(-1.23) (-0.57) (-0.45) (-0.37) (-0.18) (-0.44)
Liquidity + -0.0004 0.0001 0.0002 0.0002 0.0002 -0.0023
(-0.07) (0.02) (0.06) (0.06) (0.07) (-0.08)
Intercept -1.7580 -1.5532 " -1.5466 “ -1.6389"' -3.0204 -3.7095 '"
(-261) (-2.30) (-2.22) (-2.39) (-6.83) (-6.94)
SIC dummies yes yes yes yes yes yes
Year dummies yes yes yes yes yes yes










































As a further robustness check, I estimate the logistic regressions in Tables 8 and 9 using two 
year net-of-market returns in order to test whether the performance factor becomes significant 
when using returns from a longer period of time, but 1 do not report these results. The results
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obtained using the two year returns are comparable to those reported earlier. Again, net-of- 
market return fails to gain any significance in predicting targeting probability after controlling 
for cross-sectional differences in investment opportunities. Surprisingly, as a result of using 
two year returns, diversification becomes significantly positively related to the targeting 
probability at least at 10% level in every model.
In addition, I examine the sensitivity of results to changes in the specification of control firms 
by estimating regressions using a different subset of the control sample. While my control 
sample does not include any cases of hedge fund activism in 2000-2006, it does include a 
great deal of firms that were subject to other kinds of corporate control activity, such as 
takeovers, proxy fights, shareholder activism by institutional investors, and bankruptcies. 
These events may be driven by the same underlying reasons and therefore affect the results of 
the regressions. Therefore, I exclude from the control group all firms that are reported to be 
“inactive” in Thomson Worldscope at the end of 2006 and conduct similar logistic regressions 
as in Tables 8 and 9 (not reported). In spite of the difference in firms that make up the control 
group in these regressions, I obtain the same pattern of coefficients and significance as in 
Tables 8 and 9. Thus, the findings do not appear to depend on the specification of the control 
sample.
5.1.4 Logit regressions for activism type subsamples
I also estimate logistic regressions for six subsamples according to the type of demands set 
forth in the 13D filing. The subsamples are: 1) general, 2) corporate governance, 3) capital 
structure, 4) strategy, 5) sale of the company, and 6) merger opposition related demands. I do 
not estimate logistic regressions for firms to whom activist hedge funds were willing to 
extend financing as there are only two such cases. Elaboration on these categories can be 
found in Section 4. The model specification used in the regressions of each subsample is the 
same as Model III in Tables 8 and 9.
It should be noted that there are two equally important shortcomings in this type of analysis. 
First, even though estimating separate regressions for each subsample allows me to analyse 
how different factors affect targeting likelihood in each subsample, it does not specifically test 
whether the factors are different from subsample to subsample. More importantly, if the same 
variable is found to affect the targeting likelihood, it is impossible to test in which subsample 
its effects are the strongest or the weakest. Thomas (1997) offers a partial solution to the 
problem. He suggests that one runs a logit regression where the dependent variable is one for
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one subsample and zero for others. But, as Thomas (1997) notes, this approach only tests 
whether the characteristics of firm differ between subsamples, not their impact on targeting 
likelihood. Similar analysis of target characteristics between subsamples is carried out in 
Section 5.1, but using a different methodology. Another approach commonly used in 
empirical literature is the multinominal logit model (binominal logit is used in this thesis). 
However, the dependent variables in multinominal logit should be, at least in some way, 
ordinal, which they certainly are not in this thesis.
General
The first column of Table 10 on the following page shows logistic regression estimates for the 
subsample of 281 activism events with general demands to increase shareholder value and 
control firm-years. The dependent variable equals one for activism targets and zero 
otherwise. The events were activist hedge funds stated specific demands are not included in 
the regressions. It should be noted, however, that analysis of this subsample is not very 
interesting because it covers over 50% of the full sample and results are therefore likely to be 
very similar to the regressions estimates obtained in the previous section.
As shown in Table 10, the net-of-market return does not appear to be a factor in determining 
targeting likelihood in this subsample, although the sign of the coefficient is as expected. The 
coefficients for free cash flow, cash ratio, and debt ratio follow similar pattern and obtain 
roughly the same levels of significance as they do in Tables 8 and 9. The same can be said for 
sales growth and diversification, although the coefficient for sales growth is only significant 
at 5% level for this subsample. There are no notable differences in the coefficients for 
industry q and abnormal q either. With respect to other variables, I do not find any notable 
differences in the pattern and significance of coefficients, indicating that the drivers for this 
type of activism do not differ significantly from activism in general. A more plausible 
explanation would be that as the number of events in the general category takes over 50% of 
the full sample, the results presented in Tables 8 and 9 are driven by the motives of hedge 
funds to engage in this type of activism. Therefore, it is of paramount interest to analyse the 
other subsamples separately.
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Table 10: Logit regressions for activism type subsamples
The table reports the maximum likelihood regression coefficients and corresponding t-statistics (in parentheses under each coefficient) for six 
different subsamples of hedge fund activism covering 2000-2006 and consisting of 470 NYSE, NASDAQ, and AMEX listed firms that were 
subject to 13D filings by activist hedge funds and 18,696 firm-years that were not. General category includes all events where the hedge 
funds do not specify any demands; rather they state a general demand to increase shareholder value through discussions with management. 
Corporate governance category includes events related to firing CEOs, changing board composition, or rescinding takeover defences. 
Demand sale category includes events where the hedge funds demand a sale of the target company, or some of its assets. Capital structure 
category relates to demands to disgorge excess cash. Strategy category includes events where the hedge fund’s aim is to change operating 
strategy Oppose M&A category includes events where the hedge fund is opposing a pending M&A deal. Categories are not mutually 
exclusive so one event can appear in more than one category. In each regression, the dependent variable is a dummy variable that equals one 
for firms that were subject to 13D filings by activist hedge funds and zero otherwise. Independent variable Net-of-markel return is the one 
year unadjusted return prior to the 13D filing year less same period return on S&P 500 index; Free cashflow is earnings before depreciation 
and amortisation less tax, interest, dividends and share repurchases divided by total assets; Cash ratio is the cash and marketable securities 
divided by total assets; Debt ratio is the total debt divided by total assets; Sales growth is the average geometric growth rate in firm’s sales 
for a two year period before the 13D filing year; Diversification is the number of business segments for which a firm reports four-digit SIC 
code; Tobin's q is the sum of market value of equity and book value of debt divided by the book value of assets; Industry q is the median 
Tobin’s q of firms in the same Fama-French 48 industry; Abnormal q is the percentage difference between Tobin’s q and industry q, Insider 
ownership is the percentage of closely held shares as reported by Thomson Financial; Institutional ownership is the percentage of shares held 
by institutional investors as reported by Thomson Financial; Infmarket capitalisationjis the natural logarithm of year end market 
capitalisation; R&D dummy is a dummy variable that equals one if the firm reported R&D expenditures, and zero otherwise; Liquidity is the 
mean yearly share turnover of a firm’s stock; SIC dummies are dummy variables that represent the ten one-digit SIC codes. Year dummies 
are dummy variables that represent the individual years. All variables are calculated as of the year end before the 13D filing. For each 
coefficient, ***, **, and * indicate that the coefficient is different from zero at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.








Net-of-market return -0.0410 -0.1058 -0.4088 ' 0.3427 -0.9112""' 0.6666
(-0.32) (-0.49) (-1.60) (1.21) (-2.72) (1.54)
Free cash flow + 1.3408 - -0.2612 3.3349 "" 0.8740 2.8498 '" 2.9162 "
(2.45) (-0.38) (2.73) (0.66) (1.81) (1.30)
Cash ratio + 0.0954 0.5550 0.7987 1.2606 ‘ 1.8956 "" 2.9845 ""'
(0.24) (0.84) (1.00) (1.43) (1.70) (2.32)
Debt ratio _ -0.2850 0.4628 -0.2137 0.4170 0.8270 1.8900
(-0.71) (0.71) (-0.26) (0.48) (0.71) (1.47)
Sales growth - -0.5057 " -1.4155 ™ -1.7067 - -0.7087 -1.4879 "" -1.1996
(-2.16) (-2.83) (-2.65) (-1.19) (-1.67) (-1.16)
Diversification + 0.0461 0.0297 0.0021 0.0873 -0.0729 -0.1070
(1.08) (0.39) (0.02) (0.92) (-0.53) (0.67)
Industry q - -0.3462 "" -0.7120 " -1.3334 " -1.1537 " -1.1444" -0.9945 "'
(-1.91) (-2.18) (-2.69) (-2.30) (-1.31) (-1.66)
Abnormal q -0.6366 -1.3527 ■" -1.1679 "" -1.3403 "" -1.2361 " -1.8640 ""
(-4.17) (-3.66) (-2.99) (-2.90) (-2.06) (-2.43)
Insider ownership - -0.0065 -0.0101 " -0.0154" -0.0088 -0.0175 "' -0.0117
(-2.05) (-1.81) (-2.26) (-1.25) (-1.65) (-1.01)
In (market capitalisation) - -0.0914 -0.1015 ■ -0.0458 -0.1087 0.0276 0.0290
(-2.45) (-1.50) (-0.60) (-1.25) (0.24) (0.22)
R&D dummy - -0.0670 -0.3044 0.1549 -0.3508 -0.1060 0.7946
(-0.41) (-1.08) (0.47) (-0.94) (-0.19) (1.29)
Liquidity + -0.0159 -0.0425 0.0006 0.0001 0.0164 0.0010
(-0.49) (-0.60) (0.15) (0.01) (0.31) (0.32)
Intercept -3.7252 -5.9238 -3.7441 """ -3.6577 -5.4456 -6.7968
(-6.61) (-4.98) (-3.03) (-2.96) (-3.24) (-3.68)
SIC dummies yes yes yes yes yes yes
Year dummies yes yes yes yes yes yes












































The second column of Table 10 shows logistic regression estimates for the subsample of 90 
corporate governance related activism events and control firms. This category included events 
where activist hedge funds demanded board seats, the CEO to be fired, or other mostly 
takeover defence related changes. The most interesting result obtained from this regression is 
the fact that the likelihood of corporate governance related activism is decreasing with free 
cash flow, indicating that activist hedge funds are more likely to demand managerial changes 
in firms that are underperforming in terms of accounting performance. Even though the free 
cash flow does not enter the model with any significance, it receives a negative sign only in 
the case of corporate governance related activism. This supports the finding in Section 5.1 
showing that firms targeted with corporate governance related proposals have negative free 
cash flow which is significantly lower compared to targets of other types of activism. The 
descriptive statistics also show that firms targeted with corporate governance proposals have 
experienced significantly lower sales growth in two years prior to targeting. Although the 
coefficient for sales growth is negative and highly significant, the results do not differ 
markedly when compared to the determinants of other types of activism. Similarly, the 
coefficients for other variables follow similar pattern and significance when compared to full 
sample and other types of activism, with the exception that the coefficient for market 
capitalisation is only significant at 10% level, indicating that size does not play that important 
role as it does in general.
Demand sale
One of the most radical requests set out by activist hedge funds in the 13D filings is the 
demand to sell the whole company or particular assets to the highest bidder. Column 3 of 
Table 10 shows estimated logistic regression coefficients for the subsample of 67 targets that 
were subject to such proposals. As shown in Table 10, the probability of being targeted with 
the intention of putting the company for sale decreases significantly in abnormal q and 
industry q. However, this result does not differ from the full sample regression estimates. 
Furthermore, the coefficients for free cash flow, sales growth, and insider ownership 
generally follow a similar pattern as the coefficients for the full sample in Table 8. However, 
in contrast to the pooled data, the likelihood of being targeted with sale and divestiture 
proposals is significantly negatively related to prior performance. The coefficient for net-of- 
market is significant at 10% level. This is consistent with Manne (1965) who argues that
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acquisitions occur in response to poor performance by incumbent managers. When activist 
hedge funds demand a sale of the company it implicitly suggests that the incumbent managers 
are to blame for the poor performance. Furthermore, even though sale and divestiture 
proposal targets are roughly of equal size with other targets, market capitalisation does not 
generally affect their targeting probability as it does for targets in general.
Capital structure
In the case where the activist hedge fund is proposing changes to capital structure, one would 
expect such variables as cash ratio and debt ratio to figure more prominently in target 
selection process when compared to other types of activism. Therefore, I estimate logistic 
regressions for the subsample of 53 activist hedge fund targets that were subject to a 13D 
filing whose purpose was to change the target firm’s capital structure through a share 
repurchase, dividend payment, or leveraged recapitalisation. The control group is the same as 
in earlier regressions. The results are presented in column 4 of Table 10. As shown in column 
4 of Table 10, the likelihood of becoming subject to capital structure proposals by activist 
hedge funds depends on somewhat different factors when compared to targets in general. 
Most importantly, firms who hold more cash in their balance sheet are significantly more 
likely to be targeted with capital structure proposals, as suggested by the positive and 
significant coefficients for cash ratio. Another notable difference is the positive, although not 
significant, coefficient for net-of-market return, suggesting that the likelihood of targeting 
increases rather than decreases with prior performance in the case of capital structure 
proposals. This result is in line with Jensen’s (1986) argument according to which firms with 
substantial free cash flow and cash reserves have done exceptionally well in the past. Table 10 
also shows that the probability of receiving capital structure proposals is significantly 
decreasing in abnormal q and industry q, a result that is in line with previous analysis. 
Furthermore, in contrast to earlier regression, sales growth, diversification, insider ownership 
and market capitalisation do not have very robust effects on the probability of receiving 
capital structure proposals.
Strategy
The fifth column of Table 10 shows logistic regression estimates for the subsample of 29 
firms that were targeted in an attempt to influence strategic and operational changes at target 
firms and control firms. As shown in column 5 of Table 10, the likelihood of becoming a 
subject to proposals that demand strategic changes at target companies is significantly
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negatively related to prior performance. The coefficient for net-of-market return is negative 
and significant at 1% level. The value of the coefficient is also substantially lower in this 
regression than others, indicating that prior performance is a decisive factor in determining 
the probability of this type of activism. This is also evident from the univariate analysis, 
which shows that firms subject to strategy related activism significantly underperform the 
market by 25% in the previous year. For comparison, the mean net-of-market return is only - 
3% for the full sample. This result is in line with Manne’s (1965) theory. Another notable 
difference is the positive and significant coefficient for cash ratio. When considering other 
variables, the significance of coefficients for abnormal q and industry q are only significant at 
5% level, indicating that undervaluation does not play that important role in the case of 
strategy related proposals. What is more, the coefficient for size is positive, indicating that 
size does not deter strategy related activism.
Oppose M&A
I also estimate logistic regressions for the subsample of 22 activist hedge fund targets that 
were subject to a 13D filing whose purpose was to oppose pending M&A deals. The control 
group is the same as in earlier regressions. The results are presented in the sixth column of 
Table 10. It should be noted that as a whole the model suffers from lack of significance, 
which can be explained with low number of observations for this category. Most interesting 
result of the regression in column six of Table 10 is the positive coefficient for the net-of- 
market return variable. The coefficient t-statistic is also quite high, but still insignificantly 
different from zero. The most plausible explanation is that net-of-market return variable for 
this activism type is affected by the pending M&A deal and corresponding premium in case if 
the firm is a target of a takeover bid. Indeed, univariate results show that oppose M&A 
category target firms overperform the market in the year prior to targeting. Second 
noteworthy aspect is that the probability of this type of activism is significantly positively 
related to cash ratio, as indicated by the 1% significance level. It is commonly suggested that 
corporate acquirers are tempted by the targets excessive cash holdings because disgorging 
excess cash provides a rather easy profit opportunity. Acknowledging this, activist hedge 
funds may be motivated to purchase shares in the target and block the acquisition so as to be 
part of this profit opportunity by pressuring managers of the target to pay the cash out 
themselves. Considering other variables, abnormal q and industry q are again significantly 
negatively related to targeting probability, with no notable differences compared to other
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categories. Interestingly, size obtains a positive coefficient in this regression, but it is not 
significantly different from zero.
Overall, the results in Table 10 suggest that the same probability model does not apply for all 
activism types. For example, the hypothesis that poorly performing firms are more likely to be 
targeted is valid in general, corporate governance, demand sale, and strategy categories, but 
fails to gain any support in the capital structure and oppose M&A categories. Indeed, it seems 
that the opposite is true for latter categories as suggested by the positive coefficients for net- 
of-market return. The explanation with regard to the oppose M&A category is obvious: the 
pending M&A deal that the hedge fund is opposing is probably affecting the returns. In the 
case of capital structure activism, Jensen’s (1986) hypothesis that firms with substantial 
amounts of excess cash have performed exceptionally well in the past may provide a plausible 
explanation.
Table 10 also provides some interesting results with respect to the free cash flow hypothesis. 
The regression coefficients for free cash flow are positive for all categories expect for 
corporate governance related activism where the coefficient is negative. This suggests that 
while majority of hedge fund activism events are driven by the motive to reduce agency 
problems the free cash flow hypothesis does not universally explain the occurrence of hedge 
fund activism. Indeed, the demands by activist hedge funds to fire CEOs, for example, may be 
driven by the fact that they are incompetent rather than entrenched. While higher cash ratio 
significantly increases targeting probability in case of capital structure, strategy, and M&A 
related activism, the same cannot be said for general, corporate governance, and demand sale 
categories. However, the coefficients for cash ratio are positive throughout Table 10 
indicating that excess cash plays at least a minor role in the decisions of activist hedge funds 
to engage in activism.
Another noteworthy aspect of Table 10 is the fact that diversification fails to gain any 
significance in predicting hedge fund activism likelihood. However, as shown in Tables 8 and 
9 diversification entered the model with significance only in cases where the regressions did 
not control for Tobin’s q suggesting that Tobin’s q, industry q, and abnormal q may be 
capturing all its effects. This is plausible given the empirical evidence suggesting that the 
excessive diversification may result in undervaluation (see, e.g. Berger and Ofek 1995). As 
also shown in Table 10, insider ownership takes expected sings in every regression. It fails to 
gain significance in capital structure and oppose M&A regression models, but this may be
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explained with the low number of observations for these categories. With regard to ln(market 
capitalisation) the results are somewhat more interesting. Size seems to significantly deter 
hedge fund activism only general and capital structure categories. Again, this may arise from 
the fact that these categories are those with the most observations. In demand sale and capital 
structure categories, ln(market capitalisation) obtains expected signs but fails the significance 
tests. In contrast, it has positive coefficient in the strategy and oppose M&A categories, but 
the t-statistics are extremely low.
Although there is some variation in the pattern of coefficients between different types of 
activism, two variables stand out from Table 10 as consistently obtaining significant 
coefficients with expected signs. Most importantly, the likelihood of hedge fund activism is 
significantly negatively related to abnormal q in all activism types, suggesting that 
undervaluation plays a very important in determining targeting probability. This is consistent 
with the hypothesis that activist hedge funds consistently seek undervalued targets. What is 
more, the probability of becoming a target is significantly negatively related to industry q in 
every category of activism. Together, these results suggest that activist hedge finds are more 
likely to target undervalued firms in undervalued or underperforming industries
5.2 Shareholder gains
This section investigates whether hedge fund activism creates shareholder value. Specifically, 
I do this by examining the cumulative abnormal returns to target firm shareholders around the 
initial 13D filing date. Positive cumulative abnormal returns around the 13D filing would 
indicate that hedge fund activism increases shareholder value. Insignificant returns would in 
turn be consistent with activism having no effect or a mixed effect - positive and negative. 
Finally, negative returns would indicate that hedge fund activism disturbs managers and has a 
detrimental effect on firm value.
5.2.1 Cumulative abnormal returns
Table 11 reports daily abnormal returns (AR) for the 470 13D filings during a 101-day event 
window extending from 50 days before through 50 after the initial 13D filing date, which is 
the first public announcement date of the activist hedge fund’s ownership exceeding 5% of 
the firm’s outstanding equity. Table 11 also presents the cumulative abnormal returns (CAR) 
for days from 50 days before through 50 days after the 13D filing. Two-tailed t-statistics is 
also provided for both ARs and CARs. I do not mark t-statistics for CARs with stars due to
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the fact that all CARs are significant at 1% level after day -10. Furthermore, the third and 
sixth columns of the table report the proportions of positive ARs and CARs on a given day, 
respectively. The CAR over the same period is also plotted in Figure 1. Figure 1 also includes 
CARs for the sample that includes the otherwise omitted financial firms to ensure robustness 
of results.
Table 11 : Abnormal returns around 13D filing date
The table reports mean daily abnormal returns (AR) and cumulative mean daily abnormal returns (CAR) for 470 firm that were subject to 
13D filing by activist hedge funds in 2000-2006 from 50 days before through 50 days after the initial 13D filing. The table also reports the 
percentage of positive ARs and CARs. The abnormal return is calculated based on the market model parameters estimated days of-300 to - 
51 using S&P500 as the market proxy. “T-stat” reports the test statistics of a two-tailed t-test for the null hypothesis of zero abnormal return. 
For each day, ***, **, and *, indicate that the AR is different from zero at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.
Event day
AR CAR
Mean t-stat % Positive Mean t-stat % Positive
-50 0.08% 0.493 47.63% 0.08% 0.493 48.83%
-40 -0.10% -0.783 46.15% 0.06% 0.121 50.74%
-30 -0.06% -0.226 48.45% -0.87% -1.136 49.68%
-20 0.41% 2.177 " 52.33% 0.41% 0.434 51.80%
-15 0.13% 0.529 48.94% 0.99% 0.946 50.32%
-14 -0.21% -1.423 45.76% 0.78% 0.724 50.53%
-13 0.32% 1.661 ' 50.00% 1.09% 0.998 51.59%
-12 0.31% 1.207 49.15% 1.41% 1.235 52.23%
-11 0.38% 2.257 " 48.73% 1.78% 1.571 52.44%
-10 0.45% 2.584 51.27% 2.23% 1.978 52.65%
-9 0.16% 1.274 50.21% 2.39% 2.091 52.87%
-8 0.15% 0.748 48.31% 2.54% 2.184 54.56%
-7 0.67% 3.163 •" 49.58% 3.20% 2.693 56.05%
-6 0.37% 2.434 " 52.75% 3.58% 3.029 56.69%
-5 0.39% 2.587 "" 54.66% 3.97% 3.308 55.63%
-4 0.32% 2.465 " 52.97% 4.29% 3.572 57.54%
-3 0.17% 1.050 47.88% 4.46% 3.689 57.54%
_2 0.47% 2.482 " 52.33% 4.94% 4.028 57.32%
-i 0.31% 2.243 " 52.12% 5.25% 4.295 58.17%
13D filing date 0.92% 4.675 *** 55.93% 6.16% 5.064 60.51%
1 0.58% 3.569 “• 54.66% 6.75% 5.521 61.36%
2 0.35% 2.458 ” 51.91% 7.09% 5.771 62.21%
3 0.07% 0.522 46.82% 7.17% 5.781 60.72%
4 -0.08% -0.630 46.61% 7.08% 5.675 61.36%
5 0.27% 1.725 ‘ 53.81% 7.35% 5.827 60.72%
6 0.30% 2.162 " 51.69% 7.65% 6.042 61.36%
7 0.43% 3.287 "• 52.33% 8.07% 6.305 62.42%
8 -0.07% -0.526 47.03% 8.00% 6.296 61.57%
9 -0.09% -0.783 49.79% 7.91% 6.174 60.51%
10 -0.06% -0.482 46.19% 7.85% 6.030 60.08%
11 0.21% 1.622 49.36% 8.06% 6.143 60.93%
12 0.00% 0.024 47.88% 8.06% 6.136 61.15%
13 0.23% 1.911 ' 52.97% 8.28% 6.261 61.36%
14 -0.23% -1.775 - 46.61% 8.06% 6.029 60.93%
15 0.24% 1.871 * 49.79% 8.29% 6.144 60.08%
20 0.26% 1.425 49.36% 8.12% 5.818 60.93%
30 0.33% 2.321 50.91% 8.77% 5.903 62.00%
40 0.20% 1.631 48.74% 9.07% 5.724 58.81%
50 -0.03% -0.302 44.50% 9.23% 5.535 59.02%
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Table 11 shows that the ARs for target firms begin accumulating well before the 13D filing 
date. It should be reiterated here that activist hedge funds must file the schedule 13D 10 days 
after exceeding the 5% ownership threshold. During the 10 day period, they can they can 
increase their holdings as much as they like and they have strong incentives to do so. By 
holding more shares they represent a more credible threat to the incumbents and are more 
likely to succeed. The 10 day period also mitigates the free-rider problem as they can increase 
their stake while the public is oblivious of their plans. Indeed, we observe the first cluster of 
significantly positive ARs on days -13, -11, and -10, slightly before the 10 day period, 
suggesting that the run-up may be caused by the hedge fund accumulating its 5% stake. We 
also observe a significantly positive run-up between days -7 and 0 with the exception of day - 
3 when the AR is not significantly different from zero. In total, the run-up in returns from 50 
days before through 1 day before the 13D filing date is 5.25%, which is considerably higher 
than 1.8% reported by Brav et al. (2006) but seems to be in line with that reported by Klein 
and Zur (2006) who do not report exact figures. The evidence is consistent with existing 
takeover literature, which accounts this run-up in the target’s share price to illegal insider 
trading or media rumours and pre-announcement share purchases by the eventual acquirer 
(see, e.g. Keown and Pinkerton 1981, Jarrell and Poulsen 1989, and Meulbroek 1992).
On the 13D filing date, hedge fund activist targets experience a significantly positive 
abnormal return of 0.92%. The returns remain significantly positive for the two following 
days, averaging 0.58% and 0.35% on days 1 and 2, respectively. The [0, 2] cumulative 
abnormal return of 1.85% is of similar magnitude that the 2.3% obtained by Brav et al. (2006) 
for the same period.
Overall, target firm shareholders gain on average 9.23% during the event window suggesting 
that hedge fund activism does create shareholder value. The CAR is significantly positive 
already from day -10 onwards. CAR reaches 6.16% at the 13D filing date and drifts about 3% 
upwards to 9.23% by day 50. The finding that over 60% of targets experience positive CARs 
during the 101 day event window lends further support for the hypothesis that hedge fund 
activism is value increasing. When a [-20, 20] window is used, the total CAR is 8.10% and 
the fraction of firms that earn positive returns is 65%. These results are somewhat higher than 
those obtained by Brav et al. (2006) who report a CAR of 6.8% during an event windows off- 
20, 20] days even though they use a smaller sample from a shorter period of time. Klein and 
Zur (2006) show that targets earn a return of 10.3% during a [-30, 30] day event window, but 
the higher returns can be attributed to the fact that they calculate only raw returns.
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Another explanation for the positive abnormal returns around the 13D filing date is that 
activist hedge funds provide a credible mechanism for signalling information to other 
investors. According to Chidambaram and John (1998), large institutional investors can 
convey private information that they obtain as a by-product of monitoring to other 
shareholders. Under this hypothesis, the 13D filing by an activist hedge fund conveys 
favourable information, such as undervaluation, to markets, which then results in an increase 
in share price. In this case, activist hedge funds do not improve firm performance per se, but 
let the market know that the firm is doing better than the market currently believes. The 
positive abnormal returns accompanied with strong evidence from logit regressions that 
activist hedge funds target undervalued firms are consistent with this hypothesis.
Alternative explanation for positive abnormal returns around the event date could be an 
increase in demand for the shares of the target firm. If the excess supply curve of the target’s 
shares is upward sloping, new demand could only be met at higher prices (see, e.g. Scholes 
1972, Mikkelsen and Parcth 1985). The significantly positive abnormal returns before the 10- 
day period are consistent with the increased demand hypothesis. However, the fact that we 
observe significantly positive abnormal returns on the 13D filing date, and after, is 
inconsistent with the hypothesis that increased demand is the sole cause of abnormal returns.
As a conclusion, the positive abnormal returns associated with 13D filings by activist hedge 
funds are consistent with the hypothesis that activist hedge funds can curb moral hazard and 
improve performance as well as with the undervaluation hypothesis. Investors seem to believe 
that activist hedge funds either improve firm performance or consistently target undervalued 
firms, which in turn results in a higher share price. I also present some evidence in support of 
the increased demand hypothesis, but this effect seems to play only a minor role in explaining 
share price increases associated with hedge fund activism.
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The figure shows mean daily abnormal returns (AR) cumulative abnormal returns (CAR) for 470 firm that were subject to 13D filing by 
activist hedge funds in 2000-2006 from 50 days before through 50 days after the initial 13D filing. I also include the CARs for the sample 
that includes financial firms as a robustness check. The abnormal return is calculated based on the market model parameters estimated days 
of -300 to -51 using S&P500 as the market proxy. The x-axis is the day relative to the 13D filing date. The у-axis is the cumulative abnormal 
return.




• CAR, Incl. financial firm»
i,l,I,I,i,I
Days relative to the 13D filing date
5.2.2 Cumulative abnormal returns by year
Given the substantial increase in the number of firms targeted by activist hedge funds from 
2000 to 2006 accompanied with the dramatic increase in the number of hedge funds pursuing 
activist strategy, examination of cumulative abnormal returns associated with hedge fund 
activism by targeting year is in order. The expectation is that returns from activism should 
decline due to diminishing returns and competition between activist hedge funds. This 
reasoning parallels the arguments of Bradley et al. (1988) according to which the best 
opportunities in the corporate acquisition market are taken first resulting in diminishing
returns over time.
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Table 12: Cumulative abnormal returns by year
The table reports mean cumulative abnormal returns on different event windows for 470 hrm that were subject to 13D tilings by activist 
hedge funds in 2000-2006 by 13D filing year along with the number of observations for each year. The table also reports the F-test statistics 
and corresponding p-values for difference in means between years. Panel A reports cumulative abnormal returns before the 13D filing date 
(day 0), Panel В around the 13D filing date, and Panel C after the 13D filing date. The abnormal return is calculated based on the market 
model parameters estimated days of-300 to -51 using S&P500 as the market proxy. For each mean cumulative abnormal return, ***, **, and 
* indicate that the value is different from zero at 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. Symbols, \b, and ‘ indicate that the mean CAR for 
particular event window differs between years at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.
Mean cumulative abnormal return by 13D filing year Difference test
Event window 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 F-stat Prob > F
Panel A: Cumulative abnormal returns before 13D filing date
CAR|.so,-i| 5.70% 9.53% 2.88% 12.83%'" 2.89% 5.42% "' 2.32% 1.47 0.187
CAR,.20,.,, 6.56% " 6.78% 8.54% *" 10.63%'" 3.61%"' 3.30% " 3.78% 2.21 b 0.0409
Panel B: Cumulative abnormal returns around 13D filing date 
13D filing date 0.27% 3.04% " -0.22% 0.34% 0.60% 1.48%"" 0.94% ” 2.17 11 0.0443
CA*tt1 4.00% ” 3.98% " 0.37% 2.91% " 2.10%'" 3.41% ~ 2.28% 1.14 0.3355
CAR|.20, 20J 11.83% '" 13.45% ' 9.46% •' 15.29%'" 5.36% " 6.40% '" 5.59%
2.6* 0.00172
CAR|.50, 501 19.27%'" 24.25% " 5.80% 22.83% 4.33% 7.84% "' 2.59%
3.82 ' 0.001
Panel C: Cumulative abnormal returns after 13D filing date ---------------------------
CAR,,, 20, 5.00% 3.63% 1.13% 4.32% '" 1.15% 1.63%" 0.88% 1.25 0.2777
CAR,, so. 13.30%" 11.68%" 3.13% 9.66% '" 0.84% 0.94% -0.68% 5.45- 0.000
Number of observations 22 26 33 68 88 108 125
Table 12 present the cross-section of cumulative abnormal returns for different event
windows according to the year of targeting. The CARs from 50 days before through 50 days 
after the 13D filing for each year are also plotted in Figure 2. Panel A of Table 12 reports 
cumulative returns for periods of 50 and 20 days prior to the 13D filing. The results show that 
13D filings are preceded by positive abnormal returns in every year. The magnitude of these 
returns is somewhat different from year to year, but there are no substantial differences that 
would warrant further analysis.
As shown in the Panel В of Table 12, the pattern of cumulative abnormal returns around 
different event windows lends support for the diminishing returns hypothesis. For event 
windows [-20, 20] and [-50, 50], the CARs are significantly higher in years 2000-2003 than in 
2004-2006. In 2000, 2001, and 2003 the CAR [.5o, so] are in the 20% region and highly 
significant, while returns in 2002, 2004, 2005, and 2006 all below 10% and generally 
insignificantly different from zero, with CAR [.50, so] for 2005 being the exception. The high F- 
stats for the CAR [-50, 50] and CAR ¡.20, 20] regressions indicate that the differences are 
statistically significant at 1% level. These results suggest that returns from hedge fund
82
activism have decreased over time, consistent with the finding of Bradley et al. (2006) that 
closed-end fund discount shrinks in anticipation of the open-ending attempts from hedge 
funds.
The picture is less clear when looking at CARs on shorter event windows that do not seem to 
diminish over time. The pattern of shorter event window CARs may be explained by 
increased interest in hedge fund activism by the financial press and investors in general. 
Interest in hedge fund activism has surely increased in recent years. For example, a search for 
U.S. news in Lexis Nexis database using words “hedge fund” and “activism” or “activist” by 
year produces 764, 403, 144, 112, 93, 62, and 94 hits for years 2006-2000, respectively. 
Furthermore, some investors are increasingly trying to benefit from hedge fund activism by 
buying shares in firms that are subject to 13D filings. There are even services that track 13D 
filings on the behalf of investors. This should result in the following pattern of returns: short 
term returns should be relatively high as increased demand pushes up prices right after the 
13D filing date thereby decreasing the post announcement drift in returns - that is, the 
markets should become more efficient. The returns at 13D filing date and during the [-2, 2] 
day window seem to support this hypothesis as more recent returns are more significant.
Furthermore, as shown in Panel C of Table 12, the post-announcement returns are 
significantly lower in 2004-2006 compared to 2000-2003. This has important implications to 
investors who are trying to mimic activist hedge funds. While the strategy of buying shares in 
firms subject to 13D filings at the end of day 0 has earned an average return of 3.04% in 50 
days, these returns have been significantly lower in 2004-2006 compared to 2000-2003. 
Indeed, in 2004-2006, the post 13D filing cumulative abnormal returns do not differ 
significantly from zero, suggesting that the entire effect of hedge fund activism on firm value 
is already in the share price at the end of the 13D filing day. In contrast, the returns in 2000, 
2001, and 2003 are positive and significant, indicating that investors tracking activist hedge 
fund purchases have been able to make abnormal gains.
Figure 2 and Figure 3 plot the cumulative abnormal returns by targeting year. Figure 2 plots 
mean daily abnormal returns from 50 days before through 50 days after the 13D filing date. 
Figure 3, on the other hand, plots aggregate mean CARs for 101, 41, and 5-day periods 
surrounding the 13D filing date. Figure 2 shows that the returns have declined significantly 
over time. Returns in 2000, 2001, and 2003 seem to be markedly higher than returns in 2002, 
2004, 2005, and 2006.
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The figure plots mean cumulative abnormal returns from 50 days before through 50 days after the I3D filing date for 470 firm that were 
subject to 13D filings by activist hedge funds in 2000-2006 by 13D filing year. The abnormal return is calculated based on the market model 
parameters estimated days of-300 to -51 using S&P500 as the market proxy The x-axis is the day relative to the initial 13D filing date (day 
0). The у-axis is the cumulative abnormal returns from 50 days before through 50 days after the 13D filing date
Figure 2: Cumulative abnormal returns for 101-day period around the 13D fding date by year
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As a robustness check, Figure 3 plots cumulative abnormal returns for different holding 
periods by targeting year. As shown in Figure 3, CARs for 101 and 41 -day event windows 
appear to decline over time with the exception that CARs are exceptionally low in 2002. The 
decline is not so evident from the 5-day event window CARs, but there still seem to be a 
slight decline in returns towards 2006.
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Figure 3: CAR до, од CAR [-20,201» CAR ,.2,21 and 13D filing date returns by year
The figure plots mean cumulative abnormal returns from 50, 20, and 2 days before through 50, 20, and 2 days after the 13D filing date for 
470 firm that were subject to 13D filings by activist hedge funds in 2000-2006 by 13D filing year. The abnormal return is calculated based 
on the market model parameters estimated days of -300 to -51 using S&P500 as the market proxy. The x-axis is the day relative to the initial 








5.2.3 Cumulative abnormal returns by activism type
Given the considerable heterogeneity in activist hedge fund demands at target companies, I 
also analyse the cross-section of cumulative abnormal returns by type of activism. As 
explained in Section 4.2.2, I divided hedge fund activism events into seven categories 
according to the type of demands set out in the Item 4 of the Schedule 13D for the target firm. 
Because the categories are not mutually exclusive, calculating simple means would not give 
the right picture of returns associated with each category. Therefore, 1 estimate OLS 
regressions that show how the CARs for different event windows correlate with the dummy 
variables corresponding to the 7 categories of activism type. The intercept is suppressed to 
zero to obtain coefficients that can be interpreted as mean abnormal returns for a particular 
category. The results are reported in Table 13.
The general category includes all events where the hedge funds do not specify any demands; 
rather they state a general demand to increase shareholder value. The corporate governance 
category includes all events related to firing CEOs, changing board composition, or 
rescinding takeover defences. The demand sale category includes events where the hedge 
funds demand a sale of the target company, or some of its assets, to a third party (in most 
cases) or to themselves. Capital structure category relates to demands with respect to 
disgorging excess cash through dividends, share repurchases, or leveraged recapitalisations. 
The strategy category includes events where the hedge fund’s aim is to change the target
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firm’s operating strategy. The oppose merger category includes all events where the hedge 
fund is opposing a pending M&A deal; either demanding a higher price for their shares or 
discouraging the target firm to go ahead with a planned acquisition. Finally, the financing 
category takes all events where a hedge fund is willing to extend financing to the target firm 
to implement growth strategies or help it in financial distress.
Table 13: Cumulative abnormal returns by activism type (OLS regressions with suppressed constant)
The table reports regression coefficients and corresponding t-statistics (in parentheses under each coefficient) for OLS regressions on 
cumulative abnormal returns for 470 firm that were subject to 13D filing by activist hedge funds in 2000-2006 using activism type dummies 
as independent variables. The table also reports model F-statistics and corresponding p-values. Activism type dummies represent the seven 
different categories of activist hedge fund demands at target firms: general, corporate governance, demand sale, capital structure, strategy, 
oppose M&A, and financing. Categories are not mutually exclusive. The constant term is suppressed to zero to obtain coefficient values that 
can be interpreted as mean abnormal returns for a particular category. Panel A reports cumulative abnormal returns before the 13D tiling date 
(day 0), Panel В around the 13D filing date, and Panel C after the 13D filing date. The abnormal return is calculated based on the market 
model parameters estimated days of -300 to -51 using S&P500 as the market proxy. For each coefficient, ***, **, and * indicate that the 
coefficient is different from zero at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. Symbols, \\ and ‘ indicate that the coefficients for each 
regression are different from each other at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.
Independent variables: Activism type dummies
F-stat Prob > FDependent variable General
Corporate
governance Demand sale Capital structure Strateg)1 Oppose merger Financing
CAR,.», 4.69% - 3.90% 1.99% 1.73% 2.17% 9.80% • 30.88% 3.3- 0.002
(3.03) (1.34) (0.58) (0.45) (0.43) (1.84) (1.63)
CAR,.» 4.38% - 4.01% - 3.15% 0.35% 2.95% 9.12%“ 20.26% * 7.9V 0.000
(4.69) (2.28) (1.52) (0.15) (0.96) (2.84) (1.77)
Panel B: Cumulative abnormal returns around 13D filme date ________________________ _______________________ __________________________________________ _
13D filing date 0.43% 0.37% 2.41%” 0.02% 0.25% 1.02% 3.24% 5.08* 0.000
(175) (0.79) (4.41) (0.03) (0.31) (1-18) (1.07)
CAR,.; 21 1.55% ” 2.50% “ 5.86% ~ -0.95% 0.54% 1.81% -8.25% 14.98* 0.000
(3.73) (3.18) (6.34) (-0.91) (0.39) (1.24) (-1.6I)
CARi 20 201 6.61% 6.99% “ 7.86% ~ -3.85% 5.88% 10.26%" 32.30% “ 12.7* 0.000
(5.57) (312) (2.98) (-1.29) (1.50) (2.46) (2.21)
8.40% " 8.66% ' -5.90% 9.05% 14.10%" 36.03% 5.28* 0.000
(3.67) (2.12) (1.86) (-1.12) (1.30) (1.91) (1.39)
Panel C: Cumulative abnormal returns after 13D filing date
CAR|| io] 1.88% ~ 2.58% " 2.30% * -4.27% ~ 2.70% 1.05% 8.78% 3.74* 0.001
(2.98) (2.17) (1.65) (-2.70) (1.30) (0.48) (1.13)
CAR|1-So| 2.72% ~ 4.13%“ 4.27%- -7.67% ” 6.62% ’ 2.71% 1.90% 3.86* 0.000
(2.65) (2.13) (1.87) (-2.97) (1.95) (0.77) (0.15)
Number of observations 305 103 72 58 31 24 2
The data exhibited in Table 13 suggests that there are substantial differences in returns 
between the activism type categories. With regard to CARpo, 20] and CARpso, 50], activism that 
opposes pending M&A deals yields the highest abnormal returns of 10.26% and 14.10%, 
respectively. This is reasonable because pending M&A deals may not go through without the 
support of the hedge fund’s at least 5% stake, giving them a strong bargaining position against 
possible acquirers. The short event window abnormal returns for this type of activism are also 
positive, yet insignificant. However, closer examination of abnormal returns in this category
i
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shows that a bulk of these returns accrue in the pre-13D filing period, suggesting that the 
pending M&A deal itself may account for most of the returns. Indeed, the cumulative 
abnormal returns preceding the 13D filing date are positive and highly significant (Panel A) 
while the returns after the 13D filing are not significantly different from zero (Panel B). This 
finding casts doubt on whether target firm shareholders gain from this type of activism. 
Nevertheless, the results reported herein are consistent with those of Brav et al. (2006), with 
the exception that they report slightly lower returns. This is probably due to the fact that their 
sample is from 2005-2006, when the returns are generally lower.
As shown in Table 13, activism that targets the sale of the target firm yields high and 
significantly positive returns that are robust for different periods. With regard to CAR [.20,20] 
and CAR [.50,50], this type of activism generated returns of 7.68% and 8.66%, respectively. 
Therefore, the results suggest that this type of activism does create shareholder value, a 
finding that is similar to Brav et al. (2006) A similar pattern of abnormal returns arise when 
looking at corporate governance and strategy categories. The returns generated by the 
corporate governance related activism for periods of 41 and 101 days around the 13D filing 
date are 6.99% and 8.40%, respectively. Brav et al. (2006) do not find positive abnormal 
returns for corporate governance related activism. This can be explained with the fact that 
about 50% of the corporate governance related activism takes place in 2000-2004, and 
therefore are not included in their sample. Activism aimed at improving target firm’s strategy 
yields abnormal returns of similar magnitude, but the returns are insignificantly different from 
zero except for the 41 -day period after the 13D filing. The returns for the 41 and 101-day 
periods are 5.88% and 9.05%, respectively. Similarly, the activism with no specific demands 
generates significantly positive returns of 6.61% and 7.74% for event windows [-20, 20] and 
[-50, 50], respectively. Moreover, when activist hedge funds are willing to extend financing to 
target firms, the abnormal returns are quite high, but insignificant due to the fact that there are 
only 2 such events in the sample.
Surprisingly, I find that activism that seeks to change the capital structure of target firms 
yields negative abnormal returns of -3.85% and -5.90% for the 41 and 101-day periods, 
suggesting that this type of activism does not increase shareholder value. Closer examination 
of the data reveals that only the post 13D filing date returns are significantly negative. A 
plausible explanation may be that once targeted with a capital structure proposal, investors 
learn about the firm’s limited growth opportunities, which offsets the possible effects of 
distributing excess cash to shareholders.
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The figure plots regression coefficients for OLS regression of cumulative abnormal return during 101-day event window surrounding the 
13D filing date for 470 firms that were targeted by activist hedge funds in 2000-2006 using activism type dummies as independent variables. 
Activism type dummies represent the seven different categories of activist hedge fund demands at target firms, general, corporate 
governance, demand sale, capital structure, strategy, oppose M&A, and financing. Categories are not mutually exclusive. The constant term 
is suppressed to zero to obtain coefficient values that can be interpreted as mean abnormal returns for a particular category. 1 he abnormal 
return is calculated based on the market model parameters estimated days of-300 to -51 using S&P500 as the market proxy. Y-axis is the 
coefficient in the OLS regression that can be interpreted as mean CAR. Activism type dummy variables are on the X-axis.












5.3 Sources of shareholder gains
In previous section I examined the cross-section cumulative abnormal returns associated with 
13D filings by activist hedge funds. This section, in turn, investigates CARs in a multivariate 
setting where numerous firm characteristics are applied to OLS model. I also control for the 
cross-sectional variation in returns by including dummy variables for targeting year, activism 
type, and industry in the regression models. It should be noted that neither Brav et al. (2006) 
nor Klein and Zur (2006) examine returns associated with hedge fund activism in a 
multivariate setting using firm characteristics as explanatory variables.
Table 14 reports the results of four multivariate regressions where the dependent variables are 
CAR t.5o, so], CAR [-20,20], CAR t.2,2], and the 13D filing date return, respectively. Independent 
variables are the ones also applied in the logit regressions in Section 5.1.3. However, I 
exclude the R&D dummy and liquidity as independent variables due to their extremely low 
significance in the logit and OLS models. I also exclude institutional ownership variable 
because it limits the number of observations. Furthermore, I add a dummy variable 
corresponding to type of activism to control for the cross-sectional variation in returns.
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The table reports OLS regression coefficients and corresponding t-statistics (in parentheses under each coefficient) for four OLS regressions 
models where the dependent variables are cumulative abnormal returns over event windows [-50 ,50], [-20, 20], [-2, 2], and [0, 0], where day 
0 is the initial 13D filing date. The abnormal return is calculated based on the market model parameters estimated of days -300 to -51 using 
S&P 500 index as market proxy. Independent variable Net-of-market return is the one year unadjusted return prior to the 13D filing year less 
same period return on S&P 500 index; Free cash flout is earnings before depreciation and amortisation less tax, interest, dividends and share 
repurchases divided by total assets; Cash ratio is the cash and marketable securities divided by total assets; Debt ratio is the total debt 
divided by total assets; Sales growth is the average geometric growth rate in firm’s sales for a two year period before the 13D filing year; 
Diversification is the number of business segments for which a firm reports four-digit SIC code; Industry q is the median Tobin’s q of firms 
in the same Fama-French 48 industry; Abnormal q is the percentage difference between Tobin’s q and industry q, Insider ownership is the 
percentage of closely held shares as reported by Thomson Financial; Infmarket capitalisation)^ the natural logarithm of year end market 
capitalisation; Activism type dummies represent the seven different categories of activist hedge fund demands at target firms: general, 
corporate governance, demand sale, capital structure, strategy, oppose M&A, and financing; SIC dummies are dummy variables that 
represent the ten one-digit SIC codes; Year dummies are dummy variables that represent the individual years. All variables are calculated as 
of the year end before the 13D filing. For each coefficient, ***, **, and * indicate that the coefficient is different from zero at the 1%, 5%, 
and 10% levels, respectively.




sign 5o| CAR|.2o,20| CAR,.2.2| CAR|0-o|
Net-of-market return -0.1797™ -0.0867 ™ -0.0282 ™ -0.0071 '
(-5.12) (-4.36) (-4.05) (-1.64)
Free cash flow + 0.2648 " 0.1237 ' -0.0467 41.0176
(2.01) (1.66) (-1.79) (-109)
Cash ratio + 0.2798 " 0.0599 0.0061 -0.0096
(2.31) (0.87) (0.25) (-0.64)
Debt ratio - 0.0912 0.0670 -0.0149 -0.0215
(0.87) (1.12) (-0.71) (-1.67)
Sales growth + -0.0553 -0.0101 0.0041 0.0198
(-0.85) (-0.27) (0.32) (2.49)
Diversification + 0.0030 -0.0087 0.0023 0.0024
(0.25) (-1.29) (0.97) (1.64)
Industry q - -0.0196 -0.0061 -0.0186 -0.0062
(-0.40) (-0.22) (-1.89) (-1.03)
Abnormal q - -0.0799 0.0102 0.0089 0.0009
(-1.86) (0.42) (1.04) (0.16)
Insider ownership - -0.0023 ™ -0.0011 -0.0001 -0.0001
(-2.39) (-2.13) (-0.37) (-0.62)
In (market capitalisation) - -0.0023 -0.0005 -0.0021 -0.0011
(0.09) (-0.07) (-0.83) (-0.74)
Constant -0.0213 0.1158 0.0846 0.0001
(-0.09) (0.85) (1.77) (0.03)
Activism type dummies yes yes yes yes
SIC dummies yes yes yes yes





















First column of Table 14 examines how CAR [.50, so] correlates with various target firm 
characteristics. The most prominent result of this regression is the highly significant negative 
coefficient for net-of-market return, suggesting that shareholders of firms that have performed 
extremely badly in the previous year gain more from the activist hedge fund intervention. 
This finding lends strong support for the hypothesis that activist hedge funds can successfully 
discipline poorly performing firms and improve performance. Moreover, the fact that higher 
returns come from worst performing firms indicates that changes in such firm are easier to 
implement and are more likely to increase shareholder value, as suggested by Kahn and 
Winton (1998).
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The regression results in the first column of Table 14 also show a positive and significant 
relation between CAR [.50,50] and free cash flow and cash ratio. These results are consistent 
with the argument of Jensen (1986) stating that value increasing takeovers occur in companies 
that have substantial free cash flow and are susceptible of agency problems. In the case of 
hedge fund activism, the positive relation between free cash flow, cash ratio, and returns may 
be explained by the fact that investors increase their expectation of firm value in anticipation 
of such value increasing takeovers. Also, the positive CARs associated with hedge fund 
activism may arise in anticipation of debt creation, which, according to Jensen (1986), helps 
to prevent nonvalue maximising behaviour on the part of managers. However, the negative 
returns associated with capital structure proposals contradict the latter argument. Empirically, 
the results for free cash flow and cash ratio are consistent with the findings of Lehn and 
Poulsen (1989) examining LBOs and free cash flow theory. They document a positive relation 
between free cash flow and premiums paid in LBOs. Similarly, the result for cash ratio is 
consistent with Faleye (2004) who finds that abnormal returns associated with proxy fight are 
positively related to excess cash holdings. These findings, accompanied by the fact free cash 
flow is significantly positively related to the probability of targeting, are consistent with the 
notion that activist hedge funds are able to target firms suffering from severe agency problems 
and improve their performance by mitigating these problems.
Furthermore, the results presented in Table 14 lend further support for the undervaluation 
hypothesis as the relation between CAR [-50,50] and abnormal q is significantly negative at 5% 
level. This finding suggests that investors regard the 13D filing by an activist hedge fund as a 
signal of undervaluation and adjust their assessment of target firm value accordingly. 
Moreover, the significantly negative coefficient for abnormal q indicates that the more the 
target is undervalued the higher the abnormal return at targeting will be. This result is 
consistent with the findings of Lang et al. (1989) and Servaes (1991) who document a 
negative relation between Tobin’s q and gains from takeovers. The fact that abnormal q 
predicts the probability of hedge fund activism as well as the associated returns in a 
statistically significant manner makes a compelling case in support of the undervaluation 
hypothesis.
Another noteworthy point in Table 14 is the significantly negative between CAR [.50,50] and 
insider ownership. This finding lends further support for the free cash flow hypothesis. As 
argued in Jensen (1986), free cash flow is a problem when agency costs are high. Insider 
ownership is often used as a proxy for the severity of agency problems. For example, Lehn
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and Poulsen (1989) divide their LBO sample into high and low insider ownership subsamples 
and find that the coefficients for free cash flow are significantly higher in the latter suggesting 
that smaller the insider ownership, greater the potential for agency costs. Thus, the finding is 
consistent with the notion that the room for improvement, and potential gains thereof, are 
higher in firms with greater problems of agency.
The second column of Table 14 reports the OLS regression coefficients of CAR [-20,20] on the 
same independent variables as the first column. The results are generally consistent with the 
first column regression of CAR [.50, sop Net-of-market return is significantly negatively 
related to the cumulative abnormal return, but the coefficient is slightly smaller. The 
coefficient for free cash flow is positive and significant, but also smaller. The relation 
between cash and cumulative abnormal return is positive, but insignificant. Furthermore, the 
coefficient for abnormal q looses its significance and the sign changes as well. The relation 
between insider ownership and CAR [-20, 20] is significant and negative, but only at 5% level 
compared to 1% significance in the first regression. The decrease in the significance of 
coefficients can be observed from the F-statistics and explanatory power of the second model, 
which are both smaller compared to the CAR [.50,50] regression. Overall, the results from this 
regression are consistent with disciplinary role of activist hedge funds, the free cash flow 
hypothesis, and agency problem hypotheses in general, as indicated by the significant 
coefficients for net-of-market return, free cash flow, and insider ownership.
The third column of Table 14 presents the estimates of OLS regression coefficients for the 
same independent variable using CAR [.2,2] as the dependent variable. The results obtained 
from this regression differ markedly from the two previous models. Net-of-market return is 
still significantly negatively related to CAR, but the coefficient is distinctly smaller. Free cash 
flow enters the model with a significantly negative coefficient, which is seemingly 
inconsistent with the free cash flow hypothesis. Moreover, median q enters the model first 
time with a significantly negative coefficient. This, however, supports the undervaluation 
hypothesis, and can be explained by the fact that investors may recognise that the target firm 
comes from an undervalued industry and adjust their expectations accordingly as they do not 
have time to thoroughly analyse the firm and spot firm-specific undervaluation. The fact that 
abnormal q receives a significant coefficient in the first regression, where the cumulative 
abnormal return period is 101 days, is consistent with this explanation. Generally, the lack of 
significance compared to the two previous models, may arise because shorter period returns 
may be driven by some other than fundamental factors. Indeed, a closer look at the activism
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type dummy variables reveals that the demand sale and financing dummies enter the model 
with significant coefficients explaining the increase in explanatory power.
A similar inconsistent pattern arises when the 13D filing date return is regressed on the same 
independent variables. The effect of net-of-market return endures in this model as well, but 
the significance level decreases to 10%. Surprisingly, the negative coefficient for debt ratio 
becomes significant at 5% level, which is consistent with the free cash flow hypothesis. This 
finding is similar to Haw et al. (1987) who suggest that lower returns for highly levered firms 
arise from the fact that their unused debt capacity is smaller. Even more surprising is the fact 
that sales growth enters the model with a positive and significant coefficient. This finding is 
similar to Lehn and Poulsen (1989). This is extremely puzzling given the highly significant 
negative coefficient for sales growth in the logit models. Neither I nor Lehn and Poulsen 
(1989) have an explanation for this seemingly inconsistent result. Overall, the results from 
this regression specification support the disciplining hypothesis but are largely inconsistent 
with agency cost and undervaluation hypotheses.
To analyse the effects of targeting year on cumulative abnormal returns in a more robust 
manner, I examine the coefficients of year dummy variables used in the Table 14 regressions 
separately. As shown in Section 5.2.2, returns from hedge fund activism have decreased 
significantly over time. This issue is revisited in Table 15 as it examines the effects of 
targeting year on CARs in a multivariate setting. Panel A of Table 15 plots the regression 
coefficients for year dummies of the four regression specifications presented in Table 14. 
Year 2000 is the omitted variable so the coefficients can be interpreted as a particular year’s 
effect on CARs when compared to that of year 2000. Panel В reports the coefficients as well 
as t-statistics for the year dummies. Consistent with the univariate analysis, the coefficients 
for year dummies seem to decline over time in the regressions where CAR [-50,50] and CAR [. 
20,20] are dependent variables. However, all coefficients for year dummies in these regressions 
have quite low values and are insignificantly different from zero. This result suggests that 
targeting years themselves do not affect CARs and raises the question whether Bradley et al.’s 
(1988) diminishing returns hypothesis is accurate in explaining the decline in returns from 
hedge fund activism. In fact, the results suggest that activist hedge funds have targeted 
different kind of companies in the early years or that targeted firms with certain 
characteristics have been especially profitable to activist investors in some years. For 
example, firms with low Tobin’s q may have been more attractive investments in the early
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years of the sample, but after the relatively long bull market in share prices in the U.S., the 
advantages of “value investing” may have diminished.
Table 15: Regression coefficients for year dummies from multivariate OLS regression of CARs
The table plots and reports OLS regression coefficients and corresponding t-statistics for targeting year dummies from four OLS regressions 
models from Table 14 where the dependent variables are cumulative abnormal returns over event windows [-50 ,50], [-20, 20], [-2, 2], and 
[0, 0], respectively, where day 0 is the initial 13D filing date. The abnormal return is calculated based on the market model parameters 
estimated of days -300 to -51 using S&P 500 index as market proxy. Year dummies are dummy variables that represent the individual years. 
All variables are calculated as of the year end before the 13D filing. Year 2000 is the omitted variable. Panel A plots the coefficients. Y-axis 
is the regression coefficient. X-axis is the year dummy variables. Panel В reports these coefficients and corresponding t-statistics. For each 
coefficient, ***, **, and * indicate that the coefficient is different from zero at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.






2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006
Targeting year (year 2000 omitted)
Panel B: Coefficients and t-statistics (in parentheses) for year dummies from multivariate OLS regressions of CARs
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006
CAR [.50, 50| (dropped) -0.017 -0.018 0.078 -0.068 -0.060 -0.127
n/a (-0.16) (-0.18) (0.83) (-0.77) (-0.68) (-1.46)
CAR [.20, 201 (dropped) -0.013 0.035 0.066 -0.018 -0.028 -0.041
n/a (-0.20) (0.60) (1.24) (-0.35) (-0.57) (-0.83)
CAR [„2_ 2| (dropped) 0.011 -0.028 -0.008 -0.002 0.003 -0.009
n/a (0.49) (-1.40) (-0.45) (-0.10) (0.19) (-0.54)
13D filing date (dropped) 0.025* -0.005 0.006 0.013 0.019* 0.013
n/a (1.85) (-0.36) (0.52) (1.20) (1.73) (1.21)
To analyse how activism type affects cumulative abnormal returns in a more robust manner, I 
also examine the coefficients for activism type dummy variables used in the Table 14 
regressions separately. As shown in Section 5.2.3, returns from hedge fund activism show 
significant cross-sectional variation between different activism types. The analysis presented 
in Table 16 re-examines this issue and investigates the effects of different activism types on 
CARs in a multivariate setting. Panel A of Table 16 plots the regression coefficients for 
activism type dummies of the four regression specifications presented in Table 14. Panel В
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reports the coefficients as well as t-statistics for the activism type dummies. Overall, the 
results from Table 16 indicate that even though activism type appears to have some impact on 
CARs, the effects are not robust in a multivariate setting as suggested by the fact that nearly 
all coefficients are insignificantly different from zero. This evidence suggests that activist 
hedge funds target different kinds of firms with different type of proposals and the unique 
firm characteristics in each category give arise to the cross-sectional differences in returns. 
The evidence casts doubt on the univariate results regarding the relations between shareholder 
gains and types of activism obtained in Brav et al. (2006) and in this thesis.
Table 16: Regressions coefficients for activism type dummies from multivariate OLS regression of CARs
The table plots and reports OLS regression coefficients and corresponding t-statistics for activism type dummies from four OLS regressions 
models from Table 14 where the dependent variables are cumulative abnormal returns over event windows [-50 ,50], [-20, 20], [-2, 2], and 
[0, 0], where day 0 is the initial 13D filing date. The abnormal return is calculated based on the market model parameters estimated of days - 
300 to -51 using S&P 500 index as market proxy. Activism type dummies represent the seven different categories of activist hedge fund 
demands at target firms: general, corporate governance, demand sale, capital structure, strategy, oppose M&A, and financing. However, 
financing category is excluded from this table as it includes only two activism events. Panel A plots the coefficients. Y-axis is the regression 
coefficient. X-axis is the activism dummy variables. Panel В reports the coefficients and corresponding t-statistics. For each coefficient, ***, 
**, and * indicate that the coefficient is different from zero at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.
Panel A: Plotted coefficients for activism type dummies from multivariate OLS regressions of CARs
Regression coefficient ■CAR (-50, 50]
-0.06 --------------------------------------------------------------------- ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Oppose M&A Strategy Demand sale Corporate governance General Capital structure
Activism type dummies
Panel B: Coefficients and t-statistics (in parentheses) for activism type dummies from multivariate OLS regressions of CARs






CAR |_5o, 5(1] 0.141 0.026 0.024 0.080 0.075 -0.010
(1.51) (0.36) (0.37) (1.51) (1.19) (-0.18)
CAR |_2o, 2(1] 0.068 0.009 0.025 0.042 0.009 -0.035
(1.29) (0.21) (0.68) (1.38) (0.24) (-1.16)
car,.2,2| 0.000 -0.016 0.044"' 0.006 -0.011 -0.014
(-0.01) (-1.09) (3.46) (0.56) (-0.89) (-1.31)
13D filing date 0.005 0.000 0.010 -0.001 -0.006 0.001
(0.47) (-0.02) (1.21) (-0.17) (-0.72) (0.18)
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6 Conclusions
In recent years, the market for corporate control in the U.S. has experienced a dramatic 
increase in hedge fund activism, yet this phenomenon has received virtually no attention in 
finance literature. Motivated by the increased importance of activist hedge funds in the 
market for corporate control, this thesis examines i) the determinants of hedge fund activism 
by comparing 470 activist hedge fund-target firm pairs to 18,696 control firms that were not 
targeted using multivariate logit specification, ii) shareholder gains from hedge fund activism 
by calculating cumulative abnormal returns around these activism events, and iii) the sources 
of gains from hedge fund activism in a multivariate setting using firm characteristics, and 
targeting year and activism type dummies as independent variables.
This thesis contributes to existing research in numerous ways. First, it provides a more 
comprehensive picture on the type of firms targeted by activist hedge funds and on the factors 
that affect targeting likelihood. Most importantly, this thesis extends the work of Brav et al. 
(2006) and Klein and Zur (2006) as it is the first paper to investigate the effects of 
undervaluation on targeting likelihood. In addition, this thesis examines the previously 
unexplored relation between targeting likelihood and variables such as sales growth, firm size, 
insider and institutional ownership. Third, this is the first paper to examine the cross-sectional 
variation in returns from hedge fund activism over time covering a period from 2000 to 2006. 
Fourth, this thesis is the first attempt to examine the relations between CARs and target firm 
characteristics in a multivariate setting. This analysis sheds additional light on hedge funds 
motives to engage in activism as well as on the type of firms that are most likely to benefit 
from hedge fund activism. Finally, compared to concurrent studies, the data used in this thesis 
cover a longer period of time from 2000 to 2006 and contain about four times as many hedge 
fund activism events.
The key finding of this thesis is that activist hedge fund targets are significantly undervalued 
compared to their industry peers and targeting likelihood is increasing significantly in the 
magnitude of undervaluation. Target firms are also characterised as having high free cash 
flow, low growth opportunities and low insider ownership when compared to control firms 
and such firms are also more likely to be targeted. This thesis also shows that hedge fund 
activism creates shareholder value, but returns have declined significantly in 2000-2006 due 
to increased competition of fewer attractive targets and to the fact that markets increasingly 
anticipate hedge fund activism. Finally, the thesis shows that CARs are negatively related to
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pre-targeting performance, positively related to free cash flow, and negatively related to 
insider ownership. CAR is also significantly related to abnormal q supporting the view that 
markets recognise that activist hedge funds are able to spot undervalued firms. The evidence 
supports the view that activist hedge funds target undervalued firms and can discipline 
underperforming and entrenched managers. The remainder of this section discusses these 
central findings more directly and suggests areas for future research. Summary of key 
findings is presented in Table 17 at the end of Section 6.1.
6.1 Discussion of central findings
Univariate tests
Univariate tests provide preliminary support for several hypotheses presented in Section 3.1. 
Most prominent results of the univariate tests relate to firm-specific valuation measures. 
Decomposing Tobin’s q into industry and firm-specific components reveals that abnormal q is 
both negative and significantly smaller for targets than nontargets. However, 1 do not find 
robust differences in industry q between activist hedge fund targets and control firms. This 
evidence lends support for the undervaluation hypothesis. Brav et al. (2006) do not use similar 
decomposition but find that targets have significantly lower Tobin’s q values than their 
control firms.
The results also support the inefficient management hypothesis as activist hedge fund targets 
fare significantly worse than control firms in terms of prior stock price performance. This 
finding is in contrast to previous evidence which does not find significant differences in share 
price performance between activist targets and nontargets (Brav et al. 2006, Klein and Zur 
2006). Interestingly, univariate tests provide only moderate support for the free cash flow 
hypothesis since the differences in free cash flow between targets and nontargets are only 
significant in the mean. However, target firms appear to possess significantly lower growth 
opportunities when measured with sales growth. This suggests that even though target firms 
do not appear to retain substantially higher free cash flows, they certainly do so given their 
future investment opportunities. In comparison to previous studies, Brav et al. (2006) find 
significantly higher mean and median cash flows for target firms, but no differences in sales 
growth. Klein and Zur (2006), on the other hand, do not find differences in return on assets 
between targets and nontargets. These differences may be partially explained with the fact 
that both Brav et al. (2006) and Klein and Zur (2006) use market/book matched control firms.
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I find no differences in cash holdings or debt levels between targets and nontargets, but this 
may simply be a market/book effect, too. These results are in line with Klein and Zur (2006) 
who find no differences in cash holdings between targets and market/book matched control 
firms. In contrast, Brav et al. (2006) find that targets have significantly less cash and higher 
leverage than control firms. With regard to diversification, targets have more business 
segments than nontargets, but the differences are only significant in the mean. This finding is 
in line with Brav et al. (2006) who show that targets are more diversified than control firms 
when measured with the Herfindahl-index. I also show that that target firms have somewhat 
lower insider ownership and significantly higher institutional ownership than nontargets. 
Targets also appear to be of smaller size when measured with market capitalisation. Neither 
Brav et al. (2006) nor Klein and Zur (2006) examine how insider ownership differs between 
activist hedge fund targets and control firms, but in line with my results, Brav et al. (2006) 
show that targets have significantly higher institutional ownership. Brav et al. (2006) also 
show that targets are significantly smaller in size.
Logistic regressions
The most important contribution of this thesis relates to the undervaluation hypothesis. To 
date, there is no research on the relation between undervaluation and the probability of hedge 
fund activism. For example, although Klein and Zur (2006) analyse the determinants of hedge 
fund activism, their control group does not allow them to examine the effects of Tobin’s q on 
targeting probability. Brav et al. (2006) only perform univariate tests in order to examine how 
the characteristics of activist hedge fund targets differ from other firms and find that targets 
have lower Tobin’s q values, but do not examine how it affects the targeting likelihood. In 
addition, this thesis uses a novel approach introduced by Ang and Chen (2006) and 
decomposes Tobin’s q into firm-specific and industry-specific components, which mitigates 
the problems arising from alternative interpretations for Tobin’s q and removes the effects 
that are time period or industry-specific.
The main finding of this thesis is that undervalued firms (when measured with abnormal q, 
the firm-specific component) are significantly more likely to be targeted by activist hedge 
funds suggesting that an important motive for hedge funds to engage in activism appears to be 
target undervaluation. This result is robust to different model specifications, different sets of 
control firms, and also holds in the case where logistics regressions are performed for 
different subsamples based on activism type. With regard to industry-specific measure, the
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results indicate that firms that come from industries with low Tobin’s q values are 
significantly more likely to be targeted by activist hedge funds. Together these results suggest 
that activist hedge fund look for companies from undervalued or underperforming industries 
and that are severely undervalued compared to industry peers. These results are consistent 
with empirical evidence from takeovers that low Tobin’s q and firm-specific misvaluation 
increase targeting likelihood (see, e.g. Ang and Chen 2006, Rhodes-Kropf et al. 2005, 
Hasbrouck 1985, Servaes 1991).
The logistic regression also show that activist hedge funds are more likely to target firms with 
substantial free cash flow suggesting that activist hedge fund are motivated by the possibility 
to reduce agency problems and thus create shareholder value. This result is robust to different 
model specifications, variable specifications, and control groups. This result is also in line 
with Klein and Zur (2006) who show that targeting probability is positively related to return 
on assets and with Jensen’s (1986) free cash flow theory. Furthermore, the fact that sales 
growth is significantly negatively related to targeting probability provides corroborating 
evidence in support of the free cash flow hypothesis. These results compare to Lehn and 
Poulsen (1989) and Opier and Titman (1993) indicating that, at least to some extent, activist 
hedge funds have similar motives than private equity firms contemplating LBOs.
I also present new evidence supporting the hypothesis that entrenched insiders deter hedge 
fund activism since high insider ownership is associated with low targeting probability. 
Neither Brav et al. (2006) nor Klein and Zur (2006) examine how insider ownership affects 
targeting likelihood, but the results are largely consistent with the literature covering 
takeovers (McConnel and Servaes 1990), proxy fights (Dann and DeAngelo 1988), and 
activist block purchases (Bethel et al. 1998). An alternative argument would be that firms 
with high insider ownership are better run and thus less likely to experience hedge fund 
activism.
The results of logit regressions are largely inconsistent with the inefficient management 
hypothesis since the coefficients for net-of-market return are consistently insignificantly 
different from zero after controlling for Tobin’s q. This indicates that pre-targeting 
performance does not robustly affect targeting likelihood, which is surprising since targets 
significantly underperform control firms in the year before targeting. However, this result is 
in line with Karpoff et al. (1996) who show that even though firms receiving shareholder 
proposals underperform the market, pre-targeting performance does not affect targeting
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likelihood. Faleye (2004) examines the determinants of proxy fight in 1989-2000 and reports 
similar results. It may be that the target firm underperformance is correlated with some other 
factors that are more decisive in predicting hedge fund activism.
In addition, I document a positive relation between institutional shareholdings and targeting 
probability, which is consistent with the hypothesis that large shareholders mitigate the free­
rider problem (Shleifer and Vishny 1986). Finally, I show that high market capitalisation 
deters activist hedge funds, which is consistent with the wealth constraints and idiosyncratic 
risk hypotheses that suggest that activist hedge funds are less likely to target large companies 
because accumulating at least a 5% stake in such firms requires too much capital and 
introduces too much idiosyncratic risk on their portfolios.
Cumulative abnormal returns
I find strong support for the hypothesis that hedge fund activism creates shareholder value. 
Target firm shareholders gain on average 9.23% during a 101-day event window. The finding 
that over 60% of targets experience positive CARs lends further support for the hypothesis 
that hedge fund activism is value increasing. When a [-20, 20] window is used, the total CAR 
is 8.10% and the fraction of firms that earn positive returns is 65%. These results are 
somewhat higher than those obtained by Brav et al. (2006) who report CAR of 6.8% during 
an event windows of [-20, 20] days. Klein and Zur (2006) show that targets earn a return of 
10.3% during a [-30, 30] day event window, but they use raw returns, which naturally makes 
their estimates higher. The higher returns documented in this thesis arise due to the fact that I 
use data from a longer period of time and the returns in earlier years are higher.
This thesis extends existing literature by documenting cross-sectional differences in returns 
from hedge fund activism over time. The data show a significant decline in returns between 
2000 and 2006: CARs over the 101-day event window are statistically significantly higher in 
2000 (19.27%), 2001 (24.25%), and 2003 (22.83%) than in 2002 (5.80%), 2004 (4.33%), 
2005 (7.84%), and 2006 (2.59%). Furthermore, the CARs in 2004 and 2006 are 
insignificantly different from zero. The pattern of returns over the longer event window can 
be explained by Bradley et al.’s (1988) diminishing returns hypothesis where the increase in 
the number of targeted firms and competing activist hedge funds drive down returns. The 
results are also consistent with the hypothesis that investors increasingly anticipate hedge 
fund activism. The returns on the 13D filing date are in turn higher and significantly positive 
in 2003 (3.04%), 2005 (1.48%), and 2006 (0.94%) while in 2000, 2001, 2002, and 2004 the
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returns are insignificantly different from zero. The pattern of returns on the 13D filing date is 
consistent with the hypothesis that hedge fund activism has attracted an increasing amount of 
attention from the financial press and investors making the share prices reflect expected 
wealth effects more promptly.
The cross-sectional analysis of cumulative abnormal returns also reveals that there are 
significant differences in returns that could have been made by buying shares in firms subject 
to 13D filings by activist hedge funds at the end of the 13D filing date. The post­
announcement returns over the [1, 50] day window are statistically significantly lower in 
2004-2006 compared to 2000-2003. While this strategy has yielded significantly positive 
abnormal returns in 2000 (13.30%), 2001 (11.68%), 2003 (9.66%), the returns in 2002 
(3.13%), 2004 (0.84%), 2005 (0.94%), and 2006 (-0.68%) are insignificantly different from 
zero. This indicates that investors tracking activist hedge fund purchases have been able to 
make abnormal gains in 2000, 2001, and 2003 but realised no profits in 2002, 2004, 2005, and 
2006.
The data also show that although hedge fund activism is generally associated with increases in 
shareholder value, this finding does not hold for all types of activism. I show that activism 
generating significantly positive returns includes events where activist hedge funds demand 
sale of the target firm (mean cumulative abnormal return associated with this type of activism 
during a 101-day period around the 13D filing date is 8.66%), propose changes in corporate 
governance (8.40%), recommend improvements in strategy (9.05%), and generally try to 
increase shareholder value (7.74%). The evidence with regard to events where activist hedge 
funds oppose pending M&A deals (10.26%) is less clear and suffers from the fact that the 
longer event periods might include the pending M&A deal announcement and corresponding 
returns. Similarly, returns associated with events where hedge funds are willing to provide 
financing to target firms (36.93%) are not robust as the number of such cases in the sample is 
only two. Finally, 1 show that activism related to changing the target firm’s capital structure (- 
5.90%) is associated with negative abnormal returns. These findings are comparable to Brav 
et al. (2006) who also study the cross-section of abnormal returns between different activism 
types in 2005-2006 with the exception that they do not find significantly positive returns in 
the case of corporate governance related activism. Furthermore, in Brav et al.’s (2006) paper, 
CARs associated with capital structure targeting are not negative but insignificantly different 
from zero. However, as I show, these results do not persist in a multivariate setting.
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Sources of shareholder gains
This thesis is also the first paper to examine the sources of gains from hedge fund activism by 
examining the relations between CARs and target firm characteristics. The findings from the 
OLS regressions of cumulative abnormal returns on firm characteristics support the results 
obtained from multivariate logit analysis. After controlling for cross-sectional variation in 
returns over time and between activism types, I find that CAR is negatively related to 
abnormal q supporting the view that markets recognise that activist hedge funds are able to 
spot undervalued firms. However, the coefficient for abnormal q looses its significance when 
shorter than 101 -day holding periods are used, but the coefficient for industry q turns negative 
instead, suggesting that the market focuses on industry valuation levels rather than firm- 
specific valuation close to the 13D filing date. This result is consistent with Lang et al. (1989) 
and Servaes (1991) who document a negative relation between Tobin’s q and gains from 
takeovers.
CAR is negatively related to pre-targeting performance. This result is robust to different 
holding period returns around the 13D filing date. This evidence supports the view that 
activist hedge funds can discipline underperforming managers. CARs are positively related to 
free cash flow and cash. This evidence is in line with Lehn and Poulsen (1989) who find that 
LBO premium is positively related to free cash flow and Faleye (2004) who shows that CARs 
associated with proxy fights are positively related to excess cash. However, the results are 
somewhat inconsistent when returns are calculated over different holding periods. CAR is 
also negatively related to insider ownership suggesting that insiders deter changes, as well as 
manage their firms better as suggested by Dann and DeAngelo (1988), Stulz (1988), and 
Denis (1990).
This thesis also examines the effects of targeting year and activism type on cumulative 
abnormal returns in multivariate setting. After controlling for firm characteristics, returns 
from hedge fund activism show a declining trend from 2000 to 2006, but the results are 
generally insignificant. More importantly, the cross-sectional differences in returns from 
hedge fund activism between activism types all but disappear in multivariate OLS 
regressions, although there seems to be a weak relation between CARs and some types of 
activism. The evidence casts doubt on the univariate results regarding the relations between 
shareholder gains and types of activism obtained in Brav et al. (2006) and in this thesis.
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* Table 17: Summary of findings on determinants of hedge fund activism and sources of shareholder gains
Expected signs
Targeting Shareholder
Hypothesis Variable probability gains
HI Net-of-market return Negative Negative
H2 Free cash flow Positive Positive
H3 Sales growth Negative Negative
114 Cash ratio Positive Positive
H5 Debt ratio Negative Negative
H6 Diversification Positive Positive
H7
Tobin's q, Industry q, 
Abnormal q
Negative Negative
H8 Insider ownership Negative Negative






Logistic regressions: What factors 
affect targeting likelihood?_____
Weak support. Sign as expected but
no significant effects on targeting 
probability after controlling for 
Tobin's q.
Strong evidence. Firms with high 
free cash flow significandy more 
likely to be targeted by activist 
hedge funds.
Strong support. Low growth firms 
significandy more likely to be 
targeted.
Weak support. Sign as expected but 
significant effects on targeting 
probability only in some logit 
specifications and for some 
subsamples.
No support. Sign as expected but 
no significant relation between 
targeting probability.
Very weak evidence. Sign as 
expected but significant effects on 
targeting probability only in some 
logit specifications.
Strong evidence. Firms with low 
Tobin's q, Abnormal q and 
Industry q significantly more likely 
to be targeted by activist hedge 
funds.
Strong support. High insider 
ownership deters activist hedge 
funds as negative and significant 
coefficient in all specifications. 
Strong support. Institutional 
ownership significandy positively 
related to targeting likelihood in all 
logit specifications.
Strong support. Activist hedge 
funds avoid firms with high market 
capitalisation as negative and 
significant coefficients in all 
regressions.
OLS regressions: What factors 
affect shareholder gains? 
Strong evidence as poorly
performing firms experience 
significandy higher CARs on all 
holding periods from 101 to 0 days.
Moderate support. 101 and 41-day 
CARs significandy positively 
related to free cash flow.
Inconsistent results. Generally no 
significant relation between CARs, 
but positively related to 13D filing 
date return.
Moderate support. Cash holdings 
significandy positively related only 
to 101-day event window returns.
Mixed results. Inconsistent signs in 
OLS regressions.
No support. No relation between 
diversification and CARs. Sign of 
the coefficient inconsistent across 
regressions.
Moderate support. 101-day CAR 
significandy negatively related to 
abnormal q. 5-day CAR 
significandy related to industry q.
Moderate support. 101 and 41-day 
CARs significandy negatively 
related to insider ownership.
Support, but results not reported 
due to low number of observations.
No support. Sign as expected but 
not market capitalisation not 
significantly related to CARs.
6.2 Directions for future research
My results also raise important questions for future research. The first potential area for 
further empirical examination relates to changes that take place in target firms after the 13D 
filing date. The results of this thesis indicate that the market believes that hedge fund activism 
is value increasing. Therefore, it would be interesting to examine what changes are 
undertaken by target firms that would explain the positive abnormal returns associated with 
hedge fund activism. For example, does the operating performance of target firms improve
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after targeting? Do target firms experience increased M&A activity, higher top management 
turnover, or above average payouts of excess cash to shareholders?
The second important area not examined in this thesis is the long-run performance of activist 
hedge fund targets. Many critics argue that activist hedge funds are motivated by short-term 
gains at the expense long-run performance. It would be interesting to examine whether the 
positive effects of hedge fund activism on target firm value in the short-run can persist in the 
long-run as well. Moreover, it would be interesting to learn whether there is a correlation 
between long-run post-targeting performance and the above mentioned post-targeting 
changes. It is too early in the cycle to examine the long-run performance of target firms as 
majority of target firms were targeted less than two years ago.
The third area that could prove to be an interesting topic for future research relates to 
diminishing returns from hedge fund activism. This thesis documents that returns from hedge 
fund activism have decreased significantly over time. This raises two obvious questions. First, 
will returns from hedge fund activism decrease even further as the number hedge funds and 
capital pursuing activist strategies increase? Second, if returns from hedge fund activism 
decline to a point where it is no longer profitable for hedge funds to engage in activism as 
suggested by the insignificant returns in 2006, then what will be the volume of such events in 
the future? It may well be that hedge fund activism proves to be a passing phenomenon.
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